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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this present study is to identify and 
evaluate obstacles in the way of liberalising banking and 
insurance services in the EC area. Two countries are 
used as cases for this purpose: the UK and Greece.
The UK cases represent the barriers to freedom of 
financial services in the developed EC countries while 
the Greek cases represent those of the developing EC 
countries. The distinction between developed and
developing countries is considered as necessary since the 
rationales that exist for erecting barriers to freedom of 
financial services seem to vary according to the level of 
development. In the developed countries protectionist
measures are imposed to safeguard the interests of the 
consumers, while in the developing countries the placing 
of strict barriers to trade in international financial
services is used mainly as support for protection of the 
domestic financial sector and financial protectionism.
In the UK case studies barriers in the way of
liberalising banking and insurance services are 
identified and evaluated in the light of the divergence 
of supervisory philosophies and practices between the UK 
and the continental European countries. The UK
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authorities have adopted a flexible supervisory system 
which is considered by the other European countries as 
one that moves in a direction inconsistent with the 
objective of preserving the integrity of the financial 
system. In the Greek case studies the analysis suggests 
that the unification of the European financial sectors 
would have detrimental effects not only on the domestic 
financial sector but also on the whole economy. The 
authorities would find it very difficult to accept a 
measure which would bring about complete freedom of 
competition, particularly within the timescale set by the 
EC Commission - ie the end of 1992.
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
The present study is concerned with the attempts of the 
Member States of the EC to achieve their declared aim of 
a Common Market in financial services by the end of 1992. 
Its scope is to identify and evaluate protective barriers 
to intra-EC trade in financial services -banking and 
insurance - and examine the potential for their 
elimination in the foreseeable future. The study 
explores the obstacles to be overcome in the search for 
financial integration, the conditions necessary to enable 
progress towards it to be made, and the strengths and 
weaknesses of different types of strategies intended to 
hasten its achievement.
The subject of financial services has been given 
attention from the early years of European integration. 
Interest in this subject has been renewed recently after 
the Member States were assigned the task of creating one 
Common Market for financial services from the current 
twelve separate national ones. The Commission's White 
Paper published in 1985 commits the Community to 
realizing by 1992 a truly single market not only for 
goods but also for services including services of 
financial institutions. The financial industry is vast 
and immensely important in terms of the services it
provides, the funds it makes available for investment, 
the people it employs and the general impact it has on 
economies. It is one of the largest industries in the 
world.
The study is divided into two parts. Part 1 refers to 
banking and Part 2 to insurance? and both follow the 
same form. The first chapters of both parts give 
general surveys of the moves towards a Common Market 
in banking and insurance respectively. The Community 
is developing a strategy based on the Treaty of Rome 
and the White Paper for the completion of the 
internal market. The aim of these chapters is to outline 
the Commission's strategy for the banking and insurance 
sectors and highlight their philosophy shaping its 
actions. Whether this strategy will be successful is 
discussed with reference to two EC countries: the UK and
Greece.
Obviously, the obstacles to freedom of financial services 
relate to the conditions under which a financial 
organization can conduct business in a given country or 
with residents of the country concerned. These 
conditions are determined by a host of elements such as 
regulatory provisions and administrative practices 
relating to the conduct of business. Accordingly, in the 
first sections of the case studies the analysis focuses
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on existing restraints arising from government 
regulations, policies and administrative practices, on 
assessing the relative importance of such impediments and 
on providing the rationales for their existence.
The analysis of the rationales that exist for 
instituting protectionist measures against the entry, 
establishment and market access of financial 
institutions, indicates that these vary considerably 
from country to country. In the developed countries 
restrictions are imposed in the light of prudential 
considerations - ie. to protect domestic consumers 
from the consequences of a "bad buy". In the developing 
countries the placing of strict limits mainly stems from 
the desire to protect the domestic capital market, the 
sophistication and development of which lags behind. The 
choice of the two countries is therefore not haphazard. 
The UK case demonstrates the barriers to freedom of 
financial services in the developed EC countries while 
the Greek case presents those of the developing EC 
countries. Each has, however, unique elements.
In the UK case studies special sections are devoted to 
the impact of financial integration on the British 
economy in order to anticipate the British attitudes 
towards the various aspects of the integration process. 
The discussion is broadened by presenting the
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difficulties in the way of harmonizing the existing 
approaches of prudential supervision. Since the 
completion of the internal market for financial services 
can take place only through a narrowing of differences in 
supervisors' policies, barriers to freedom of financial 
services are identified and evaluated in the light of the 
divergence of supervisory philosophies and practices 
between the UK and the continental European countries. 
Another objective emerged when assessing the large 
difference in practical and philosophical approaches to 
prudential supervision, namely the need to identify 
factors behind its existence. These factors relate to 
the various political forces and pressure groups policies 
which would possible affect the integration process.
In the Greek case studies the objective has been to 
identify the point where a country strikes a balance of 
costs and benefits of an open-door policy in the 
financial sector. Indigenous financial organizations may 
be seen as not being sufficiently equipped to withstand 
competition from more sophisticated foreign institutions. 
In a developing country the domestic capital market plays 
a special role in the attainment of national 
macroeconomic goals and a foreign presence affects the 
competitive balance in the national financial system, 
while changes in the latter may not be considered to be 
desirable.
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The study is an attempt to look into the future and 
discuss the extent that a Common Market in financial 
services will be attained in the next few years. 
However, the study is not only concerned with the 
barriers to freedom of financial services. It is also 
seen as an opportunity to examine critically the 
Commission's strategy in the financial field and make 
some policy recommendations.
The existing literature reveals areas of considerable 
uncertainty over a wide range of technical matters which 
are covered by the present study. However, the author 
found a number of experts to discuss these matters and in 
many cases he was allowed access to internal working 
documents.
My indebtedness to those who have in one way or another 
helped in producing this study is extensive. It 
includes my supervisors Dr Paul Taylor and Mr Alan 
Marin, who went through successive drafts of this 
work with great patience and who made so many useful 
suggestions for improvement. To all those unnamed 
officials actively involved in the European and National 
policy making in Brussels, London and Athens who were 
kind enough to respond to my questionnaires and who 
permitted me to interview them in person, I owe many 
thanks. I also wish to express my warm gratitude to the
13
numerous individual experts in financial institutions who 
gave some of their valuable time to discuss with me many 
aspects of the state controls on the financial systems. 
My special thanks go to Mr John Young, Economic Adviser 
of Lloyds Bank; Mrs Fiona Brener, Analyst in Bank of 
England? Mr Dimitris Agelides, Director of the National 
Bank of Greece and Mr Kindley Doerr, Economic Adviser to 
Commercial Union Insurance, for the documentation they 
provided and for their stimulating comments? of course 
none of them is responsible for the arguments and 
opinions expressed in this study.
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P A R T B A N K I N G
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UNIFYING THE EUROPEAN BANKING SECTORS : EC PROPOSALS FOR 
DISMANTLING BARRIERS TO THE LIBERALISATION OF BANKING
SERVICES
16
By January 1, 1993 according to the Commission's
programme for the completion of the internal market, the 
EC will have become a single integrated market through 
which labour, capital and products will flow freely. The 
origins of the internal market programme are based on the 
Treaty of Rome and the White Paper of 1985. The Single 
European Act of 1986, which followed and which was 
ratified by all Member States, defined the internal 
market as one "without internal frontiers in which the 
free movements of goods, persons, services and capital is 
ensured" (1) . The 1992 concept in essence means the 
transformation of the EC from a fragmented to a pan-EC 
domestic market.
The financial services market is one of the most 
important individual sectors to face Commission attention 
in the internal market programme. This is not only 
because it is large (6% of Community (GDP) (2) but also 
because it plays a substantial role in the development 
of other sectors. The integration of the financial 
sectors of each Community country can build a momentum 
towards the creation of a Central Eurobank and a 
Eurocurrency. According to the Commission the logical 
next step if financial markets are unified is the 
creation of a Central Eurobank and a Eurocurrency.
The liberalization of capital movements is an 
indispensable part of financial integration since it is
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closely linked to the freedom of providing financial 
services. The elimination of all restrictions on capital 
flows will allow financial intermediaries the freedom to 
offer services throughout the EC.
As early as the 1960s the Community adopted legislation 
(3) requiring Member States to allow free movements 
of capital for direct investment, personal capital 
movements and granting and repayments of short and 
medium credits related to commercial transactions. 
However, a number of Member States made extensive use of 
the protective clauses provided for in the Treaty to 
maintain or reintroduce restrictions on capital 
movements which were in principle liberalized under
Community Law.
A major step toward capital movement liberalisation was 
taken in 1988 when the Council adopted a Directive (4) 
requiring the Member States to liberalize capital 
movements before 1992. Already three countries-
Britain, Denmark and West Germany - have no exchange
controls. The others apart from Greece, Ireland,
Portugal and Spain must comply by July 1990 and these 
four will themselves have to open up by the end of 1992 
unless severe problems arise. Obviously, the EC 
recognises the difficulties faced by these countries on 
the process of liberalizing capital movements, due to bop
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considerations. However, the Commission is hoping that 
the free flow of capital will be completed by 1992.
The creation of a Common Market in banking is a key 
element of financial integration. This implies the 
establishment of a unified market in which banks will 
have the right to establish their branches and no 
government regulation should obstruct the neutrality 
between buying financial services from a domestic bank or 
buying them domestically from a local branch of a foreign 
bank.
The Commission's proposal for a Second Banking 
Coordination Directive, published in February 1988, 
addressed itself precisely to these issues, with a series 
of proposals including the concept of a "single banking 
licence"(5). This would imply that any credit 
institution authorized in a Member State could establish 
branches and operate in any other Member State without 
the need of any other authorization. The proposal 
embodies a shift in the Commission's policy from 
imposed harmonization to mutual recognition of national 
rules and standards. The shift in the Commission's 
policy would have (if adopted) fundamental and far 
reaching effects on the Member States' regulatory 
framework.
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Before considering the proposal for the Second Banking 
Directive in detail it is necessary to outline, in 
chronological order, other relevant EC legislation which 
affects the regulation of the Community banking sector.
As early as 1973, the Council adopted a Directive (6) on 
the abolition of restrictions on the freedom of 
establishment and the freedom to provide services in 
respect of self-employed activities of banks and other 
financial institutions. However, the Directive soon 
became superfluous because the freedoms it envisaged were 
sanctioned by the Treaty of Rome itself (thereby having 
direct effect). Nevertheless the Directive is not 
totally irrelevant since it contains useful provisions 
concerning the definition of the words "banks", "banker" 
and other equivalent terms. This proved to be the 
starting point on the long road towards an integrated 
European Market in banking.
However, the abolition of restrictions on the 
freedom of establishment and on the freedom to provide 
services is a necessary but not adequate precondition for 
the establishment of a Common Market. Requirements and 
regulations which are appropriate to the domestic banks 
may prove particularly onerous when applied in the same 
form to a foreign bank. For instance, one of the 
conditions relating to taking up business is a minimum
20
capital. This would mean that a credit institution 
wishing to set up in all twelve countries would have to 
multiply its minimum capital by twelve. This would 
constitute a clear discrimination to such an institution, 
compared with another institution wishing to operate 
only in its country of origin by the creation of twelve 
branches - ie. with similar territorial expansion. 
Obviously, the mere fact of treating a banking 
institution from another Member State in the same way as 
a domestic institution could not ensure the existence 
of a Common Market.
This is also true for the requirements relating to the
pursuit of business. At the present time a credit
institution which is established in several Member
States of the Community must comply with the
different ratios in force in each Member State with some
adverse consequences from the point of view of
competitiveness when compared to an institution
established in only one country (7) . The undertaking of
banking business worldwide involves considerable "sunk"
costs that are not borne by domestic networks. According
k
to an EC official, the requirements for the regular 
returns to banking supervisory authorities vary greatly 
from one Member State to another. This is very 
inconvenient for branches operating in other Member 
States since they have to supply often widely diverging
-K ( Intci'vie^ y S\oo J 1-^  o3 )
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sets of information to the authorities of home and host 
countries. Through coordination of national regulations 
the banks would be able to provide output from a single 
data base which can be used simultaneously for the 
regular returns to the various national authorities.
Some progress towards coordination has been made with the 
First Council Directive (8) of 1977 on the coordination 
of laws, regulations and administrative provisions 
relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of 
credit institutions. Indeed, the Directive recognizes 
that in order to make it easier to take up and pursue the 
business of credit institutions, it is necessary to 
eliminate the obstructive differences between the laws of 
the Member States as regards the rules to which these 
institutions are subject. However, the Directive lays 
down a series of principles rather than specific rules. 
Given the extent of the differences between the national 
laws, the conditions required for a common market could 
not be created by means of a single Directive.
The Directive laid down the principle that a credit 
institution should receive prior authorization before 
commencing its activities. It also set out some 
requirements which were made compulsory. These are 
related to the existence of adequate funds, the 
submission of a programme of operation and the existence
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of at least two persons (the so-called "four eyes 
principle") who effectively direct the business. These 
requirements are not comprehensive and they are rather 
vague, while individual Member States may impose 
additional requirements.
Even more important is the fact that some Member States 
may continue to apply the criterion of the economic need 
as a condition for the entry into the Market. If the 
application for authorization is examined in terms of the 
economic needs of the market, it means that the
responsible supervisory authority may refuse an 
authorization on the grounds that there are already 
enough banks to service the area where the new
institution wishes to establish itself. The operation of 
a new institution in this area may create excessive
competition undermining the viability of some
institutions and the security provided to the depositors.
According to the Directive the criterion of economic need 
shall be applied only on the basis of general 
predetermined criteria aimed at promoting: a) security
of savings, b) higher productivity in the banking system, 
c) greater uniformity of competition between the various 
banking networks and d) a broader range of banking 
services in relation to population and economic activity. 
However, the assessment of economic need is largely 
discretionary. And the Commission considered the
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elimination of the condition by 1989.
The Directive introduces certain elements of flexibility. 
One element of flexibility is that prior authorization 
(which is compulsory for the establishment of any new 
institution) is not necessary in the host country. 
Another element of flexibility is that a branch can be 
established in another Member State in the legal form 
accepted in the home country.
Obviously, the Directive provides for some harmonization 
of the national laws relating to the entry and 
establishment of banking institutions. However, this is 
not the case with respect to national laws relating to 
the pursuit of business.
The national supervisory authorities set out specific 
prudential controls in order to ensure the viability of 
the individual banks and to protect the interest of the 
depositors. A harmonization of these controls is the only 
means by which to open the possibility for a true and 
proper right of establishment and free provision, of 
services for banks in all the Member States. The 
Directive does not really provide for the harmonization 
of these controls. Instead, it sets out a procedure 
which would progressively lead to a degree of
24
approximation of these controls.
In these respects the Directive provides that the 
authorities for the purposes of observation shall 
establish ratios between the various assets and 
liabilities of credit institutions with a view to 
monitoring their solvency and liquidity and the other 
measures which may serve to ensure that savings are 
protected. The Advisory Committee (set up by the 
Directive) has been charged with deciding on the content 
of the various factors of these ratios. However, the 
various calculations should be made for observation 
purposes only and the compulsory ratios in force in the 
various Member States would not be affected. The 
Advisory Committee may make suggestions to the Commission 
with a view to coordinate the prudential ratios applied 
in the different EC countries.
Other provisions of the Directive deal with cooperation 
between supervisory authorities. The Directive provides 
that the competent authorities of the Member States 
concerned shall collaborate closely in order to supervise 
the activities of credit institutions operating in 
several Member States in order to facilitate the 
supervision of the solvency and liquidity.
The main task of the promotion of close cooperation
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between national authorities is monitoring the activities 
of foreign banks in their own territories. The 
Commission has provided a forum over the years in which 
supervisors can learn of each others techniques and 
experience and hear of problems which may be emerging in 
different national systems which could be of wider 
concern. The Commission believes that it is particularly 
valuable in establishing close personal contacts between 
supervisors in different countries - relationships which 
in a number of cases facilitate rapid and effective 
cooperation between the authorities concerned when banks 
operating within their respective jurisdictions 
experience problems. National systems have grown up with 
different traditions: some with detailed statutory
arrangements, others with more informal and flexible 
supervisory frameworks? some have comprehensive 
examination procedures, others do not. In practice, 
however, Member States have to learn much from each other 
and this mutual learning process may well over time 
produce some convergence between national supervisory 
systems.
The Directive contains provisions with respect to 
branches of institutions having their head office in a 
non-Member State. According to these provisions in no 
circumstances can an institution from a non-Member State 
receive more favourable treatment than that accorded to
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branches of credit institutions having their head office 
in the Community. Furthermore, the EC may conclude
agreements with one or more third countries to apply 
provisions which, on the basis of the principle of
reciprocity, accord to branches of a credit institutions 
having its head office outside the Community identical 
treatment through the territory of the Community. These 
provisions are considered as the first step towards a 
Common Community policy with respect to the setting up of 
branches by banks from non-Member States.
Other provisions of the Directive deal with the causes of 
the withdrawal of an authorization. However, given the 
importance of these regulations within the national
banking laws, these provisions can be considered as 
almost negligible steps towards harmonization.
The Directive can be considered as the first step forward 
in the coordination of supervisory regulations which is a 
necessary precondition for the creation of a Common 
Market in banking. It provided for coordination with 
respect to the requirements concerning entry into, and 
establishment in, the market? it set an institutional
cooperation among the national supervisory authorities? 
and it made a move toward a common policy vis-a-vis third 
countries.
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However, it is fair to say that this first step was 
rather compromising. Branches of credit institutions 
originally established in other Member States were still 
subject to local authorization requirements. The 
national supervisory authorities were granted significant 
discretionary powers to apply to the entry and 
establishment of these branches the administrative 
provisions and regulatory practices governing the entry 
and establishment of indigenous banks. Furthermore, the 
Directive did very little to eliminate the significant 
disparities between national requirements regulating the 
establishment of crossborder branches of credit 
institutions authorized in other Member States. The 
practical effect of the first Directive was therefore to 
affirm the right of banks originally established in 
one Member State to open branches in other Member States 
but always under the same conditions and controls as 
those applying to the indigenous banks.
Of significant importance in this respect would be the 
requirement in the case of a branch, to have "own funds", 
as if it were a bank incorporated locally. In addition, 
products which are sold by the branch in the domestic 
market must comply with the requirements in force in the 
country where this branch operates.
The realization of a Common Market in banking requires
28
the harmonization of banking laws and regulations. 
Obviously, this objective cannot be implemented in the 
short-run. It is a long term goal which has to be 
achieved by stages. The establishment of the principle 
of supervision on a consolidated basis is one such stage.
The concept means that the supervisors of the country of 
origin will monitor banks which have their head office in 
their territory as well as branch operation in other 
countries. The principle of consolidated supervision has 
an important advantage for the supervisors since they 
would be able to supervise the global operation of the 
banks. If the powers of the supervisory authorities ended 
at national frontiers they would be unable to fulfil 
their control function properly in a world where banking 
is becoming increasingly international (9) . Even more 
important is the fact that the eventual aim of the 
adoption of this principle is to provide for overall 
supervision of a credit institution operating in several 
Member States by the competent authorities in the Member 
States where its head office is situated, so that 
distortion of competition between such credit 
institutions and the domestic banking institutions of 
their host countries is avoided.
In this respect, the Council adopted a Directive (10) in 
1983 on the supervision of credit institutions on a
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consolidated basis. The Directive can be considered as 
the next step forward from the first Coordination 
Directive. It provides that banking institutions that 
have a majority holding (more than 50%) in other credit 
or financial institutions, shall be subject to 
supervision on the basis of the consolidation of their 
financial holdings with those of the other credit or 
financial institutions concerned. Where a credit 
institution has a participation of 50% or less in another 
credit or financial institution and a situation of 
effective control exists, it shall be for the relevant 
Member States or competent authorities to determine the 
method of consolidation.
Supervision on a consolidated basis is only required 
where a credit institution is the head of a group or sub­
groups. Furthermore, the Directive left a great deal of 
discretion to the competent authorities to determine the 
consolidation techniques. Since the harmonization of 
these techniques would be very difficult to be achieved 
the Directive is concerned solely with the establishment 
of the basic principle of supervision on a consolidated 
basis. In this respect the Directive requires Member 
States to eliminate any obstacle to the flow of 
information across national borders which is necessary 
for consolidation to be effected.
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In itself, this Directive is a relatively simple affair, 
but it illustrates the increasing willingness of the 
Community to eliminate the technical and philosophical 
differences of the Member States and take a specific 
coordinated action in the financial sphere - an area 
where only modest common progress has been made.
The First Banking Coordination Directive set minimum 
requirements for the initial authorization of credit 
institutions; but there were insufficiently precise and 
left Member States free to impose stricter provisions if 
they wished. Barriers to entry and establishment of 
banking institutions to other EC countries continued to 
remain substantial.
One of the main reasons for the lack of progress was the 
feeling that freedom of establishment and freedom to 
supply services across borders could not safely be 
granted without first carrying out a thorough 
harmonization of the laws and regulations governing the 
provision of the service in question (11). According to 
an EC official some Member States that were reluctant 
about operating in an open banking market adopted 
delaying practices. By 1985 it was time to make a fresh 
start, and it came from Lord Cockfield, the senior 
British member of the Commission. Lord Cockfield's White 
Paper, "Completing the internal market", shifted the
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emphasis away from thorough harmonization of regulatory 
systems towards the principle of home country control on 
the basis of the mutual recognition by EC Member States
however, a minimum harmonization is considered necessary 
to make the principle of mutual harmonization acceptable.
One of the great motivating forces behind the completion 
of the internal market is the widespread belief that 
freedom of competition within the EC will benefit both 
the banking industry and its customers. "The consumer is 
one area", said the White Paper, "will have access to the 
full range of banking services available in all Member 
States" (13) . He would be able to choose the best deal 
to meet his specific needs or requirements. According to
the Commission, liberalization of banking services, as in 
the case of trade, will increase the welfare of EC 
citizens.
The Commission believes that liberalization of the 
banking sector will stimulate competition in that sector 
and will lead to a better allocation of resources. The 
resulting rationalizations and increased competitiveness 
at the EC level would provide EC banking institutions 
with considerable advantage in exporting their services 
outside the Community to the rest of the world. The move 
towards a Common Market in banking services implies
of each others' systems (12) . On the other hand
ntei-v»eu>
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unprecedented opportunities for this sector. No European 
country on its own will be able to compete in the 1990s 
and beyond with the giant resources of Japan and the US. 
If the European organizations take advantage of a single 
European market of 320 million people, they will be able 
to compete effectively with their rivals in the non-EC 
countries. The awareness in the Member States that the 
European companies would have a unique opportunity to 
expand and increase their potential strength in what will 
be the world's largest single market was one of the main 
driving forces behind the Member States' commitment to 
create a Common Market in financial services.
The basic issues concerning the EC policy towards the
banking sector are contained in the proposal for a Second
Council Directive (14) on the coordination of laws,
regulations and provision relating to the taking-up and
pursuit of the business of credit institutions ("the
Second Banking Coordination Directive") submitted by
the Commission to the Council in February 1988.
*
According to the Commission this Directive is to 
constitute an instrument which is essential for 
achieving the internal market, a course determined by 
the Single European Act and set out in timetable form 
in the Commission's White Paper, from the point of 
view of both the freedom of establishment and the 
freedom to provide financial services in the field of
¥ C , G  *~V|Nvt £S\OV\ J 3«»e 1383)
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banking institutions.
The principal aims of the Second Directive are as 
follows:
1) To remove the barriers to entry and establishment
of banking organizations to other EC Member States.
2) To harmonize licencing conditions since the central
concept of a Common Market is the principle that a 
credit institution licensed to pursue banking 
business in one Member State must be free to engage 
in the same activity in any other Member State.
3) To promote the cooperation between national
supervisory authorities.
Each of these objectives are considered in turn.
A. FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT AND FREEDOM TO PROVIDE 
SERVICES THROUGHOUT THE EC
The Second Banking Coordination Directive provides that 
any banking organization established in any Member State 
of the EC will be allowed to open branches in all the 
others and its operation will be governed by the 
supervisory authorities of the country where the head 
office is situated. This is the adoption of the 
principle of "home country control".
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At present the entry and establishment of foreign banking 
organizations to national markets are subject to 
authorization by the host supervisory authorities and 
this is considered as an important barrier to freedom of 
establishment in the banking sector. In most Member 
States, branches of foreign banks are required to have 
"own funds" or "endowment capital" as if they were new 
banks incorporated in that country. Obviously, this 
requirement even if it is appropriate to the local banks 
may prove particularly onerous when applied in the same 
form to a foreign bank since the latter should comply 
with solvency requirements in its home country. And such 
an uneven impact is considered as a form of 
discrimination.
In addition, the requirement that the operation of 
foreign banking institutions in the host country is 
governed by the regulatory authorities of this country 
imposes limits on the range of activities the branch 
could pursue. Today various restrictions exist in 
different Member States with respect to the type and 
range of services banks are allowed to offer and this is 
considered to constitute a serious obstacle on freedom to 
supply services.
The Second (draft) Banking Coordination Directive is
35
precisely designed to eliminate the above restrictions.
According to the Second Banking Coordination Directive 
any institution seeking to establish a branch in another 
Member State will be required to give notification to the 
competent authority of its home Member State of its 
intention and also provide it with certain prescribed 
informations such as a programme of operations setting 
out inter alia the types of business envisaged and the 
structural organization of the establishment, the amount 
of own funds and the solvency ratio of the credit 
institution and the names of those responsible for 
controlling the activities of the branch. The above 
information is necessary for the home supervisory 
authority to exercise effective control.
Unless the home supervisory authorities doubt the 
adequacy of the organizational structure of the credit 
institution taking into account the envisaged operations, 
they should transmit the notification to the host 
supervisory authorities. If the home authorities refuse 
to send the notification to the host authorities they 
must give reasons for their refusal to the respective 
institution within three months of receipt of the 
notification. Any such refusal shall be subject to a 
right of appeal to the courts. This provision indicates 
that a refusal should not be discretionary. Once a
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banking organization proved that it had fulfilled the 
prescribed conditions the responsible authority had then 
to send the notification.
When notification is given to the host supervisory 
authority this cannot refuse permission to establish a 
branch and the respective institution may commence 
business upon receipt of the appropriate notice from the 
competent authority of the host Member State, or upon 
expiry of the three month notice period, whichever occurs 
first. Obviously, these provisions eliminate the 
barriers to freedom of establishment.
As far as the freedom to provide banking services is 
concerned, the Second Banking Coordination Directive will 
generally permit any banking organization established in 
one Member State to offer its services in another Member 
State. The respective bank need not be established in 
the host country, nor will it need to modify its banking 
products to comply with host financial regulations. The 
services in question must be those included in the 
relevant list of qualifying bank activities which is 
annexed to the respective Directive and which includes 
the following: deposit taking and other forms of
borrowing; lending including in particular consumer 
credit, mortgage lending, factoring and invoice 
discounting and trade finance (including forfeiting);
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financial leasing? money transmission services? credit 
cards, traveller's cheques and banker's drafts? 
guarantees and commitments? money market instruments? 
foreign exchange? financial futures and options? exchange 
and interest rate instruments? securities? participation 
in share issues? money broking? portfolio management and 
advice? safekeeping of securities? credit reference 
services and safe custody services. This implies that a 
bank operating in another Member State may not be able to 
conduct the same range of business as home banks in that 
country because some activities may be allowed by the 
host country regulator but not by the home country 
regulator (15).
However, the respective proposal for Directive 
recognizing the scope for potential conflict between the 
different national laws and regulations applies certain 
restrictions to this wide freedom of the provisions of 
services. These restrictions may be invoked by the host 
Member State on grounds of public good. Individual 
countries will reserve the right to place restrictions on 
banking organization in order to protect the public good. 
Since the Directive does not spell out the circumstances 
in which the public good exception may be invoked, the 
Court of Justice will have to interpret the respective 
provision.
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The Second Banking Coordination Directive also provides 
that non-banking institutions that are subsidiaries of 
banks authorised by a Member State and whose obligations 
are guaranteed by the parent bank could take advantage of 
the freedoms provided by the respective Directive if they 
provide one of the activities included in the respective 
list. In some countries banking institutions cannot 
exercise directly certain activities (for example, 
leasing or factoring) but can only do this through a 
subsidiary. The provision outlined above is designed to 
deal with this anomaly.
Broadly speaking, the Directive provides that cross- 
border branches and services of authorised credit 
institutions would be supervised by the competent 
authorities of the home Member State and is designed to 
eliminate the remaining obstacles to freedom of 
establishment and to provide services. Any bank will be 
able to establish and/or provide services in any Member 
State without the need to obtain local authorization and 
without having to modify its banking products in order to 
make them comply with the domestic regulations. This is 
certainly the case where the services in question are 
those included in the relevant "qualifying list" and the 
bank seeking to offer services is authorised to provide 
them in its home country. The "qualifying list" is very 
wide and provision is made to update it easily from time
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to time. Furthermore, as a consequence of the adoption 
of the principle of "home country control" the local 
branches of foreign banking organizations may no longer 
be required to keep minimum "own funds" on their books.
B. THE SINGLE BANKING LICENCE
After considering the freedom of establishment and to 
provide services, the importance of single authorization 
by the responsible home supervisory authorities becomes 
readily apparent. At the core of the Directive is the 
basic principle which establishes the single banking 
licence (16). The establishment of a single EC banking 
licence allows a financial institution licensed in one EC 
country to operate in all countries of the EC, foregoing 
the need for 11 additional licenses to be received under 
11 additional regulatory schemes (17). The single 
banking licence will enable the banking organizations to 
carry out a wide range of banking services provided only 
that the institution is permitted to offer such services 
in its home country.
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According to an EC official the proposal is based on the
believes that , once adopted, the Directive will 
establish the "universal bank” as the standard type of 
banking institution in Europe and finalise the trend away 
from the separation of banking business to the creation 
of one-stop shopping in financial services.
The key feature of the proposed Directive is the concept
of the single banking licence. According to an EC 
*
official this concept can be achieved only through the 
widespread acceptance of the principle of the mutual 
recognition of the national regulatory standards. One of 
the major goals of the Second Banking Coordination 
Directive is therefore to complete the essential 
harmonization of national supervisory systems and in 
particular the harmonization of licencing conditions 
which are necessary to secure the mutual recognition of 
the supervisory systems, paving the way for the single 
banking licence recognised throughout the Community.
The respective proposal for Directive introduces the 
provision that in order for banking institutions to 
obtain authorization they must as a principle have 
initial capital of at least 5 million ECUs. This 
provision is designed to ensure that EC banks that could
"universal banking" model. Indeed, the Commission
niepvi
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undertake cross-border business have sufficient capital.
Furthermore, the controls by the responsible authorities 
over ownership of a credit institution by the important 
shareholders is a key element of prudential supervision 
in banking. In this respect, the Second Banking 
Coordination Directive provides that the responsible 
authorities shall not grant authorization permitting the 
taking up of the business of a banking institution before 
they have been informed of the identity of the 
shareholders or members, whether direct or indirect, be 
they physical or legal persons, holding a qualified 
participation, and of the amount of such participation. 
The responsible supervisory authority shall appraise the 
suitability of the abovementioned shareholders or 
members.
The respective proposal for Directive also provides for 
the harmonization of the conditions relating to the 
operation banking institutions. The own funds of credit 
institutions must not fall below the initial capital 
required when they were authorized. In appropriate 
circumstances, the competent authorities may allow an 
institution a certain limited period in which to restore 
its own funds to the agreed period.
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The responsible supervisory authorities shall require 
any physical or legal person, who is considered the 
direct or indirect acquisition of a qualified 
participation in a credit institution, to first inform 
the competent authorities, telling them of the size of 
the intended participation. The abovementioned persons 
must similarly inform the competent authorities if 
they propose to increase their qualified participation 
such that the credit institution would become a 
subsidiary.
The authorities shall assess the suitability of the 
abovementioned persons. They shall require that in 
cases where these persons exercise their influence in a 
way which is likely to be to the detriment of the prudent 
and sound management of the banking activities of the 
institution, the competent authorities
shall take appropriate measures to bring such situation 
to an end. Such measures may take the form of sanctions 
against directors and managers, or suspension of 
voting rights in respects of the shares held by the 
shareholders or members in question.
Even more important is the fact that the efficient 
supervision of credit institutions requires control on 
equity participation of the respective institutions in 
non-credit and non-f inancial enterprises. It is 
considered that equity participation by a banking
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institution in a subsidiary may undermine the financial 
stability of the former if the latter runs into 
difficulties. This is the so-called contagion risk. 
Furthermore, equity participation constitute a long-term 
freezing of the assets of a banking institution something 
which might affect its ability to fulfil its commitments 
to the public.
In this respect the Second Banking Coordination Directive 
sets specific limits as to the amount of participation. 
A banking institution shall not hold a qualified 
participation of an amount greater than 10% of its own 
funds in an undertaking which is neither a credit 
institutions nor a financial institution. The total 
amount of specified participation in undertakings other 
than banking institutions or financial institutions shall 
not exceed 5 0% of the own funds of the credit 
institution. These limits may be exceeded in exceptional 
circumstances. However, in such cases the responsible 
authorities shall require the credit institution either 
to increase the volume of own funds or take other 
remedial measures.
C COOPERATION BETWEEN THE SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES OF
THE MEMBER STATES
The view is generally held that the establishment and
44
operation of a Common Market in banking require close 
cooperation between the national supervisory authorities. 
The First Banking Coordination Directive provided a 
mechanism for cooperation between the banking supervisory 
authorities by requiring those authorities to collaborate 
closely in order to supervise the activities of credit 
institutions involved in cross-border banking business. 
The Second Banking Coordination Directive tries to 
reinforce the cooperation between supervisory authorities 
by providing clear ground rules which identify the 
supervisory responsibilities of those authorities.
The respective Directive reaffirms the principle of home 
country control. A bank authorised in an Member State 
will no longer be required to seek authorization from the 
host supervisory authorities. Instead, the latter must 
allow anyone licenced in another Member State to perform 
any of a set of designated financial services. The home 
authorities shall ensure the existence within each 
institution of sound administrative and accounting 
procedures and adequate internal control mechanisms. 
These authorities shall also ensure that such procedures 
and mechanisms exist in banking institutions concerned in 
the scope of consolidated supervision.
The reciprocity provisions contained in the Second 
(draft) Banking Coordination Directive are expected to
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have important implications for non-EC banking 
institutions. The present position appears to be that 
the reciprocity provisions will not be retro-active. 
Thus all banks incorporated in a Member State by the date 
of implementation of the Directive should be able to take 
full advantage of the benefits of a single licence (18). 
The reciprocity provision applies only to subsidiaries. 
Branches of foreign banks would not be subject to any 
additional control but would not be capable of possessing 
a single licence which will be effective throughout the 
Community. Non-EC institutions which seek to establish 
an EC subsidiary or which propose to acquire a "qualified 
participation" (which effectively means a holding, direct 
or indirect in an undertaking which represents 10% or 
more in the capital voting rights or which enables the 
exercise of a significant influence in an undertaking) in 
a banking institution after the date on which the 
respective proposal for Directive comes into force will 
be subject to authorization by the relevant host 
supervisory authority. These authorities would be 
required to notify the Commission.
According to the original proposal the Commission shall 
within three months of receiving the information examine 
whether all the EC credit institutions enjoy reciprocal 
treatment in the non-EC country concerned. If the 
reciprocity is absent the Commission may suspend the
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decision of the respective Member State. The reciprocity 
provision raised substantial criticism from some Member 
States as being very rigid. In the meantime, the 
Parliament proposed that the reciprocity provisions 
should cover branches of non-EC banks as well as 
subsidiaries.
In April 1989, the Commission produced a revised proposal 
designed to make the respective provision more flexible 
and less bureaucratic. According to the revised proposal 
where EC banks do not enjoy "national treatment" (right 
comparable to local banks) the EC will take retaliatory 
measures (19). The Commission does no longer propose 
that an application should be automatically suspended on 
a case by case basis. Instead the reciprocity provision 
is used as a means of safeguarding EC access to third 
country markets. This will be done in two ways. Firstly, 
Member States shall inform the Commission whether any 
credit institutions face difficulties in establishing or 
undertaking banking activities in any third country. And 
secondly, the Commission should prepare reports 
concerning the treatment of EC banks in the non-EC 
countries. If the banks of a Member State are subject to 
discriminatory treatment, action may be taken by the 
Commission. This action may take the form of 
negotiations with the third country concerned. However, 
the practicalities of the reciprocity provisions still
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remain far from clear.
The Commission believes that the Community is one of the 
most open banking markets in the world and that in a 
highly financially interdependent world, EC banks should 
enjoy a national treatment in other world markets. Thus, 
the Commission not only focuses on the liberalization of 
financial services within the context of the Internal 
Market, it also makes a significant attempt to liberalize 
financial services worldwide as in the case in the 
negotiations in GATT for trade in services. Obviously, 
there is a strong link between the creation of a Common 
Market In banking and international negotiations for 
trade in services. A Common Market implies a common 
policy with respect to the establishment of third country 
banks. The granting of a single licence which provides 
the banks with the right to operate freely throughout the 
EC will possibly have an important effect, not only on 
the country of the first establishment but also for all 
the EC countries. In this respect the Second Banking 
Coordination Directive has adopted the reciprocity 
provision outlined above to be used as a means of opening 
up foreign financial markets to EC banks.
The Second Banking Coordination Directive clearly 
indicates that the EC strategy for the banking sector 
consists of three fundamental features: the home country
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control principle, the harmonization of the essential
aspects of banking regulation and the mutual recognition 
of financial standards.
The principle of home country control meaning that all 
the activities of banking institutions throughout the 
Community's territory carried out through branching or on 
a cross-frontier provision of services, in principle, 
will be supervised mainly by the competent authorities of 
the Member State head office. The principle of home 
country control introduces the concept of the single 
banking licence and associated with it, an agreed list of 
banking activities.
The licence to operate will be issued by the home country 
and it will be the home country authorities who are 
responsible for ensuring that basic prudential standards 
are maintained. However, at the same time, the host 
supervisory authorities can enforce its own operating
rules. Indeed, while responsibility for the financial
soundness of a banking institution, and in particular for 
its solvency, will rest with the competent authorities of 
its home Member State, the host country authorities will 
retain responsibility for the latter relating to
liquidity.
Indeed, the Directive provides that host Member
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States shall retain primary responsibility for the 
supervision of the liquidity of credit institutions until 
further coordination. Liquidity controls are an 
important instrument of prudential supervision designed 
to ensure that individual banks are always in a position 
to fulfil their commitments to the public. The 
Commission initially believed that coordination would be 
achieved before the end of 1992 so that responsibility 
for liquidity supervision could be transferred to the 
home supervisory authority.
The Directive also provides that supervision of risk 
exposure should be subject of close cooperation between 
the competent authorities of the home and host countries. 
Together with liquidity and capital adequacy, control on 
risk exposure has traditionally been one of the most 
important elements of prudential supervision. Risk 
exposures refer mainly to concentration of credit to any 
one customer or a group of affiliated customers. Heavy 
exposures to individual large borrowers involve 
significant risks to the respective banks. If these 
borrowers run into financial difficulties the stability 
of the banks and the protection of the depositors will be 
undermined.
Controls over exchange risk exposure is another 
instrument of prudential supervision. Currency or 
foreign exchange risk relates to the vulnerability of a
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bank to losses resulting from an imperfect matching of 
claims and liabilities denominated in foreign currencies 
in the event of unanticipated changes in exchange rates. 
According to an EC official, until further coordination 
the host country will retain primary responsibility for 
supervision in the field of risk exposure. The 
Commission believes that the line between the 
responsibilities of the home supervisory authorities and 
those of the host authorities is clearly defined.
The harmonization of the essential aspects of prudential 
regulations is another key element of the EC strategy 
towards the banking sector. The harmonization of 
prudential regulations includes all the aspects regarding 
the soundness and stability of banking institutions.
Indeed, the role of the EC Commission can be divided 
into two parts. First is the harmonization of the 
prudential regulation which ensures the protection of the 
depositors as well as the stability of the financial 
system as a whole. The second is to remove the remaining 
barriers to freedom of establishment in the banking 
sector and to provide for full freedom of services. And 
there is a great interconnection between these two tasks. 
Greater freedom of establishment and to provide services 
clearly depends on mutual trust between national 
supervisory authorities that one Member State regulatory 
regime is broadly equivalent to another.
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The mutual recognition of financial standards is one of 
the fundamental features of the Community's policy in the 
banking field. Its adoption has shifted the emphasis 
away from the detailed harmonization of the national 
regulatory systems which have proven to be impractical in 
many respects. However, the concept of mutual 
recognition should not be regarded as the straight 
opposite of the harmonization procedure (20). The mutual 
recognition of national regulatory systems can only be 
justified if the rules and standards of prudential 
supervision are equivalent. Obviously, equivalent 
supervisory standards can be achieved only through some 
harmonization on the Community level.
The Second Banking Coordination Directive constitutes an 
essential instrument towards removing the barriers to 
both freedom of establishment and to provide services- 
ie. achieving a Common Market in the banking field. The 
approach towards removing these barriers which has been 
adopted by the Community is to achieve only the essential 
harmonization necessary and sufficient to secure mutual 
recognition of authorization and of supervisory systems, 
thus enabling the principle of home country control and 
the granting of a single licence recognized throughout 
the Community.
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In this context, the Directive can be implemented only 
simultaneously with specific Community legislation 
dealing with the harmonization of national rules and
practices referring to the prudent conduct of business. 
Indeed, as it has been pointed out elsewhere the
responsibility for the financial soundness of a credit 
institution, and in particular for its solvency, will 
rest with the competent authorities of its home Member 
State.
The EC strategy designed to integrate the twelve banking 
sectors by 1992 contains further harmonization measures 
which are considered below. These measures which will
come into force simultaneously (according to the
Commission) with the Second Banking Coordination 
Directive constitute the necessary and essential 
prerequisites for the unified banking market by 1992.
The proposal for a Directive concerning the own funds 
represents the first concrete attempt towards 
harmonization of prudential standards.
The First Banking Coordination Directive contains a
£
definition of own funds. According to an EC official 
even if the definition of own funds proved to be 
sufficient at the initial stage, later it became evident 
that the definition was inadequate in the light of the
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further moves towards harmonization coupled with the 
rapid development of the banking industry since 1977.
A precise description, containing all the items that may 
be considered as the capital of a banking institution is 
becoming increasingly necessary, especially since the 
implementation of the Directive on the supervision of 
credit institutions on a consolidated basis.
Capital adequacy is a cornerstone of banking supervision 
and a clear definition of own funds is an essential 
requirement for an effective banking coordination. 
Community provisions in the area of banking coordination 
will refer to such definition for a wide range of 
purposes, and will also improve the comparability between 
credit institutions which in a common banking market are 
in direct competition with each other. For competitive 
reasons the definitions and standards pertaining to their 
own funds must be equivalent in the Community.
Funds in a credit institution serve a number of purposes. 
Usually, they finance a credit institution's business, 
especially when the institution starts its operations. 
The own funds of a credit institution can serve to absorb 
losses and therefore to guarantee the stability and the 
continuity of the respective institution: their role in
this respect is essential in maintaining the confidence
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of depositors. They are also a yardstick reassuring the 
solvency of the institution and other factors that play a 
vital role in banking supervision.
Knowledge that adequate capital exists to protect the 
depositors from losses is reassuring and thus increases 
the confidence in the bank and the financial system. A 
bank with a strong capital position will enjoy the 
confidence of other banks and that is also true for the 
banking system as a whole. The capital resources of the 
banks comprising the system must be considered as 
adequate in order to ensure that depositors continue <to 
remain confident about the stability of the system. The 
need for a strong capital position does not arise only 
due to micro-level concern for the interests of 
individual depositors. There is also a macro-economic 
dimension which needs to be constantly in the 
supervisor's view. Banks have a central intermediary 
role in sustaining economic activity, and the maintenance 
of a sound banking system is essential for the fruitful 
development of both the national and international 
economy.
Own funds therefore occupy a central position in the 
business of a credit institution? adequate capital is 
necessary to safeguard not only the solvency of the bank 
but also its liquidity. Since Member States use a
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variety of methods to calculate a credit institution's 
capital resources, the Commission is seeking to move 
towards establishing a common basis of measurement of own 
funds. Through the adoption of common criteria, the 
competent authorities in charge of banking supervision 
will be placed in the position whereby they can be sure 
of the basic equivalence of standards of supervision in 
all Member States. This is very important particularly 
with a view to completion of the internal market by the 
end of 1992.
In this context, towards the end of 1986 the Commission 
proposed a Directive (21) concerning the harmonization of 
the definition of "own funds" of credit institutions. 
The main aim of the Commission's efforts is to define the 
elements of own funds , to apply that definition more 
uniformly, and to improve the comparability amongst 
banking institutions competing in the same markets.
However, the Commission believes that the respective 
proposal for the Directive represents only a preliminary 
stage in a process to strengthen the capital adequacy of 
EC credit institutions and to define more strictly the 
criteria for elements to qualify as own funds.
Certain provisions of the respective proposal for the 
Directive make a distinction between the "internal" and
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"external" elements of own funds.
The internal elements can be divided into four sub­
groups :
1. Paid-up capital including the benefit of any share
premium account but excluding banks' holding of 
their own shares.
2. Reserves in an legal sense and accumulated retained
profits (excluding the amounts allocated to cover 
general risks)
3. Re-evaluation reserves (formally recognized as 
part of shareholders funds)
4. Other internal elements.
Internal elements are defined as funds that are at 
the free disposal of a credit institution in order 
to cover normal business risks which have not actually 
been identified; there must be evidence of their 
existence in the internal accounts of the institution 
concerned and their amount must be determined by the 
management of the institution, verified by independent 
auditors and made known to the competent supervisory 
authorities.
The second layer of the own funds definition consists of 
"external elements" which are funds placed at the
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disposal of a credit institution but not fully owned or 
controlled by it, or put at the disposal of a credit 
institution for a limited period only. The external 
elements can be included in the own funds up to not more 
than 50% of the total of internal elements. Member 
States are asked to ensure that credit institutions 
presently operating above this level will move to this 
limit in a gradual process.
The respective proposal for a Directive deliberately does 
not contain an exhaustive list of forms qualifying as 
"external elements" of own funds and, thus, leaving scope 
for innovations in this area. However, it provides for 
certain criteria to be met.
External elements comprise the following:
1. Subordinated liabilities.
2. Capital not paid up in the form of liabilities of 
members of cooperative credit institutions.
3. Liabilities of members of cooperative credit 
institutions which are not paid up.
4. Elements other than liabilities of cooperatives but 
only if they meet certain criteria.
It is considered that the proposal for Directive
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concerning the harmonization of the definition of own 
funds of credit institutions is a flexible procedure 
and provides a maximum of elements and amounts in order 
to encompass the variety elements comprising own funds 
presently available in the different Member States, 
leaving to the discretion of the Member State the 
possibility to exclude certain elements or to provide 
lower ceilings for the amounts in question. The 
proposal gives a neutral enumeration of the components 
which the Member States may account as own funds.
According to an EC official appropriate solvency ratios 
play a central role in the prudential supervision of 
credit institutions. The Commission believes that ratios 
which weight assets and off-balance sheet transactions 
according to the degree of credit risk are particularly 
useful measures of solvency. It also believes that the 
development of common standards of capital adequacy in 
relation to assets and off-balance sheet items at risk is 
accordingly, one of the essential areas of harmonization 
necessary for the achievement of mutual recognition and 
thus completion of the internal market in banking 
services.
In this context, a proposal for Directive (22) on 
solvency ratios was submitted in May 1988. It aims to 
harmonize prudential supervisory rules and to protect
Ises)
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investors. The respective proposal for Directive relates 
the own funds of a credit institution (the numerator of 
the ratio) to its total assets and off-balance sheet 
liabilities, adjusted to reflect degree of risks (the 
denominator of the ratio). It establishes a uniform 
method of assessing the ability of banking institutions 
to meet credit losses arising from the default of their 
customers.
More particularly, the new proposal for Directive 
contains common definitions and risk weights for the 
components of the denominator. It provides that the 
numerator must be own funds as defined in the own funds 
proposal and lays down rules for the calculation of the 
ratio. Besides laying down common definitions and 
methods of calculation, the proposal provisionally fixes 
the minimum uniform solvency threshold at 8%. The 
proposal also specifies the responsibilities of the home 
supervisory authorities in controlling the ratios and in 
initiating appropriate action to raise these should the 
need arise.
The major shortcoming of the proposal for Directive on 
solvency is that it covers only credit risk, ie. the 
risk arising in the event of default by counter parties 
to loan agreements, off-balance sheet engagements etc, 
without capturing general risks presented by movements
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in interest rates or foreign exchange rates. However, 
the Commission is at present working on proposals for 
the further harmonization of prudential rules relating to 
these risks and to other forms of market risks.
The Commission believes that this proposal if 
adopted would achieve a considerable degree of 
harmonization of prudential standards which are necessary 
for the internal market. It would also raise supervisory 
standards in the field of bank's solvency especially in 
relation to risks arising from off-balance sheet trans­
actions (for instance, guarantees extended by a bank 
against third parties' obligations) which are an 
increasingly important banking business.
The Commission made also other important attempts 
towards harmonization and raising the prudential 
supervisory standards of the Member States. In 1986 it 
issued a Recommendation on monitoring and controlling the 
large exposures of credit institutions. Monitoring and 
controlling the exposures are an integral part of any 
supervisory system. Excessive concentration of leading 
and other exposures on a single customer or a group of 
connected customers results obviously in a considerable 
degree of risk concentration undermining the financial 
stability of the respective banks and the protection of
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the depositors. According to this Recommendation an 
exposure of a credit institution is considered to be 
large exposure when its value has exceeded 15% of own 
funds. Credit institutions may not incur large 
exposures which in the aggregate exceed 800% of own 
funds. Furthermore, credit institutions may not incur 
an exposure to a Client when its percentage value exceeds 
40% of own funds.
Another Recommendation encouraged Member States not yet 
operating deposit guarantee systems to introduce them by 
1990. The introduction of such a system is considered as 
one of the measures dealing with the management crisis 
of banking organizations.
Indeed, in December 1985 the Commission adopted a 
proposal for a Directive (23) on the reorganization and 
the winding-up of credit which was amended later to 
include deposit-guarantee schemes. Reorganization 
measures means measures which are intended to safeguard 
or restore the financial situation of a banking 
institution; while "deposit-guarantee schemes" means all 
provisions designed to guarantee appropriate 
compensation for depositors or to protect them against 
any loss.
This proposal for Directive recognizes that consideration
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should be given to the situation which might arise if a 
credit institution runs into difficulties, particularly 
where that institution has branches in other Member 
States. There is a tendency in the laws and practices in 
force in the Member States to institute reorganization 
procedures, aimed at preventing banks from becoming 
insolvent as soon as financial difficulties become 
apparent, so as to maintain savers' confidence in the 
banking system.
However, since it is difficult to harmonize these laws 
and practices the respective proposal for Directive tries 
to secure mutual recognition by the Member States of the 
achievements of each in resolving the financial 
difficulties of its own banking institutions. It 
therefore provides that the implementation of 
reorganization measures in respect of a bank operating in 
several Member States should be entrusted to the 
competent authorities of the home country and these 
authorities must be empowered to enforce their own laws 
outside their national territory in consultation with the 
authorities of the other Member States concerned.
The same considerations also apply with respect to 
winding up. As far as the deposit-guarantee scheme is 
concerned, the respective proposal provides that these 
schemes shall cover deposits of foreign branches and 
shall extend cover to deposits received by branches set
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up in host countries which have no deposit-guarantee 
scheme.
The principle of home country control is the central 
element of the EC policy in the banking field and seems 
to be the only means of attaining a Common Market 
particularly within the timescale. Indeed, there are two 
other alternative approaches to integration in this 
field: the host country control and the joint control.
These two alternatives are considered below.
The principle of host country control implies that 
branches of foreign banks will be supervised by the host 
supervisory authorities. This means that the Community 
should introduce fully harmonised EC-wide regulations to 
replace the national rules and practices so that to 
ensure that branches of banks operating in different 
Member States are subject to equal treatment. However, 
as it is pointed out elsewhere, the harmonization 
undertaken by the Commission, until the adoption of the 
new methods of the Single European Act, judged by the 
results, have proven to be impractical in many respects.
In fact, it was that experience and the need to complete 
the Common Market in banking within the timescale that 
forced the Commission to shift its policy emphasis and 
adopt as the main tool for integration the home country
64
control. This principle is associated with only a 
minimum harmonization of prudential regulation necessary 
to ensure the mutual recognition of financial standards.
Furthermore, there is a justified expectation that the 
new Community strategy will lead to a major harmonization 
process at a later stage. Every country in the EC would 
have to accept other Member State's banking regulations 
thus exposing local banks to competition with foreign 
banks which possibly enjoy more liberal rules at home
(24) . The home country control initially would lead to 
distortion of competition, putting domestic banks at a 
disadvantage against foreign competitors which are 
subject to less stringent controls. As a result, the 
strictly regulated Member States will be forced to 
remove the strict regulatory provisions in order not to 
jeopardise the competitive performance of the indigenous 
banks. The Commission's efforts in respect of banking 
have been to identify the areas where it is thought 
essential that banking law is harmonised, leaving the 
rest to gradual approximation to achieve common standards
(25) .
The home country control principle obviously 
incorporates a mechanism which strongly presses towards 
harmonization of domestic banking laws and regulations. 
There is not such a mechanism within the host country
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control principle. In addition, the host country 
control principle could be discriminatory against 
foreign banks. Discrimination can arise due to stringent 
enforcement of apparently non-discriminatory regulations.
And this is clearly demonstrated in the Greek case 
study. Thus, only by adopting the principle of home 
country control can a truly common banking market come 
into existence, which would have the same characteristics 
as a present-day national market.
Another alternative approach to integration in the 
banking field would have been joint supervision by both 
home and host country authorities.
However this form of supervision requires fully and 
clearly allocated responsibilities between the national 
authorities. The first major problem then, which arises 
for the supervisory authorities whose banks are involved 
in international banking business, is the allocation of 
supervisory responsibilities. The task of the Commission 
would have therefore been to address itself to the 
division of supervisory responsibilities among the 
national authorities. However, this task would involve 
lengthy discussions so that they would hopefully lead to 
a clear understanding between the different authorities 
parent and host - about the nature of the supervisory 
responsibilities borne by each in respect of
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international banking activities undertaken in their 
territories. Obviously, the clear allocation of 
responsibilities between parent and host authorities, 
with both having a duty to ensure that surveillance of 
banks' foreign establishments was adequate, would involve 
considerable time delays.
The joint supervision would also require a considerable 
harmonization effort which as we said above has proven 
to be impractical in many respects. Indeed, this 
explains why the EC Commission has shifted its policy 
emphasis and adopted as its main tool for integration in 
the financial field the mutual recognition of supervisory 
standards and the principle of home country control.
It is widely believed that the new Community Strategy and 
in particular the adoption of the Second Banking Co­
ordination Directive will have an important deregulatory 
impact on the most strict systems. The practical effect 
of the switch to have home country control will be the 
gradual deregulation of the banking sector as it would be 
untenable for the individual Member States to continue to 
enforce excessively restrictive national regulations 
against their own banks (26).
The range of activities included in the list is also a 
subject of concern. Institutions from other Member
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States will be allowed to provide the full list of 
their activities on their host country if they have been 
authorised in this respect by the home supervisory 
authorities. On the other hand, the provisions of the 
proposal for a Second Banking Coordination Directive do 
not impose upon Member States the obligation to let their 
domestic banking institutions undertake all these 
activities. The Member States can therefore continue to 
impose prudential restrictions on indigenous banks with 
respect to the scope of banking business. However, this 
will result in a discriminatory treatment against 
indigenous banks.
In this respect, the Commission believes that the local 
banking communities will press the national authorities 
to adopt a less restrictive stance. It is a justified 
expectation that the forces of competition will gradually 
erode the strict prudential controls.
It, therefore, seems that the Commissions programme's 
overriding emphasis is placed on deregulation. According
to the Commission deregulation has a positive effect on 
economies: since markets are becoming more efficient,
intermediation costs are reduced and the intensification 
of competition produces a greater range of choice for 
citizens and businesses and allow them to choose 
financial products better suited to their requirements
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and needs.
In its 1985 White Paper the Commission recognized that 
the financial services play a central role for the
development of the Community's economy. It is considered
that the ability of the European manufacturing industry 
to compete at the international level depends crucially 
upon cheap financing. The inefficiency of the banking 
sector imposes an additional cost to the rest of the
economy. The EC strategy for the banking field (if
implemented) would promote rationalization and have 
important and far reaching effects on the national 
economies. But, will that strategy succeed?
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BARRIERS TO THE PROCESS OF LIBERALISING BANKING 
SERVICES IN THE DEVELOPED EC COUNTRIES:
THE U.K. CASE
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ESTABLISHMENT, OPERATION AND MARKET ACCESS OF BANKING 
INSTITUTIONS IN THE UK : CONDITIONS AND CONTROLS IN 1989
1. Regulatory provisions and administrative 
practices governing the entry and establishment 
of indigenous banking institutions
According to the Banking Act 1987 credit institutions are 
defined as institutions that carry on deposit taking 
business. For the purpose of this Act a business is a 
deposit taking business if in the course of the business 
money received by way of deposit is lent to others or any 
other activity of the business is financed wholly or to 
any material extent out of the capital of or the interest 
on money received by way of deposit. The definition of a 
credit institution is characterized by the idea that the 
receipt of funds from the public and the granting of 
credit must be carried out by the same institution.
Any credit institution is required to have an authoriza­
tion from the Bank of England before gaining access to 
the U.K. financial market. The minimum statutory
criteria which the Bank of England must be satisfied that 
an institution fulfills before granting it recognition 
are set out in Schedule 3 of the Banking Act 1987. If 
following authorization it appears to the Bank of England
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that any of the criteria applicable to the institution is 
not being or has not been fulfilled with respect to it, 
then the Bank of England's powers to revoke the 
authorization may be exercised. It follows therefore, 
that the criteria set out in Schedule 3 should be 
continuously fulfilled by authorized institutions and the 
Bank of England monitors their fulfillment as part of its 
regular supervision.
According to this Schedule an institution in order to 
qualify for authorization should have net assets 
amounting to not less than £1 million. Net assets are 
defined as paid up capital and reserves. The above 
amount of net assets can be varied following a decision 
of the Treasury after consultation with the Bank of 
England.
The Schedule provides also broad minimum criteria 
covering the suitability of management. Everyone 
actively involved in the management should be a fit and 
proper person to hold the particular position which he 
holds, or is to hold. In considering whether a person 
fulfills this criterion the Bank of England regards a 
number of general considerations, whilst always taking 
account of the particular circumstances of the position 
and of the institution concerned. The Bank of England 
includes amongst the relevant considerations whether the
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person concerned has sufficient skills, knowledge, and 
experience to undertake and fulfil his particular duties 
and responsibilities. It is also essential that a person 
actively involved in the management of a bank is of the 
highest integrity.
Authorization cannot be granted to an institution if the 
business is directed by a single individual. The Bank of 
England expects that the individuals concerned would be 
executive directors or generally persons granted 
executive powers and responsible immediately to the 
board. This provision is designed to ensure that at least 
two minds are applied to the implementation of the policy 
of the institution. Both persons judgments should be 
involved in order that major errors resulting in serious 
difficulties for the institution concerned should be a- 
voided. Both persons must have sufficient authority and 
responsibility to resist any imprudent and dishonest ac­
tion taken by the other person.
The Banking Act also requires that an institution con­
ducts, or in the case of an institution which is not yet 
carrying on a deposit taking business, will conduct its 
business in a prudent manner. The "prudent manner" crit­
erion is considered essential for granting an authoriza­
tion. An institution is regarded as conducting its busi­
ness in a prudent manner if it maintains adequate capital
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resources, adequate liquidity, adequate accounting and 
other records of its business and adequate systems of 
control of its business as a whole. The adequacy of the
above elements is judged in relation to the nature and
extent of the respective institutions business.
Lastly, the Banking Act 1987 requires that the business 
of an institution is or, in the case of an institution 
which is not yet carrying on a deposit taking business, 
will be carried on with integrity and the professional 
skills appropriate to the nature and scale of its
activities. This criterion goes beyond questions of the 
suitability of everyone actively involved in the 
management; it is concerned with the business standards, 
the status and position of the respective institution in 
the financial community. In forming its judgment about
the above considerations the Bank of England has regard 
not only to profitable business but also to the existence 
of management information and control systems designed to 
monitor and limit the institution's risk exposure. In 
these respects an institution applying for authorization 
is required to submit a programme of operations including 
the types of business envisaged, and the structural 
organization of the institution. The Bank of England pays 
particular attention to this programme and it considers 
it in relation to the quality, experience and skills of 
the management of the institution concerned.
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The Bank of England's experience has been that a newly 
formed institution which is not directly associated with 
an established and proven deposit-taking institution can 
run into early difficulties. These difficulties have 
usually arisen from lack of relevant expertise and 
judgment particularly in lending, or from insufficiently 
tested business strategies. The U.K. supervisory 
authorities are not easily satisfied that a newly formed 
institution (which is not directly associated with an 
established and proven deposit taking institution) will 
carry on deposit taking business with integrity and 
professional skill, unless the respective institution has 
already for some time been carrying on business similar 
to the planned ones, even if on a lesser scale but 
financed by bank borrowing or alternative sources other 
than the receipt of funds from the public.
The U.K. authorities also exert some control on the 
expansion of branch networks by indigenous institutions. 
The opening of new domestic branches does not require 
authorization and is not subject to statutory 
requirements, but requires notification. The 
notification requirement does not provide the U.K. 
supervisory authorities with discretionary powers with 
regards to branch expansion. However, the Bank of 
England generally expects the authorized institutions to
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consult and discuss with the supervisory authorities well 
in advance any plan for branch expansion. The Bank of 
England exert control on domestic branching in the 
context of its overall prudential supervision and 
considers plans for branch expansion in relation to the 
financial soundness of the bank.
The analysis of the conditions and controls governing the
entry of indigenous banking institutions indicates that
the Banking Act provides a statutory framework with
respect to granting or refusing an authorization and this
framework contains the discretionary powers of the Bank
*
of England. According to the Bank of England the 
authorization is not discretionary. The responsible
supervisory authority considers whether the prescribed 
conditions have been fulfilled, in which case the 
authorization must be issued. However, judgement of 
fulfillment relies on discretion in absence of
quantitative criteria.
The analysis also indicates that the U.K. authorities 
adopted the provisions of the First Banking Coordination
Directive with respect to authorization requirements and
set out additional requirements such as the "prudent man­
ner" criterion and the criterion referring to integrity 
and skill. Furthermore, the entry requirements are 
perfectly in line with the relevant provisions of the
a )
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proposal for the Second Banking Coordination Directive 
and these provisions could therefore be easily adopted by 
the U.K. authorities.
2. Regulatory provisions and administrative
practices governing the entry and establishment of 
branches by foreign banking organizations
UK branches of overseas credit institutions are required 
to have an authorization, if they wish to take deposits 
in the UK. Deposit-taking authority enabling an overseas 
institution to operate through a branch in the UK is 
granted to the respective institution as a whole; and 
thus a separate deposit-taking authority is not required 
for each branch office if that institution wishes to
operate in the UK with more than one branch. The entry
and establishment by foreign banking organisations of
branches in the UK is, in principle, subject to the same 
regulatory and administrative provisions applied to 
domestic credit institutions.
However, the Banking Act provides that the Bank of Eng­
land, in assessing applications from institutions whose 
principal place of business is outside the UK and which 
have been established or wish to establish branches in 
the UK, will take into account the supervisory controls
77
imposed by the relevant parent authorities. The Bank of 
England may regard itself as satisfied that certain of 
the criteria set out in Schedule 3 are fulfilled if the 
parent authorities report to the Bank of England that 
they are satisfied with respect to the management of the 
respective institution and its overall financial 
soundness. In these respects the credit institution 
concerned may be required to supply references from the 
parent supervisory authorities. The Bank of England 
expects that any move of the respective institution to 
establish a branch in the UK has been undertaken with the 
knowledge of the parent supervisory authorities.
The UK supervisory authorities believe that the primarily 
responsibility for monitoring the overall financial 
soundness of the institution concerned rests with the 
parent authority since the financial soundness of 
branches is indistinguishable from that of the parent 
bank as a whole. Accordingly the Bank of England tries 
to ensure that the financial soundness is adequately 
monitored by the authorities of the country in which the 
head office of that institution is based. If these 
authorities do not impose prudential requirements of 
equal rigour to those set out in Schedule 3 of the 
Banking Act with respect to the management and overall 
financial soundness of the applicant institution, the 
grant of the authorization would be very difficult to
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achieve.
UK branches of overseas institutions are not required to 
have their own endowment capital as is the case in many 
other countries. The branches of overseas institutions 
are not considered as separate entities but as integral 
parts of the international operations of these 
institutions. However, the Bank of England expects the 
overseas institutions to maintain an adequate amount of 
capital resources in relation to their operations 
worldwide. The UK supervisory authorities may regard the 
above criterion as fulfilled if it is satisfied as to the 
supervision exercised by the relevant overseas 
authorities and these authorities inform the Bank of 
England that they are satisfied about these aspects of 
the applicant institution. Indeed, the Bank of England 
requires from the relevant supervisory authorities an 
assurance ("letter of comfort") that they supervise the 
overall activities of the applicant institution. The 
assurance should confirm that the institution concerned 
is prudently run and its solvency and liquidity are 
appropriate having regard to the nature and scale of 
operations.
In order to qualify for authorization foreign 
institutions must also satisfy the requirements which the 
UK authorities impose with regard to competence of
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management. According to these requirements every 
director, controller and manager of the overseas branches 
should be a fit and proper person to hold that position. 
The Bank of England must also be satisfied that the 
business will be conducted with prudence and integrity 
and with appropriate professional skills. In addition the 
Bank of England expects some of those involved in the 
management to have appropriate experience, knowledge of 
the UK financial markets and adequate knowledge of 
English.
*
According to an official of the Bank of England, where 
the Bank could not be satisfied regarding the adequacy of 
supervision conducted in the home country, it would be 
obliged to reach its own judgement on all of the Schedule 
3 criteria in order to authorise an applicant from such a 
jurisdiction. As one might appreciate, it is likely to 
prove extremely difficult in practice for the Bank of 
England to satisfy itself directly in this way, bearing 
in mind that the criteria relate to the foreign 
institution as a whole not simply to the proposed UK 
branch. It is the case that a number of applications and 
proposed applications have not been proceeded with when 
the Bank of England made it clear that there would be 
problems in this regard. The UK authorities may prevent 
the establishment of foreign banking organizations with 
inadequate supervision by the respective parent
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authorities.
The Banking Act sets out specific requirements on the 
entry and establishment of representative offices of 
overseas institutions in the UK. According to section 75 
an overseas institution may establish a representative 
office in the UK if it notifies the Bank of England well 
in advance of its intentions.
In addition to this legal requirement the Bank of England 
expects to be consulted by overseas institutions in ad­
vance of a representative office being set up in the UK 
and to be assured that this move has been undertaken with 
the knowledge of the parent supervisory authorities.
There are no restrictions in the Act on the operation of 
such offices except that they are not authorized to con­
duct deposit taking business, but the Bank or England 
expects them to restrict themselves to representative 
activities in the narrow sense. The offices can represent 
the interests and promote the banking services of the 
overseas institutions and report to them on business 
trends and opportunities, but should not directly engage 
in deposit-taking, lending or other financial or 
banking activities.
In these respects the overseas institutions are required
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to deliver information of documents to the Bank of 
England in relation to their activities or proposed
particularly interested in their backgrounds and
intentions.
According to the Bank of England, the controls over the 
entry of foreign banking organizations to the UK market 
are governed solely by prudential considerations and the 
authorization is not discretionary, since authorisation 
procedures are based on the fulfillment of specific
requirements. However, the Bank of England enjoys a 
considerable degree of administrative discretion in 
interpreting the above criteria and deciding whether the 
applicants meet them. The Act itself gives, indeed, very
little guidance as to how the authorisation criteria are
to be interpreted and applied and, as a Bank of England
official pointed out, the Bank does not hesitate to use 
its discretion, common sense and experience in judging 
when the respective institutions are outside the bounds 
of acceptability. However, the intention of the Bank of 
England is to remove from entry only those institutions 
which have a great possibility of failure in order to 
protect the interests of the depositors. As a result, the 
controls over entry of foreign branches do not exert an 
influence on the size and structure of the banking 
sector, if the Bank of England's judgement is right.
activities in the UK. The Bank of England seems
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Furthermore, the UK authorities consider branches of for­
eign banking organizations as a consequence of the opera­
tion of these banking organizations worldwide. 
Obviously, these considerations are in accordance with 
the principle of "home country control” as it is adopted 
by the EC strategy designed to integrate the financial 
markets by the end of 1992. The UK authorities could 
accept the provisions of the Second (draft) Coordination 
Directive that refer to the entry and establishment of 
branches of foreign banking institutions especially since 
other provisions of the respective Directive ensure the 
adequate supervision of the entry and establishment of EC 
banks by the home authorities.
3. Regulatory provisions and administrative practices 
governing the entry and establishment of majority 
and minority owned subsidiaries by foreign 
banking organizations.
Foreign access to the UK banking system through equity 
participation in indigenous banks is subject to exactly 
the same restrictions as participation of domestic 
interests in these banks.
In principle there is no limit to the acquisition by
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overseas banking organizations of participation in in­
digenous banks and no local participation is required. 
As a matter of general policy, however, the Bank of 
England expects to be consulted in good time before any 
significant change of ownership and control of a UK bank 
takes place. Through the requirement of prior 
notification the Bank of England wishes to discuss with 
the proposed new management matters relating to the 
financial soundness of the institution concerned and the 
management's intention for the future development of 
business.
Moreover, banking mergers, in common with mergers between 
other companies, are subject to the provisions of the 
Fair Trading Act of 1973 according to which when the 
property of a company which intends to merge is above 
£5,000,000 the Secretary of State is empowered to submit 
the case to the Monopolies and Merger Commission, which 
is competent to decide if the proposed merger may 
restrain competition in the financial sector or is 
otherwise against the public interests. The Bank of 
England always expresses an opinion on the proposed 
merger. Thus, equity participation of foreign interests 
in indigenous banks are in the first place regulated in 
the framework of Anti-trust law aiming of preventing an 
institution from gaining a dominant position in the 
financial market.
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However, additional restrictions apply with respect to 
the competence of management. In general terms the UK 
supervisory authorities try to ensure that the 
institution under its proposed controller shareholders 
meets the statutory requirements of authorization as set 
out in Schedule 3.
It has been the Bank of England's policy to require "let­
ters of comfort" from overseas banking organizations 
which acquire significant shareholdings in UK banks. The 
UK supervisory authorities look for "letters of comfort" 
in respect of: a) wholly-owned subsidiaries, b) majority- 
owned subsidiaries, c) minority-owned subsidiaries in 
certain cases.
These letters ensure that the principal owners of a bank 
recognise its special nature and confirm their acceptance 
of a responsibility to support it beyond the limited 
liability attaching to their shareholding should this 
become necessary. Although the "letters of comfort" are 
not legally binding, being rather a statement of intent, 
the fact that it has been given allows the Bank of 
England to put pressures on the owners and can have an 
important effect on maintaining market confidence in a 
bank during periods of uncertainty.
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"Letters of comfort" are required in cases where overseas 
institutions acquire shareholdings of 15% or more in a UK 
bank. However, a "letter of comfort" may be sought from 
a shareholder with a holding of as little as 10% if the 
shareholder concerned has an ability to influence the UK 
institution. For instance, in the case where a
shareholder has an excess voting power in relation to the 
acquired shares.
In general it can be said that the "letters of
comfort" are required for prudential considerations and 
do not constitute a significant impediment to 
acquisitions of overseas banking organizations of 
participation in indigenous banks.
Up to now we have seen that the potential sources of
restrictions against the acquisitions by overseas banking 
organizations of participation in indigenous banks arise 
from provisions relating mainly to prudential considera­
tions and aim at ensuring that financial institutions are 
soundly and honestly run and that they are able to meet 
their commitments at all times. One might argue that in 
general the UK supervisory authorities have adopted a 
rather favourable attitude towards equity participation. 
London is one of the major financial centres due to the 
willingness of the authorities to see foreign
financial companies come to the UK in order to engage in
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financial activities and in some cases acquire 
participation in UK financial institutions. Overseas 
participation in a UK institution may increase the 
opportunities available to it, just as foreign 
participation in a manufacturing company may serve to 
introduce net capital and technology or to open up 
overseas markets (27).
However, the UK supervisory authorities believe that the
openness of the London financial market must not extend
to the point that control of the UK financial system
passes to overseas interests. It is essential that there
should be a strong British presence in the UK banking
system which control the supply of credit. On the other
hand, it is rather difficult to determine which
institutions are vital to national interests . But,
*
these interests, according to the UK authorities, always 
require the continuation of a strong British presence on 
the UK financial sector. The above considerations may 
lead to restrictions on overseas equity participation in 
British banks in the future and are inconsistent with the 
principles of a Common Market. The Commission up to now 
made significant attempts to eliminate impediments to the 
establishment of foreign branches but it did not do so 
with regard to foreign subsidiaries.
However, the adoption of Directives designed to abolish
Lsss)
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restrictions with respect to acquisition by foreign bank­
ing organizations of participation in indigenous banks 
should be an indispensable part of any strategy designed 
to integrate the banking sectors.
4. Regulatory provisions and administrative practices 
limiting the market access by foreign based banking 
organizations.
The UK monetary authorities place no limitation on market 
access by banks operating from outside the country. In 
the UK there are no restrictions on the holding of 
deposits by residents at foreign-based banks, and on the 
borrowing by residents from foreign-based banks since 
there are no exchange control regulations.
5. Regulatory provisions and administrative practices 
restricting the domestic operations of established 
foreign-owned banking organizations.
The UK authorities seem to have adopted a favourable
attitude towards the operation of foreign banking
*
organisations. According to some foreign bankers there 
are at present no regulatory provisions or administrative
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practices concerning the scope of banking business which 
discriminate against foreign banks. Foreign banking 
organisations operating in the UK are not subject to any 
limitations on their business other than those applying 
to UK banks. Foreign banks have been given the right to 
participate in trade financing insured by the Export 
Credit Guarantee Department. They have also been allowed 
to participate in the government's loan guarantee scheme 
to provide funds for Britain's smaller businesses.
Furthermore, there are no legal provisions or administra­
tive practices that relate to prudential supervision and 
which intend to discriminate against foreign owned banks 
except perhaps the policy of the Bank of England of not 
providing financial support to foreign institutions 
operating in the UK when these institutions are in a 
difficult financial situation. However, the UK 
supervisory authorities point out that this attitude is 
consistent with their view that foreign institutions are 
integral parts of the operations of the parent 
institutions worldwide and therefore the responsibility 
for providing financial assistance to them lies outside 
the scope of the Bank of England. Foreign institutions 
must first look to their parent institutions in the case 
of financial difficulties, while the parent institutions 
look to their own central banks. The Bank of England's 
attitude towards financial assistance to banks 
experiencing liquidity and solvency problems is based on
the principle of parental responsibility.
The Bank of England recognizes the danger that one insti­
tution may find itself subject to supervision from 
several directions at the same time or escape 
supervision, and cooperates closely with foreign 
supervisory authorities and requires from them an 
assurance that they supervise the whole banking group. 
To the extent that the Bank of England has ensured that 
the prudent standards are being met the UK authorities 
may not impose additional requirements.
The adoption of a non-statutory supervisory system and 
the consequent lack of transparency with respect to regu­
lation in banking do not give rise to discriminatory 
treatment against foreign banks. The Bank of England 
clearly insists that the flexible techniques of 
prudential supervision are not intended to give any 
unfair advantage to domestic banks vis-a-vis overseas 
banks, but they rather aim to take account of the great 
variety of supervised institutions and the markets they 
operate in to ensure an effective supervisory system 
without stifling competition in the banking sector.
Of course, flexibility and informality means that one can 
never be sure of equal treatment, but must rely on the 
word of the Bank of England. However, foreign bankers
v\tew\eus ; Hess\c V'e ; .
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state that they do not detect any unequal treatment aris­
ing from more enforcement of apparently nondiscriminatory 
regulations. Moreover, they point out that the absence 
of rigid regulations and the more flexible attitude of 
the Bank of England, compared with most other central 
banks means that London offers significant advantages to 
foreign banks wishing to expand their operations.
On the other hand, however, this flexible supervisory 
system, moving along non-statutory lines and a case-by- 
case approach, appears to run foul of the EC passion for 
transparency. But this lack of transparency does not 
give rise to potential sources of discriminatory 
treatment against the operation of foreign banks as the 
Commission believes.
As a consequence, one may well argue that the UK authori­
ties do not restrict the operation of established 
foreign-owned banking organisations. The fact that the 
controls are designed to take into account the 
obligations of the foreign banks to comply with 
prudential regulations in the country of origin accords 
with the principle of home country control and the 
relevant provisions of the Second (draft) Banking 
Coordination Directive.
The analysis so far leads us to the conclusion that the
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UK authorities have incorporated the provisions of the 
existing EC Directives which did little more than confirm 
an existing position. The UK financial market has
traditionally been a relatively open and unregulated 
market. The controls over entry, establishment and
operation of indigenous and foreign institutions are
motivated solely by prudential considerations. Branches
of foreign owned banking organizations are considered as 
integral parts of these organizations and are primarily 
the concern of their home supervisory authorities for 
prudential supervision. This attitude accords to a 
significant extent with the principle of "home country" 
control and the relevant provisions of the Second (draft) 
Coordination Directive. Furthermore, the UK authorities 
do not restrict the market access by foreign banks not 
established in the country since they impose no exchange 
control regulations and therefore already comply with the 
provisions of the Capital Movements Directive.
The UK banking sector is already relatively open to free 
competition. However, the question remains; will the UK 
be able to create with the other Member States a Common 
Market in banking in the years to come ? The creation of 
a Common Market in banking requires the elimination of 
barriers to freedom of banking services which, according 
to the EC strategy, will take place through the adoption 
of "home country" control. Greater freedom of banking
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services clearly depends on mutual trust between govern­
ments and regulators that one country regulatory regime 
is broadly equivalent to another. The mutual recognition 
of financial standards is one of the fundamental features 
of the Community's policy in the financial field. 
However, this can be obtained only through some 
harmonization to ensure that the rules and standards of 
supervision of the Member States are equivalent. Whether 
this harmonization will take place remains to be seen in 
the next sections.
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A COMMON MARKET IN BANKING : COSTS AND BENEFITS FOR THE 
UK BANKING INDUSTRY AND ECONOMY
The UK banking system consists of the central bank, the 
Commercial banks, the discount houses, the National 
Girobank and the National Savings Bank.
The Bank of England , as the nation's central bank, 
stands at the centre of the British financial system. In 
common with other central banks it provides the familiar 
range of services both to the banking system and to the 
government. It has the authority and responsibility to 
supervise all the individual banks.
The category of Commercial banks includes: the Clearing
banks, the Merchant banks and the overseas banks.
The clearing banks are so called because they have trad­
itionally handled the bulk of the country's cheque and 
credit clearing (28) There are five London clearing 
banks operating in England and Wales - Barclays, Lloyds, 
Midland, National Westminster and its subsidiary Coutts- 
and three Scottish clearing banks - Bank of Scotland, 
Clydesdale and Royal Bank of Scotland. In order to 
highlight the significance of these banks to the British 
banking system it is essential to say that, according to
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Table 1, they represent 52% of the total deposit 
liabilities in sterling and 8.5% of the other currency 
deposit liabilities.
Amongst the clearing banks, the London "big four" occupy 
a special place in the British financial system due to 
their enormous network of agencies and the very high 
number of deposits they collect. These banks have 
developed into universal banks providing a full range of 
financial services to individuals and companies in both 
the domestic and international market.
The London clearing banks are rather international finan­
cial institutions which provide a wide range of financial 
services in other countries mainly through the establish­
ment of branches or through the acquisition of 
participation in existing banks. The international 
activities of these banks contribute significantly to 
their profits (29).
TABLE 1
DEPOSITS HELD BY BANKS OPERATING IN THE UK
In January 1986 in £ million
Deposit in Other currency 
sterling deposit
Clearing banks 
Accepting houses 
Other British banks 
Overseas banks
129,276
14,268
36,052
68,697
50,102
13,853
27,938
496,181
Total 248,293 588,075
Source : Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 1987
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The importance of merchant banks is rather limited. 
Whilst trade finance remains the main function of the 
merchant banks, the traditional demarcations between the 
activities of merchant banks and clearing banks have 
progressively been eroded and the former carry out a wide 
range of financial activities.
As far as foreign banks are concerned we need to say that 
London's foreign banking Community has continued to 
expand both in numbers and business volume over the last 
10 years. London is the first obvious step abroad for 
most foreign banks seeking to develop their international 
presence (30). Altogether, more than 500 foreign banks 
are represented, through Representative Offices, Branches 
or Subsidiaries in London and over 60 countries have 
direct representation through a bank (31). Fewer than 
ten of the world's one hundred largest banks do not have 
a London operation: these exceptions are all essentially
domestically orientated with a low international profile 
(32). The foreign banks represent 27.6% of the total 
deposit liabilities in sterling and 84% of other currency 
deposit liabilities.
Different groups of foreign banks in London serve 
particular niches in the international market (33). The 
US banks - which is the biggest foreign bank group -
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have introduced sophisticated marketing techniques in 
order to serve the multinational corporations in Europe. 
The European banks see London as a base from which to 
develop activities on the international markets, ie. to 
develop their foreign exchange dealings, participate in 
swaps and bond trading, raise currency deposits and gain 
access to cheaper sources of finance to support the 
activities of their customers. The Japanese banks use 
London principally as a funding centre and offer a full 
range of international business (34).
Foreign banks are also represented in London through 
almost 30 consortium banks. These are defined as banks 
which are owned by other banks but in which no one bank 
has direct shareholding of more than 50% in which at 
least one shareholder is an overseas bank (35) . These 
banks are active in loan syndication.
The Discount houses are public limited companies that 
occupy a special place in the financial intermediation 
process. They seek out loanable funds mainly from the 
inter-bank market usually available very short term basis 
and then use such funds for the purchase of a variety of 
assets which includes treasury bills, commercial bills 
and certificates of deposit (36). Their main character­
istic lies in the special relationship with the Bank of 
England. The banks lend to the discount houses on a day-
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to-day basis with the option to call in the loan at any 
time. When the banks are short of funds they ask the 
discount houses to repay the loans. Then the discount 
houses borrow from or/and sell bills to the Bank of Eng­
land and use the funds obtained to repay their loans. 
Through this mechanism the Bank of England is able to 
supply the banking system with funds during a period of 
shortage and to withdraw funds from it when there is a 
surplus. It is through these operations that the Bank of 
England influences short term money market interest 
rates. The National Girobank provides a simple money 
transmission service through the UK postal system and 
with cash facilities provided through Post Offices, but 
the growth and size of its activities remain rather 
limited.
The National Savings Bank is a part of the department of 
National Savings and provides savings facilities at Post 
Offices. The funds obtained are passed on to the govern­
ment directly or indirectly through investments in 
government securities. The money raised by the National 
Savings Bank therefore contributes towards financing the 
government's spending requirements.
The British banking institutions seem to play an 
important role in the domestic and international economy. 
Many of them are involved to a considerable extent in
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branch and subsidiaries operations abroad. They also 
undertake to a considerable extent cross-border deposit- 
taking, lending and other banking services. In fact, the 
UK appears to have a comparative advantage in the 
provision of banking services.
The UK has for a long time enjoyed a strong position on 
invisible trade. This dates back to the nineteenth cent­
ury when the UK was at the head of a large and growing 
empire with strong maritime links and London had already 
emerged as an important international financial centre 
through which substantial capital funds were channelled 
to developing countries. More recently, despite 
considerable changes in Britain's role in the world, this 
strength on invisibles has persisted. The UK has 
recorded a surplus on invisibles and in many years this 
has helped to offset a deficit on trade in goods, often 
pushing the current account into surplus (see Table 2) . 
A regular analysis of trends in invisible transactions in 
the world is carried out by the UK Committee on Invisible 
Exports (37) and demonstrates that in the global context 
the UK retains a strong position on invisibles.
Within the UK's total surplus on invisibles, the services 
balance acquires a strong position. Within the services 
balance (see Table 3) the financial and other services 
balance plays an important role in restoring the whole
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TABLE 2
SUMMARY BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Current account
Visible balance 3250 1906 -1509 -5169 -3132 -9364 -10929 -10929
Invisibles
Service balance
Interest profits and dividends
balance
Transfers balance
3715
1210 
-1547
2971
1449
-1741
3995
2857
-1585
4339
4449
-1734
6606
2763
-3034
6247
5364
-2181
5682
4987
-3411
4165
5619
-3575
Invisibles balance 3378 2679 5267 7054 6335 9430 7258 6209
Current balance 6628 4587 3758 1885 3202 66 -3671 -14617
Capital transfers - - - - - - - -
Transactions in UK assets and
liabilities
UK external assets 
UK external liabilities
-50769
43400
-31407
29054
-30173
25809
-32068
24289
-53279
43782
-92462
81369
-83922
76255
-50073
52408
Net transactions -7370 -2353 -4366 -7780 -9497 -11091 -7667 2334
EEA loss on forward commitments - - - - - - - -
Allocation of special drawing rights 158 - - - - - - -
Gold subscription to the IMF - - - - - - - -
Balancing item 548 -2234 608 5895 6294 11025 11338 12283
Source : UK Balance of Payments
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TABLE 3
SERVICES SUM4ARY
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Credits
General government 410 404 470 474 481 507 517 520
Private sector and public corporations
Sea transport 3784 3267 3054 3253 3271 3230 3302 3551
Civil aviation 2359 2471 2665 2931 3078 2786 3159 3192
Travel 2970 3188 4003 4614 5442 5553 6260 6085
Financial and other services 7487 8283 9467 10655 12379 13716 14425 14583
Total credits 17001 17613 19659 21927 24651 25792 27663 27931
Debits
General government 1264 1754 1522 1655 1780 1907 2117 2353
Private sector and public corporations
Sea transport 3974 3704 3832 3847 3727 3701 3896 4127
Civil aviation 1979 2172 2345 2694 2925 3200 3778 4054
Travel 3272 3640 4090 4663 4871 6083 7280 8127
Financial and other services 2797 3372 3875 4729 4742 4654 4910 5105
Total debits 13286 14642 15664 17588 18045 19545 21981 23766
Balances
General government -863 -1350 -1052 -1181 -1299 -1400 -1600 -1833
Private sector and public corporations
Sea transport -190 -437 -778 -594 -456 -471 -594 -576
Civil aviation 380 299 320 237 153 -414 -619 -862
Travel -303 -452 -87 -49 571 -530 -1020 -2042
Financial and other services 4690 4911 5592 5926 7637 9062 9515 9478
a Overall balance 3715 2971 3995 4339 6606 6247 5682 4165
Source : U K Balance of Payments
TABLE 4
FINANCIAL AND OTHER SERVICES
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Credits
UK financial and allied
institutions (net credits)
Insurance underwriters 587 618 743 826 1534 2457 2300 1449
Insurance brokers 314 384 451 535 664 711 717 690
Banks 536 659 726 911 1105 1208 1320 1303
Commodity traders,
bullion dealers and
export houses 317 367 441 499 511 515 537 555
Baltic Exchange 287 246 246 270 229 221 227 334
Lloyds Register of Shipping 32 37 33 27 25 24 22 18
Other 59 82 95 130 139 178 349 217
Total 2132 2393 2735 3198 4207 5314 5472 4566
UK consultancy firms
(net credits)
Consulting engineers 487 565 561 577 562 508 418 400
Process engineers 296 301 296 319 282 235 248 185
Solicitors and barristers 70 80 95 120 155 190 241 300
Management 41 44 46 48 53 54 60 66
Chartered surveyors 65 73 74 92 99 110 97 100
Other identified 106 104 120 125 112 104 94 134
Total 1065 1167 1192 1281 1263 1201 1158 1185
Telcommunications 285 335 381 594 627 638 678 692
Films and television 124 172 263 291 338 267 341 354
North Sea oil and gas companies 173 210 202 213 205 186 154 180
Land transport - freight 89 '95 116 123 129 160 233 264
Advertising 69 55 56 64 77 78 98 128
Royalties from:
related concerns 238 229 307 380 440 462 654 723
other concerns 338 339 394 406 459 383 443 489
Other services 482 596 835 972 1229 1295 1164 1224
Expenditure in the UK by :
Overseas students - fees 184 206 210 219 248 275 302 337
Overseas students - other 240 243 258 280 318 361 399 446
US bases and forces 266 296 407 434 498 533 609 508
Commissions on UK imports 245 273 326 380 413 434 486 557
Other services 1118 1223 1338 1389 1477 1675 1771 1925
Statistical adjustment — — — — — 500
Total credits 7487 8283 9467 10655 12379 13716 14425 14583
Total debits 2797 3372 3875 4729 4742 4654 4910 5105
Balance 4690 4911 5592 5926 7637 9062 9515 9478
Source : UK Balance of Payments
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balance to surplus. And the banking institutions seem to 
be one of the main contributors to the net surplus in the 
balance of financial and other services, (see Table 4) . 
Obviously, the British banking institutions appear to 
play an important role in strengthening the UK's balance 
of payments position. This is a strong indication that 
the UK might enjoy a comparative advantage in the 
provision of banking services.
Another confirmation of the UK's comparative advantage in 
the provision of banking services is provided in Diagram 
A where the relative value added per employee in banking 
is presented. This Diagram reveals that the ratio of UK 
labour productivity to productivity of some European 
countries such as Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the 
Netherlands is well above one. The UK banking industry, 
therefore, experiences the highest real value added per 
employee.
Furthermore, a national industry has a comparative advan­
tage in sectors where it is able to produce at a lower 
relative cost than in other sectors of domestic industry. 
According to a recent unpublished Lloyds bank study the 
UK banking sector can produce at a lower relative cost 
than in other sectors such as airlines, office and data- 
processing equipments, aerospace, road transportation and 
telecommunications services and at a higher relative
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Diagram A
Real value added per employee in banking
Ratio of UK productivity to : -
2 . 5
2 . 0
1.5
1.0
0.5
O.o — --------- --------- --------- --------- --------
Belgium France Germany Italy Netherlands
Source : National Economic Development Office 1988
cost than in some sectors of electrical engineering, 
pharmaceuticals, food and drink, medical equipment and
k
insurance. Banking appears to be one of the cheapest and 
most competitive sectors of the UK industry. There is, 
therefore, enough evidence of the UK comparative 
advantage in banking industry.
There are probably several reasons for the UK comparative 
advantage in banking services. Part of the strength may 
be due to the high degree of competition in the banking 
sector. Indeed, the degree of state ownership is very 
limited while the deregulation and the resulting removal 
of barriers between different classes of financial ser­
vices institutions has allowed more room for market 
forces and has led to increased competition amongst the 
existing institutions and the emergence of new sources of 
competition. The high degree of competition promotes 
innovation, and increase productivity and quality of 
service.
Other reasons are the abundance of skilled labour and 
the availability of technological support. Indeed, the 
productign of banking is a labour-intensive activity 
requiring a well-educated labour force, including a wide 
range of professional expertise in financial and other 
technical subjects. However, the UK comparative 
advantage in the provision of banking services seems to
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be based, to a considerable extent, on the weak 
government control and there is enough evidence to 
justify this argument.
One of the major issues is the capital mass of banking 
institutions. In contrast to other countries, the UK 
authorities do not exercise considerable control over 
inter-bank equity participation neither enforce strict 
anti-trust laws. Equity participation require only 
notification to the Bank of England. Mergers between 
banks, in common with mergers between other companies are 
subject to the provisions of the Fair Trading Act. For
this purpose, a merger is considered as being the
acquisition of participation of more than 15% of the
share capital of a bank.
According to the provisions of the Fair Trading Act, when 
the property of a company which intends to merge is above 
£5,000,000 the Secretary of State for price and consumer 
protection may submit the case to the Monopolies and
Mergers Commission which is competent to decide whether 
the proposed merger gains a dominant position in the 
threatening of competition in the banking sector. In 
this process the Bank of England expresses its advice. 
However, the UK authorities usually take the view that 
acquisitions and mergers are part of the competitive 
process. This view increases the scope of substantial 
mergers.
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This is an important distinction between the UK and other 
countries and affects the ability of the British 
companies to operate and compete internationally. To 
become international a company needs to be of a large 
size. The internationalization of activities usually 
involves large firms and considerable financial strength. 
Larger firms might be able to market their products at 
lower prices because of lower production or distribution 
costs since they might be able to exploit increasing 
returns to scale to a greater degree.
Furthermore, the UK banking institutions are not faced 
with regulatory provisions and practices affecting the 
range of services they can offer directly or indirectly 
ie. through their subsidiaries.
Indeed, there are no regulatory provisions or administra­
tive practices that restrict the ability of the UK banks 
to engage in any business other than deposit taking. The 
UK banking institutions are allowed to get involved in 
real estate investment, insurance business, financial 
leasing and factoring and securities business. The only 
limitation arises from the application of 
particularly heavy weighting in solvency requirements. 
As a result, the UK institutions are allowed to offer 
diverse financial services to their customers, to 
operate in many areas of the market and to gain access
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to critical facilities or sources of funds.
In contrast to the UK, in other EC countries there are 
strong regulatory barriers limiting the entry of banking 
institutions to various sectors of the financial services 
industry. The limitations in the scope of permissible 
business activities generally arise in response to 
prudential considerations (that are discussed elsewhere) 
and severely restrict the ability of individual banks to 
diversify the types of activities they may offer to their 
customers.
Table 5 provides an overview of the portfolio 
restrictions currently in force in some EC Member States 
and refers to restrictions applying to business conducted 
directly by banks. The restrictions on the type of ser­
vices that can be offered and on the range of activities 
in which banks can engage directly have considerable ef­
fects on the operating behaviour of firms and diminish 
the potential for profitability. They also limit the 
level of competition, since they exclude banks from 
providing services in other sectors, and act as a severe 
brake on innovation in service development.
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TABLE 5
RESTRICTIONS ON ACTIVITIES AND SERVICES IN WHICH BANKS
CAN ENGAGE DIRECTLY
Securities Real-Estate Insurance Leasing
Belgium P R R P
France P R F SR
Germany P R F SR
Italy R R F SR
Netherlands P SR F P
UK P SR P P
P - permitted
F - forbidden
R - restricted
SR - limited by solvency requirements
Source : this table is based mainly on interviews
In addition some countries impose limitations on the 
extent to which banks can provide certain non-banking 
services through their affiliates. Only the UK does 
not apply restrictions on commercial banks' participation 
in other financial enterprises, though some limitations 
may arise from comparatively heavy weighting in solvency 
requirements for specific authorizations to limits on the 
size of equity participation relative to the capital of 
the company in which the participation is acquired. In 
these countries the authorities take the view that the 
bank entry through affiliates into areas of business 
carrying risks is incompatible with the principles of 
sound banking.
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Table 6 provides an overview of the restrictions applying 
to business conducted directly by banks in different 
Member States. Only in the UK have the authorities 
adopted, according to a central bank official, a 
favourable attitude with regard to bank acquisitions in 
institutions engaged in non-bank business since such 
operations can contribute to strengthening banks' 
capacity to withstand growing competition from non-bank 
and foreign institutions and facilitate innovation. It 
is generally accepted that the ability of banks to 
acquire participation in other enterprises increase 
banking powers and possibly profitability.
TABLE 6
RESTRICTIONS ON BANKS, EQUITY PARTICIPATION
Participations in insurance other non-financial
companies financial enterprises
institutions
Belgium
France
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
UK
F
R
P
F
F
P
R
R
P
R
R
P
F
R
P
F
R
P
P - permitted 
F - forbidden 
R - restricted
Source : this table is based mainly on interviews
110
The form of government regulation can actually affect the 
operating cost levels of banks. And it is in the system 
of prudential regulation and supervision that the UK 
differs most from other countries because there is no 
specification of strict ratios or norms. Supervision is 
conducted without any published framework with the Bank 
of England indicating in general terms the criteria on 
which it bases its judgments, and it may even specify 
certain ratios at which it will look. The important 
point is that it shows no intention of laying down 
acceptable levels for these ratios since it believes that 
each individual bank is different and must be treated 
differently. This is a very flexible system, too 
flexible and loose for many other countries in Europe and 
one that appears to give the British banking 
institutions a considerable competitive advantage.
British banks are allowed to strengthen their capital 
positions by substantial issues of subordinated loan 
stock both in sterling and in foreign currency and other 
funds which are at the disposal of the banking 
institutions for a limited period only or are not fully 
owned or controlled by them. These funds are obviously 
not available to absorb losses in the same way as paid- 
up capital or reserves. But their inclusion in the
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capital of the British banks makes them appear better 
capitalised than in fact they are. According to some 
bankers for many British banks 50% of their capital base 
consists of funds which are at the disposal of the 
institutions for a limited period only or are not fully 
owned or controlled by them. These funds cannot (or only 
to a limited extent) be included in the capital base of 
banks in other European countries.
Furthermore, the adoption of general prudential 
guidelines along which the individual banks will operate 
and the nonspecification of strict prudential ratios or 
norms with respect to liquidity and risk exposure affect 
positively the operating costs of British banking 
institutions and the level of their activities. 
Obviously, the adoption of flexible controls on the size 
of credit exposure increases the potential expansion of 
banking business. The flexible application of prudential 
controls on foreign exchange risk exposure increases 
banks' ability to participate in international deposit- 
taking and lending activities and to carry out arbitrage 
functions in the foreign exchange markets.
One therefore might argue that flexible and loose 
supervision should be held to a large extent responsible 
for the relatively low production costs of the British
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banking industry. The main reason that the British banks 
are able to compete successfully both in the domestic and 
foreign markets is not that they are offering a superior 
product or superior service. They have been able to 
quote prices which other banks faced with more demanding 
regulatory regimes, have not been able to meet.
Operating under a favourable regulatory regime the 
British banks face the attractive prospects of an 
integrated market having a bigger consumer base than 
either the US or Japan.
The Second (draft) Coordination Directive aims at 
giving full effect to the single internal market in the 
banking sector. The adoption of the home country control 
principle which implies that a banking institution 
established in any Member State of the EC will be free to 
open branches in all the others and its activities 
throughout the community will be governed by the 
regulatory authorities of its head office country will 
remove the economic protection which the national 
supervisory systems provide and create further 
opportunities for British banks. The UK banking 
institutions have for a long time successfully been 
involved in branch operations abroad.
Furthermore, in an integrated market a bank that sets
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up branches in other Member States will be able to do 
the same types of business through those branches that 
it can carry out in its home country and this provides 
new opportunities for British banks. In addition to this 
British banks will be able to undertake cross-border 
international banking operation on a large scale. 
Corporate business usually requires close and continued 
contact between bank and customer. However, the British 
banks would be able to sell innovative products to other 
countries directly from their head offices. Some 
British bankers believe that unit trusts are a prime 
candidate for vigorous cross-frontier marketing once 
national restrictions are removed. Mortgage lending, so 
far one of the most stay-at-home activities could also 
become a battle ground for cross-frontier competition.
The British banking industry seems to possess the 
necessary competitiveness to take advantage of the 
breakdown of barriers to freedom of financial services 
within the EC. Barriers in banking rank amongst the 
highest in Europe and are regarded as one of the most 
important by the UK industry and indeed by the industries 
of most other countries. Banking still remains more 
closely supervised than other areas of business activity 
and governments often use their regulatory powers to 
restrict foreign institutions looking for a share in the 
domestic market. The Banca d'Italia, for example,
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controls the establishment of new offices and has 
recently stopped issuing licenses (38). And it is in the 
banking field, where the barriers are relatively high,
that the UK may enjoy a comparative advantage. It thus
*
seems that the UK banking industry is most likely to gain 
from the disappearance of barriers to freedom in banking 
services.
On the other hand, however, an integrated market in bank­
ing does not mean only that a banking organization estab­
lished in any Member State of the EC will be free to open 
branches and transact business in all the others, but it 
also involves a certain degree of harmonization of 
national supervisory standards. The principle of "home 
country control" which implies that the banking 
activities throughout the Community will be governed by 
the regulatory authorities of the head office country can 
be accepted through the mutual recognition of 
financial standards and regulations. However, the 
concept of mutual recognition can only be justified if 
the rules, and standards of supervision of the Member 
States are equivalent. This can be obtained only through 
the harmonization of the essential elements of prudential 
regulations of the Member States.
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At present, the Member States significantly control the 
entry, establishment and operation of foreign banking 
organizations in the domestic market. In the developed 
countries these controls are mainly imposed in order to 
safeguard the soundness and stability of banks and there­
fore to protect domestic consumers rather than to reduce 
external competition and increase profits for the 
national industry. Since the controls imposed by the 
host country are related to prudential considerations 
they can be eliminated only through harmonization of the 
essential aspects of banking regulation ensuring that 
foreign banking organizations are adequately supervised 
and controlled by the home supervisory authorities.
The harmonization of the essential aspects of banking 
supervision implies that the British authorities would 
have to bring their supervisory system closer to those of 
the other European counties. This is because the UK's 
system of prudential regulation and supervision differs 
considerably from those of the other countries since 
there is no specification of ratios or norms. The Bank 
of England produces only general guidelines indicating 
the criteria on which it bases its judgement. This 
flexible system of supervision appears to be in stark 
contrast to the supervisory systems of the other European 
countries based on strict statutory requirements and
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provisions.
As a result, harmonization for the British industry would 
mean a considerable strengthening of the supervisory con­
trols which would erode to a significant extent the com­
parative advantage in the provision of banking services 
that the UK has been enjoying for so many years with 
considerable implications for the industry and the UK 
economy as a whole. The new conditions for operating for 
British banking would be an additional burden on the 
functioning of the UK banking organizations and would 
profoundly affect their ability to compete both in the 
domestic and foreign markets.
The harmonization of the essential elements of prudential 
supervision at the EC level means that British banking 
organizations would face prudential restrictions with 
respect to the type of services that they offer and on 
the range of activities in which they can engage. These 
prudential restrictions would limit their ability to 
offer diverse financial services to their customers and 
operate in many areas of the market and therefore 
diminish the potential for profitability. British 
banking organizations would also be faced with rigid 
controls with respect to solvency, liquidity and risks' 
concentration which would significantly increase their 
operating costs. British banks might not be amongst the
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most competitive ones. The British financial products 
would not necessarily sweep through an integrated 
financial market, nor would this market offer to the 
British banking industry a tremendous opportunity for 
expansion in Europe. The benefits of a common market in 
financial services for the British banking industry would 
be less than what many people might have thought. All 
the above arguments are reflected in the views of many 
bankers of national and foreign banks who permitted 
the author to interview them in person.
The conclusion that some people draw is that 1992 will 
eliminate barriers to freedom of financial services and 
increase competition between banks throughout the EC. UK 
banks are presently "ahead of the field" with regard to 
innovative financial products and therefore should be 
well suited to gain from the creation of a Common Market 
in financial services. However, the ability of the 
British banking industry to produce innovative financial 
products is to a considerable extent due to the lack of 
prudential restrictions with respect to financial 
services and activities that banks can offer and to the 
relatively high degree of competition that the present 
supervisory system allows. This ability would 
significantly be undermined by a strengthening in 
prudential controls.
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Furthermore, the British banking industry is greatly in­
volved in financial operations outside Europe. However, 
the strengthening of the present flexible supervisory 
provisions and the consequent erosion of the comparative 
advantage would significantly damage the UK industry's 
ability to compete internationally. In an integrated 
European financial market, British banking organizations 
might find it increasingly difficult to sustain their 
non-EC earnings. British banks have substantial economic 
interests outside Europe and would make considerable 
losses if any move toward integration in Europe
implied additional controls and restrictions on their 
operations undermining their standing and market share 
worldwide. Any readier access by the British banking 
industry to the European financial market may involve
also costs for this industry in terms of tighter
regulations and a consequent fall in non-EC earnings.
Even if we can identify the sources of costs and benefits 
for the British banking industry as a result of the 
integration process it is very difficult to draw 
conclusions about their extent. Their extent will depend 
significantly of the philosophy upon which the
legislative base of the future Common Market in financial 
services will be constructed. The stricter the 
prudential requirements and provisions are the fewer the 
benefits and the higher the costs for the British banking
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industry
Although it can be argued that complete harmonization 
would ultimately be the only way to achieve a truly open 
and uniform internal market, any attempt to impose it in 
one step would be rather difficult. In this context, the 
Community tries to promote unification by applying the 
principles of mutual recognition and harmonised minimum 
prudential standards. One therefore might argue that 
since the process of integration involves minimum harmon­
ization of prudential regulation the British banking in­
dustry will be able to make substantial gains in the 
Common Market at a low cost.
However, the minimum harmonization of prudential standard 
will also result in a relaxation of the more restrictive 
national provisions which presently prevent many banks in 
other Member States from competing outside their national 
borders. The strictly regulated Member States would take 
account of the consequences of the more restrictive 
national regulations and would not thereby allow foreign 
banking organizations to operate in their territory under 
more favourable conditions than its own nationals.
Indeed, according to some foreign bankers, many banking 
institutions in the other Member States see 1992 as 
providing them with an opportunity to compete outside 
their home jurisdictions in a manner which, to date, they
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have been unable to do so, due to strict national 
regulations. British banks would therefore be faced with 
effective competitors and even in that case their gains 
would not be as high as some people might have thought.
At present, London is one of the world's most important 
international banking centres, and more foreign banks are 
represented here than in any other financial capital. 
According to a report (39), total bank lending out of 
London accounts for more than 20% of the market, 
far higher than any other European financial centre, 
even if German banks have a larger share of international 
bank credit than UK owned banks - 8% and 6% respectively
at end 1988. According to a foreign banker daily foreign 
exchange turnover is estimated to be roughly twice as 
high in London as in New York or Tokyo, while deposits by 
nonresidents with banks in the UK accounted for 30% of 
the total international deposit business of banks.
There are probably several reasons for London's 
preeminence in financial services. Some of the strength 
in finance stems from the days when the UK was the major 
world power and its largest capital exporter; once a 
financial centre has become established many new entrants 
to the market will see it as a natural place in which to 
set up (40). The presence of many financial companies in 
one centre fosters developments which benefit all of
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them. Foreign banks are also drawn to the City by its 
dominance in the Euromarket and its pre-eminence in 
foreign exchange. Other reasons could relate to the 
availability of technological support and the relative 
abundance of skilled labour.
However, the main reason often given for London's 
strength in finance is the low level of regulation in its 
markets. According to a foreign banker, underpinning the 
London's reputation is the unique regulatory skill of the 
Bank of England. More than any other European country 
the UK's supervisory system is based on flexibility and 
dialogue between commercial bankers, their associations
generally praised the flexible way by which the Bank of 
England ensures the prudent conduct of business without 
restricting the banks' possibilities of profitability. 
Foreign banks are keen to exploit this element of 
flexibility in order to expand their activities carry out 
financial operations which their home parent may be 
prevented from undertaking. Furthermore, even the Bank of 
England (41) points out that flexible regulation is a 
means to the greater end of continuing to attract 
international business to London as an open financial 
centre.
One therefore might argue that the flexible system of
and the central bank. Some foreign bankers have
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prudential regulation and supervision is the main reason 
for London's pre-eminent position in finance. If this is 
the case, one effect of harmonization of prudential 
regulation within Europe would be to take this advantage 
away from London. Indeed, if in an integrated European 
market the UK authorities bring their supervisory system 
more into line with the rest of Europe, the Bank of 
England's sophisticated techniques will become too rigid 
and London will possibly lose attractiveness as the 
world's leading financial centre. The possible outcome 
of the strengthening of the British prudential controls 
would be to put the London banks on an equal footing with 
the other European banks and drive business abroad: not
only to other European centres but also to other 
financial centres outside Europe.
Furthermore, the creation of a Common Market in banking 
does not require only the elimination of the internal 
barriers, but it also involves the adoption of common 
external barriers to the entry and establishment of non- 
EC banking organizations. This means that the UK 
authorities would also have to bring the strength of 
their external barriers closer to that of their EC 
partners. And a strengthening of the external barriers 
vis-a-vis non-EC banks represents a potential threat to 
the London market's prominent position in banking. 
Indeed, Article 7 of the Second (draft) Banking
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Coordination Directive suggests that where EC banks are 
not found to enjoy national treatment in a non-EC 
country, the Commission may decide that the Member State 
should suspend new acquisitions by a banking organization 
originally established in the non-EC country concerned. 
The Commission's proposal would , by it's centralization, 
imply a greater bureaucratic burden to the entry and 
establishment of non-EC banks. The reciprocity provision 
is considered in the City as a major drawback in 
maintaining London's comparative advantage as an 
international financial centre.
However, London as an international banking centre plays 
an important role to the benefit of the UK economy; and 
this role is well recognized by the British government. 
It makes a very substantial positive contribution to the 
favourable invisible balance and the UK have much to lose 
if the EC introduces additional controls on the entry and 
operation of banks that would undermine its prominent 
position in banking. It is considered as a UK asset 
whose value should not be eroded by common rules. One 
therefore might argue that the British would not be 
prepared to accept tighter regulation in return for the 
possibility of readier access to the European Market.
The present analysis demonstrates that the Uk authorities 
have substantial economic interests in opposing any trend
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toward harmonization of controls at the EC level. This 
provides a first indication that complete integration in 
the banking field will be very hard to attain in the 
foreseeable future. In order to strengthen this argument 
it is necessary to present the divergence in the super­
visory philosophies, interests and practices between the 
UK and the continental countries.
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CONFLICTS IN NATIONAL SUPERVISORY PHILOSOPHIES AND
INTERESTS
In most countries financial institutions attract a 
greater degree of regulation than is normal with the 
providers of other goods and services. The two main 
reasons for this are that financial services are much 
more important than other commodities and, secondly, that 
financial services are often more difficult than other 
goods and services to test at the time of purchase, and 
their benefits may have to be taken largely on trust. 
The financial market has its own special features to 
which governments have responded.
The main economic reason for regulatory intervention 
in the banking field reflects a general concern with the 
vulnerability of the banking sector and the protection of 
the depositors. In this respect, the State's role should 
be a particularly onerous one where the market place does 
not find satisfactory solutions. However, the extent to 
which the market place finds satisfactory solutions is a 
matter of concern and dispute between economists and na­
tional regulators. The broad trends in policy thinking 
and attitudes remain a powerful force in shaping the 
supervisory approach to banking.
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In the system of prudential regulation and supervision 
the UK seems to differ from the other European countries. 
The UK philosophy of supervision is explained in a 
substantial volume of papers and notices issued by the 
Bank of England. These papers and notices relate to 
specific areas of prudential supervision such as capital, 
liquidity and assessment of risks exposure. In this way 
the Bank of England formulates a general supervisory 
structure which sets flexible guidelines within which the 
individual banks should operate. The papers do not 
impose specific numerical guidelines or prescriptive 
ratios that all credit institutions would be expected to 
observe.
The authorities remain firmly opposed to a rigid 
supervisory framework which would not take account of the 
differing characteristics of the supervised institutions. 
Some of them, for instance, will require more capital 
or/and more liquidity than others reflecting their 
different kind of business and the experience of their 
managements. Indeed, the papers are regarded as 
providing a flexible supervisory framework within which, 
after bilateral discussion, the Bank of England expects 
to agree appropriate guidelines with the management of 
the individual banks in order to ensure that the banks 
concerned are on a sound footing.
The process of dialogue and cooperation between the
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supervisors and supervised institutions is a key element 
in the Bank of England's flexible non-statutory approach 
to supervision. The Bank of England relies heavily on 
regular interviews and personal contacts with the 
management to ensure that the institutions concerned are 
soundly managed. The general idea behind the Bank of 
England's personal and informal style of relationship 
with the management is to make sure that the 
supervised institutions have the appropriate systems to 
ensure that their risks and exposures are properly 
recorded and reported to top management and to the 
supervisory authority and when the systems are in place 
they are properly observed (42).
The British supervisory authorities have the 
responsibility to assess whether the bank's policies with 
respect to risks and exposures are adequate and to ensure 
that they are soundly managed. If they conclude that a 
bank's policies are inadequate they put pressures on the 
bank concerned to raise the prudential standards to the 
level appropriate to ensure the sustaining of its 
prudential soundness. The Bank of England remains firmly 
convinced that the interests of good bank and of the 
banking supervisory authorities are one (43)• the 
development of sound banking practices that generate 
confidence in those who use their services. Moreover, 
the market imposes a great deal of discipline on its
128
members. Excessive risk taking, for instance, would have 
detrimental effects on the profits.
On the other hand, however, the market correction of a 
bank which ignores prudential standards will usually take 
place with time lags and these in the extreme cases could 
be against the interests of the depositors. There is, 
therefore, a need for a system which would permit the 
supervisor to have face to face contacts with the 
management, exchanging information and ideas about the 
prudent conduct of banking business. This system can 
contribute information which could not emerge from the 
balance sheets of the supervised banks. The judgement 
about the quality of management is therefore another key 
aspect of the Bank of England's approach to supervision. 
The supervisory authorities' concern has been to keep as 
a minimum degree of interference as possible in banks, 
but to retain a personal and informal relationship with 
the management.
The system provides, therefore, a great deal of flex­
ibility to the supervisors to discuss with the management 
the prudent running of banks along the general prudential 
principles set out in the consultative papers being 
brought out by the Bank of England.
The flexible approach to supervision is justified,
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according to the Bank of England, first of all by the 
effectiveness of this approach itself. A statutory 
supervisory system based on rigid rules and applied 
uniformly to all the types of institutions on which 
supervision is exercised irrespective of their size, 
scope of activity, types of markets in which they operate 
and the quality of the management, could do damage to the 
banking system as a whole: too great a degree of
uniformity would tend to create a banking community 
less well able to withstand systematic shocks, just as a 
genetically homogeneous population can be vulnerable to 
disease (44). Furthermore, flexibility permits the 
adaptation of the system to the changing market 
practices.
A flexible supervisory system is not only effective, but 
also essential to fair supervision. The adoption of 
statutory rigid prudential rules that are applied 
uniformly to the supervised banking organizations with no 
regard to their considerable degree of diversity entails 
competitive inequalities. The Bank of England believes 
that the extent of diversity among banking organizations 
seems to be substantial. Individual banks tend to give 
preference to certain types of activities and categories 
of customers due to their specialization in particular 
economic areas. Therefore, an effective and fair 
supervisory system requires a considerable degree of 
flexibility which enables the authorities to evaluate the
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extent to which the individual banks managements are in 
the position to retain control of the various forms of 
risks' concentration and have at their disposal the 
appropriate instruments to deal with them.
The issues of prudential supervision are strongly related 
to considerations of competition in the banking sector 
and the rules that are essential for the safety of the 
banking system should not act as a straitjacket on the 
banks. The operation of the system must, therefore, be 
carried out with enough flexibility so as not to stifle 
the benefits in terms of efficiency resulting from a more 
dynamic and competitive environment. According to the 
Bank of England, a statutory method of regulation would 
restrict competition between institutions as to lose 
their customers the benefits usually associated with it 
in terms of price innovation and quality and variety of 
service. '•
The UK authorities take account on the one hand, of the 
continuing tension and need to reconcile the objective of 
achieving a more efficient banking system through 
competition and, on the other hand, the absolute need to 
safeguard the financial stability of banks and the public 
confidence in the system and rely on means of discipline 
other than strict ratios or norms.
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The more frequent disclosure of information about the 
conditions of banking institutions may reinforce 
disciplines inherent in the market process. This 
approach which is described as "freedom with publicity” 
is designed to ensure that the public has access to 
adequate information, to judge for themselves the credit 
worthiness of the institutions with which they chose to 
place their savings. If this is the case banking 
institutions will be led to prudent policies avoiding 
risk-taking activities by a market mechanism in which 
weak banks lose deposits and sound banks gain them. In 
this respect, the Banking Act contains specific 
requirements concerning detailed disclosure about the 
financial conditions and performance of banking 
institutions.
The impact of the discipline inherent in the market 
process depends, to a considerable extent, on the 
perception by the market of the authorities, response to 
the prospects of failure and liquidation of a bank. In 
the Banking Act there are extensive provisions relating 
to sanctions imposed on banks that engage in unsound 
business practices, while the Bank of England is granted 
with cease and desist powers against these banks.
Moreover, the existence of a Deposit Insurance 
System consisting of a Fund and a Board and operating
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under the Banking Act provides some indications that some 
banking institutions may be allowed to fail and therefore 
enforce market discipline standards. In a case of 
failure of a contributory institution the Board of the 
System should pay out of the Fund to each depositor an 
amount equal to three-quarters of his protected deposits. 
In this way the System provides a safety net for 
depositors in the case of bank failure which, however is 
not comprehensive (since it covers only 75% of sterling 
deposits) giving, therefore, a serious incentive to 
future depositors to assess the viability of the 
institutions concerned. The rationale for providing 
deposit protection goes beyond the investor protection 
argument in a narrow sense insofar as it can be seen as a 
key element for safeguarding the stability of the banking 
system. The System may reduce the incentive for sudden 
withdrawals of funds from banks perceived to be in 
difficulty, limit the spread of fear amongst depositors 
and reduce the risk of development of general banking 
panics which could undermine the stability in the banking 
system as a whole.
The task of the Deposit Protection System is supplemented 
by the intentions and the broad discretionary powers of 
the Bank of England to intervene in problem cases 
assisting banks experiencing liquidity and solvency 
problems. The UK authorities may organize liquidity
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support for illiquid institutions. This support usually 
takes the form of loans extended by the Bank of England 
at a penal interest rate. Liquidity support could also 
be provided by other large private banks. In the UK 
banking crisis of 1973-75 the clearing banks participated 
in liquidity support operations with the instigation of 
the Bank of England.
In the case of an insolvent institutions the supervisory 
authorities may consider that the interests of the 
depositors and the stability of the UK banking system are 
better protected if they persuade the management of the 
respective institutions to find another stronger institu­
tion with which to merge or by which it may be taken 
over. The supervisory authorities should use their good 
skills and expertise to bring such changes of owner­
ship. Salvage of an insolvent institution with the 
help of other interest banks is the most usual practice. 
However, the acquisition of an insolvent institution as a 
subsidiary of Bank of England could be another practice 
(45) The Johnson Matthey Bank affair is the clearest 
example.
The Banking Act makes no reference to the Bank of 
England's discretionary powers to intervene in problem 
cases assisting banks experiencing liquidity and solvency 
problems. This is basically due to the fact that an
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extensive and highly efficient degree of protection over 
the domestic banking system may lessen the degree of 
discipline which the market imposes on banks and 
encourage them to engage in excessive risky activities. 
The main reason for not stating formal conditions for 
activating an emergency process is precisely to enforce 
risk-taking restraints and market discipline standards.
For all these reasons the Bank of England believes that 
emphasis should be placed on market discipline and a 
combination of informal powers to intervene in problem 
cases and deposit insurance eliminates the need for most 
bank regulation and supervision. However, there are 
considerable doubts about the extent to which market 
forces ultimately are capable of imposing an acceptable 
degree of discipline.
The prime responsibility for regulating banking soundness 
lies with a bank's own management; and the Bank of 
England tries to ensure that the bank concerned has at 
its disposal appropriate systems guaranteeing its 
financial stability. Indeed, one would normally expect 
that fraud and other irregularities will be the major 
cause of bank failures. However, the high degree of 
competition, that the present British supervisory system 
allows, may in some cases shift the scope of banking
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business away from concerns with safety and towards 
excessive risk taking.
In a highly competitive environment, honest bankers may 
engage in risky business. In a quest for higher profits
or/and market share, they may make subjective judgments
\
about future conditions, they may mismatch the currency 
denominations of assets and liabilities, extend loans to 
high risk customers, or hold too few liquid reserves. As 
a result the activities of fit and proper bankers may 
involve a considerable degree of risk. The banks' 
involvement in a wide range of financial services may
result in that the senior managements being unaware of 
the risks involved; while the Bank of England may not be 
able to find out. The collapse of Johnson Matthey 
Bankers in 1984 and its rescue by the Bank of England is 
a clear manifestation of this. Flexible supervision on 
the day today running of the banks can lead to flabby 
and complacent control and an unsound base for the
system.
The UK authorities in order to maintain a balance between 
stability and risk-taking try to reinforce the
disciplines inherent in the market process through the 
more frequent disclosure of information about the
conditions of banking institutions. But, in practice the 
concept of "freedom with publicity" does not seem to work
136
properly.
First of all, the availability of better informations is 
of course to the benefit of the public. However, the 
disclosure of information provides only limited 
protection against imprudent business or risks that are 
not presented in the balance sheets and, indeed, often 
are exposed after the fact. The effectiveness of the 
market stabilization effect depends very much on the 
existence of detailed informations regarding banks 
situations and prospects, which is not usually the case.
The rationale for bank intermediation lies to a large 
extent in the existence of imperfect information. Banks, 
have a special role as "inside lenders" based on 
specialised information about borrowers, so that it is 
difficult, if not impossible, for outsiders to assess 
accurately the riskiness of a bank's portfolio (46). The 
existence of information asymmetries creates a potential 
requirement for regulation. Depositors find it extremely 
difficult to make reliable judgments with respect to the 
prudent running of business and excessive risk taking by 
the respective institutions. Inexperienced depositors 
would understand very little if they looked at the 
balance sheets of individual banks.
The degree of emphasis that should be place on market
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discipline as a complement to official prudential 
supervision of banks should reflect the extent to which 
market responses to signs of strains developing in an 
institution can be expected to develop in a way congruent 
with the overriding public policy objective of preserving 
the integrity of the financial system. Once it becomes 
reasonably clear that an institution has difficulties, 
sudden withdrawals of funds from the institution 
perceived to be in difficulty will possibly take place 
undercutting orderly solutions. In addition fears may
spread among depositors posing risks to other banks and
favouring the development of general banking panics which 
could undermine the stability of the financial system as 
a whole.
In other words, reliance on frequent disclosure 
of information and market discipline as a complement 
to official prudential supervision of banks may pose
risks to the financial system in general as a result of
overreaction by the market to actual or perceived changes 
in a bank situation. The possibility of a generalised 
financial upheaval triggered by the publicised 
difficulties of one institution that are transmitted to 
others via knock-on confidence effects and associated 
deposit withdrawals creates a major rationale for strong 
government intervention in the banking sector. The UK 
secondary banking crisis of 1974/75 is an obvious example
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of this possibility when a few well-publicised problems 
in secondary banks led to a wave of deposit withdrawals 
from secondary banks, eventually threatening the 
stability of the entire UK banking system.
The UK authorities believe that a combination of the 
Bank of England's discretionary powers to intervene in 
problem cases and deposit insurance eliminates the need 
for most bank regulation and supervision. However, the 
institutions may, consciously or unconsciously, build 
into their decision making the view that deposit 
insurance and the Bank of England's discretionary powers 
to intervene in problem cases will give added time and 
leeway to deal with unforeseen problem situations that 
may arise, thus making institutions less self-reliant and 
less concerned about risk (47). Furthermore, depositors 
may anticipate that the government in the last analysis 
will take actions to protect them against loss and are 
encouraged to place funds with the institutions paying 
the highest interest rates, irrespective of whether they 
are financially weaker than their competitors. As a 
result, the banks concerned may take excessive risks in 
order to offset the higher costs of deposits. We may, 
therefore, end up in a situation where the growth of weak 
and risky institutions would be subsidised in practice at 
the expense of sounder banks.
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According to the Bank of England, the British supervisory 
system provides strong incentives to banks to avoid 
excessive risk taking since it protects the depositors 
rather than the shareholders against catastrophic loss. 
However, there seem to be a widespread feeling in the UK 
that the latter would not be allowed in the case of a 
major institution. The UK policy seems therefore 
irrelevant.
The freedom enjoyed by the banks with respect to their 
permissible activities and their adaptation to the new 
economic and financial environment have led them to offer 
a large supply of new financial instruments. Banking 
groups have developed into financial conglomerates 
incorporating a wide range of activities. The expansion 
of business outside the "traditional” banking area and 
into other types of financial activities (especially 
securities business) has increased the complexity of 
business and brought about new elements of risk. Banking 
has become more complex and more exposed to shifts in 
market expectations. Confronted with increasing risk and 
complexity the UK authorities should have taken steps to 
strengthen their prudential controls on a statutory basis 
and to reassess the existing balance between market 
forces and prudential policies.
Peter Cooke, head of banking supervision, has pointed out
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that in assessing capital adequacy in relation to wide- 
ranging financial groups supervisors "are to some extent
circumstances in which the restrictive elements in 
supervision would be generally regarded as essential. 
The UK authorities should therefore put an effective 
ceiling on the maximum capacity for overall expansion of 
a bank for a given amount of capital resources with a 
view of sustaining the soundness of individual banks and 
that of the system as a whole.
Furthermore, the supervisory umbrella should be extended 
towards a more comprehensive coverage of banking business 
in order to avoid gaps and inadequacies in the 
supervisory process. The basic approach to the 
consolidated supervision of UK institutions is described 
in a notice (48) issued by the Bank of England in May 
1985. According to this notice the Bank of England seeks 
to examine the capital adequacy and risk concentration of 
bankis on a consolidated basis, while the foreign exchange 
risk exposure on a consolidated basis is not 
contemplated. The extension of the principle of 
consolidation to cover foreign exchange exposure will 
provide the UK authorities with the possibility of 
monitoring the capital strength of a banking institution 
taking into account the totality of its business in order 
to evaluate adequately the respective bank's total
*
shooting in the dark”. There are, therefore
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foreign exchange exposure and to ensure its viability. 
The extension of supervisory coverage through 
consolidation procedures to include foreign exchange 
exposure contributes to the competitive equality (one of 
the main principles of the UK supervisory system) and 
minimizes any potential for circumventing the prudential 
controls.
The above considerations are also shared to a greater or 
lesser extent by the majority of the continental European 
countries which believe that the costs of regulation in 
terms of competition, prices, innovation and variety of 
services are outweighed by its benefits ie. the 
protection against the risk that some sizeable parts of 
the banking system as a whole may collapse. The conflict 
between stability and competition in the financial system 
is one of the unresolved problems of economic policy? and 
the continental European countries - in stark contrast to 
the UK - seem to place more emphasis on the former rather 
than on the latter.
It is perfectly apparent that the differences in the 
supervisory philosophies are substantial. Furthermore, 
it is often said that differences in philosophies usually 
reflect divergent interests and this also holds in 
the case of European banking. It seems that the UK 
authorities place a great deal of emphasis on the
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interests of the bankers rather than on those of the 
public; and there are some indications which can justify 
this argument.
The first indication comes from the nature of the British 
regulatory regime. The UK banking institutions operating 
in an environment free of legal requirements are more 
likely to undertake relatively risky policies while they 
attract depositors by paying slightly higher interest 
rates than would possibly have been the case in a strict 
regulatory system. If the risky policies succeed the 
bankers are those who reap most of the benefits. If the 
risky policies fail the losses fall mainly on the 
authorities, and the public. Since shareholders are 
confident that banks will not be allowed to collapse they 
will be those who would gain the greater and lose the 
less. The rules of the game as they are formulated 
by the present regulatory regime benefits the bankers at 
the expense of the public.
The Bank of England has long been accustomed to consult 
with the banking community over its methods of operation. 
It has longstanding relations with the British Banker's 
Association, which represents the point of view of the 
whole banking community and other bodies such as the 
Committee of London Clearing Banks, the Accepting Houses 
Committee and the London Discount Association. The Bank
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of England has also close relations with foreign banks' 
groups such as the Foreign Banks Association the American 
Bank Association and the representative office of the 
Bank of Japan. Through these association the Bank of 
England tries to seek opinions on its own actions derived 
from the practical experience of the banking community. 
On the other hand, through these associations, private 
bankers have been able to act together .to influence the 
supervisory policy in order to promote their interests. 
Consultation, and the search for consensus, become the 
outstanding characteristics of the Bank of 
England/associations relations.
As a result of this consultative process significant 
changes have been taking place in the proposals 
originally put forward by the Bank of England. The 
liquidity and foreign currency exposure papers are a 
manifestation of this. The Bank of England tried to move 
towards extending and formalising the supervision of the 
British banking system. The original papers, however, 
attracted considerable criticism from the banking 
community as being too tight, therefore posing a 
potential threat to the banks' freedom of operation. 
This argument was sufficient to convince the Bank of 
England and the conditions in the final versions of 
the papers were changed to allow more flexibility. The 
bankers were able to persuade the UK authorities that
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their proposals should be adopted.
Recently the Bank of England considered additional 
liquidity requirements for banks to hold a stock of high 
quality liquid assets against a percentage of their short 
term liabilities. These requirements (if adopted they 
would reverse the trend towards informality and 
flexibility) were considered necessary since the current 
system had proved to be unsatisfactory and ineffective 
especially in abnormal circumstances. Many institution 
had experienced short term problems with their normal 
sources of liquidity due to the unexpected interruption 
in forecast cash flows. The additional requirement 
was therefore designed to ensure that banks had 
adequate levels of liquidity to cope with sudden and 
unexpected liquidity pressures. However, its
proposal brought a strong reaction from the bankers who 
claimed that the requirement concerned will impose an 
unreasonable cost on their operations. Even though the 
Bank of England was firm in its belief that a 
framework for monitoring the availability of high 
quality liquid assets is particularly important when an 
institution experiences an unexpected interruption in
forecast cash flows, it finally withdrew its proposal. 
The interests of sound banking were superseded by the 
interests of the bankers.
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The Bank of England usually publishes its ideas and
allows plenty of time for the bankers to respond and 
comment before finalizing its rules. It seldom acts 
without receiving clear signals from the bankers that 
they too support the proposed changes in policy. The 
extensive process of consultation and dialogue between 
the Bank of England and the banking community and the
ability of the latter to influence and manipulate
public policy in its favour demonstrates that the UK 
authorities attach a particular priority to the 
interests of the bankers.
In stark contrast to the UK, the authorities of 
the continental European countries attach priority to 
the interests of the depositors and of the public in 
general rather than those of the bankers. In 
particularly, Germany represents the opposite extreme. 
The German authorities have a strong attitude to favour 
the interests of the depositors in order to protect them 
from potential losses. The consequences of the lack of 
"consumer protection” policy were revealed after the
Second World War, when depositors lost more of their 
savings. Banking institutions used the deposits to 
finance the War expenses and thus lost a substantial 
proportion of funds.
One therefore might argue that the authorities of the
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Member States attached different priorities to the 
interests of different political groups and this would 
restrain considerably the common grounds for 
harmonization of the banking regulation. It is 
considered that this would constitute the most serious 
impediment to the establishment of a Common Market in 
banking in the foreseeable future.
This elimination of the barriers to freedom of banking 
services is closely linked with the establishment of a 
harmonised supervisory regime in Europe. On the one 
hand, there are understandable concerns for greater 
intensity and coverage in regulation in Europe and the 
British are "the odd man out" among the European 
supervisors. On the other hand, the British have 
consistently pressed towards more competition within 
Europe. However, the connection between liberalization 
and regulations appears to be very strong.
Against this background, the EC Commission proposed a 
Directive designed to bring about home country control 
before the end of 1992. However, the future is not free 
from areas of potential controversy between the UK and 
the continental European countries. In the next section 
some of the directions in which one can see the debate 
going over the adoption of this Directive are reviewed.
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IMPEDIMENTS TO THE ADOPTION OF THE HOME COUNTRY CONTROL
PRINCIPLE
In the UK the Banking Act does not lay down any formal 
restrictions on the type of business which an authorised 
institution may undertake. Only the Bank of England 
needs to ensure that the respective institution has 
adequate financial resources for the scale and nature of 
its intended business. The UK institutions are allowed 
to get involved directly in the provision of certain 
"non-banking” financial products such as financial 
leasing, real estate investment, insurance business and 
securities business. However, some limitations to the 
above kind of business may arise from capital adequacy 
requirements.
British banks have been allowed to penetrate the markets 
traditionally reserved for the investment banks and other 
financial institutions such as insurance companies. 
Furthermore, the UK authorities do not impose any 
regulatory or administrative constraint on banks' equity 
participation. Only the Bank of England wishes to be 
notified in advance about any acquisition.
In contrast to the UK, in the continental countries, the
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authorities impose certain prudential limitations on the 
- scope of permissible business activities which banks may 
undertake directly or indirectly (through their 
affiliates).
In Germany, even if the system is basically of the 
universal type and with a very broad definition of 
banking activities there are certain limits on a banks' 
permissible activities. Universal banks are not allowed 
to engage in certain types of business which are reserved 
by special acts for specialised banks or other financial 
institutions. The issue of mortgage bonds is reserved 
for the mortgage banks. The operation of investment 
trusts is reserved for specialised banks issuing 
investment certificates. Banks are also prohibited from 
engaging directly in commerce, industry and insurance 
business. On the other hand, however, there are no 
limits to the extent to which banks may acquire 
participation in other financial or non-f inancial 
enterprises. The German banks hold substantial shares in 
non-financial enterprises.
In France, banks are prohibited from engaging in the 
insurance business and severely restricted from investing 
in real estate. Banks may not invest more than 20% of 
their own funds in shares of any one enterprise without 
authorization by the central bank.
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In Italy, banks are allowed to conduct directly only 
banking business. Banks are not permitted to undertake 
insurance business and to invest in real estate, except 
for their own operating needs. Securities business of 
commercial banks requires prior authorization by the 
central banks which is generally not granted. 
Participation in non-banking institutions are not 
permitted, with the notable exception of investment 
in companies performing activities complementary to 
banking business such as finance companies and data- 
processing business.
The limitations on the range of business into which 
banks may get involved arise in response to three 
broad categories of concern: conflict of interests,
safety and soundness, and concentration of power. The 
prohibition on the banks' ability to engage directly in 
the provision of certain non-banking products such as 
insurance services is felt necessary since certain high 
risk activities should be kept separate from normal 
banking business. Restrictions on security 
underwriting arise from the consideration that 
banks' involvement in underwriting as well as lending 
business may give rise to serious conflicts of 
interests: the wish to preserve customer relationships
might induce banks to overlend to underwriting
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customers, impairing the safety of the respective banks. 
Limitations on investment in real estate are imposed 
due to the illiquid nature of that form of activity.
Finally, the constraints on banks' equity participation 
may arise from several reasons. The illiquid 
nature of equity participation leads to the risk that 
liquidation of such investment can take place only at a 
high cost. Substantial equity involvement also 
undermines the respective bank's financial stability 
if the affiliate runs into difficulties. Banks,
involvement through subsidiaries into types of 
activities carrying risks is considered incompatible
with the principle of safe and sound banking.
Controls on banks' equity participation may also be
used as a means of preserving concentration of power 
and to limit the possibility that lender-customer 
relations may be influenced by ownership
considerations.
For all these reasons, in stark contrast to the UK, the
continental countries restrict the scope of banking
activities. The significant differences in the limits of 
banks' permissible activity between the UK and the 
continental countries would constitute a significant
impediment to the adoption of the principle of home 
country control in the foreseeable future. The 
continental countries would not allow British
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institutions to carry out activities which their own 
institutions are restricted from undertaking since this 
is considered necessary to ensure sound banking. On the 
other hand, the British authorities would not adopt 
similar prudential restriction on the scope of banking 
business since such restrictions limit the level of 
competition in the financial services industry, act as a 
severe brake on innovation and affect the quality and 
variety of services. This means that different products 
would be marketed within national borders? a situation 
which clearly conflicts with the principles of a Common 
Market.
The range of services that can be offered through 
branches by one state to the others are relevant to 
inter-state competition, and this is an aspect in which 
harmonization has not been attempted. Instead, the 
Second (draft) Banking Coordination Directive includes a 
list of services which any state can provide in any other 
state unless the host state objects on the grounds that 
it is against the "public good". Indeed, according to 
this proposal it will not be necessary for the banks to 
modify their products in order to make them conform with 
the requirements of the host country. The only 
exceptions which apply to this wide freedom is that the 
services in question must be those included in the 
relevant list of qualifying bank activities and the
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"public good" exception.
The relevant list does not include certain types of 
financial activities - such as insurance business - which 
are permitted to be offered by banks only in the UK. The 
continental countries would, therefore, continue to 
restrict British banks to offer these types of activities 
even after the adoption of the respective proposal for a 
Directive. As far as the services that are included in 
the list are concerned, the adoption of the Directive may 
produce a situation in which a host state does not allow 
its own institutions to offer certain financial services. 
If that fact persuades it to modify its own permitted 
activities, the single market is carried a little further 
without harmonization.
Indeed, one might argue that this can happen. In France, 
for instance, the segmentation between deposit business 
and securities business has, recently, been eroded. 
Thus, in Italy, the banks might be allowed to enter into 
the securities business in the future. However, the 
rules concerning the range of services that can be 
offered by banks may not change so easily. Apart from 
prudential considerations, it would be necessary to give 
some time to the institutions to adjust to the new 
situation. Some countries would not, therefore, be able 
to meet the deadline of 1992 and continue to impose
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restrictions on the institutions freedom to provide 
services.
These restrictions may be invoked by the host Member 
State on grounds of public good. The respective proposal 
for a Directive does not spell out the circumstances in 
which the public good exception may be invoked. However, 
it is clear that the exception is the subject matter of 
Community Law and therefore it will be the Court of 
Justice, and not the authorities of the individual Member 
States, which will interpret its scope and application. 
The Court of Justice will possibly have many differences 
to resolve and its decision may make a contribution to 
the detailed shape of the Community's financial 
services.
The respective proposal for Directive makes no 
reference to banks' equity participation in other 
financial institutions. It is therefore assumed that the 
restrictions that exist at present in some Member States 
should be eliminated. However, here again, national 
rules and regulations may not change so easily. As far 
as the banks' right to own shares in non-financial 
companies is concerned, the proposal stipulates that each 
holding may not exceed 10% of the banks's capital and 
that the total of the holdings may not be more than 50%
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of capital. Opposition is expected to this, particularly 
from Germany where banks have very large industrial 
holdings. The process of financial integration is 
unlikely to progress smoothly given the difficulties of 
harmonizing highly differentiated banking systems. With 
the exception of the UK where deregulation of market 
structures has reached an advanced stage, the European 
countries have adopted a gradualist approach. The pace 
of deregulation has been faster in some countries than in 
others.
Broadly speaking, the differences in the range of 
activities in which banks are permitted to engage are 
substantial since in some countries the concern over 
issues of stability and depositor protection is stronger 
than in others. The adoption of the Second (draft) 
Banking Coordination Directive would imply that foreign 
banking organizations may have wider or narrower fields 
of activity than domestic institutions. Member States 
are likely to find this arrangement difficult to swallow 
particularly when regulations differ widely. Opposition 
to certain areas of the respective (draft) Directive 
seems inevitable.
The Bank of England assesses banks, solvency on a case- 
by-case basis without setting any specific minimum 
solvency limit that the institutions should observe.
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For the purpose of monitoring banking solvency the
capital base is defined to include: share capital,
minority interests in subsidiaries that are consolidated 
for supervisory purposes, general reserves (balance on 
profits and loss accounts, including hidden reserves) and 
provisions (general bad debt provisions, less any
associated deferred tax asset). Preferred shares and
subordinated debt are also included in the capital base 
subject to a limit of 50% of the unlimited elements after 
the deduction of intangible assets (see Appendix 1).
The criterion which determines the status of capital base
in the UK is in accordance with the criterion set out in 
the Commission's proposal for a Directive on the own 
funds of credit institutions. However, the Bank of 
England recognizes that there are a number of elements 
(such as subordinated debt with a fixed maturity and the 
excess of market value over book value of some bank 
assets, notably bank premises and long term investments) 
that strengthen the balance sheets of banks but do not 
satisfy the above criterion. These items are also taken 
into account to some extent but only after the 
calculation of the risk asset ratio.
However, the identification of the constituents of 
capital is only the first step in the process of 
assessing an institution's solvency. The capital base is
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adjusted by deducting all intangible assets, investments 
in unconsolidated subsidiaries and associated companies 
including, but not limited to, unconsolidated joint 
ventures? and bank holdings of capital instruments of 
other banking organizations. (See Appendix 1)
The gearing ratio is expressed as the ratio of the 
adjusted capital base to total liabilities other than 
capital liabilities. However, this capital adequacy test 
is not considered as important since it does not take 
into account the different nature and degree of risk 
attached to any particular transaction. In this respect 
a form of risk asset ratio is considered as a more useful 
and effective test of solvency. Under this approach each 
broad category of assets and off-balance sheet 
obligations are given a weighting to reflect the 
different degree of riskiness inherent in each according 
to the nature of the obligation. The total of weighted 
risk assets is then measured in relation to the adjusted 
capital base to derive a ratio : the risk asset ratio.
The calculation of risk asset ratio represents only one 
element in the assessment of an institution's solvency. 
Indeed, the authorities take into account of the risk 
asset ratio as well as other qualitative factors, in 
their overall prudential assessment. They also consider 
the type of security held against advantages, the
157
profitability, the managerial skills and the sources of 
additional capital.
This line of thought led the UK authorities to set a 
minimum confidential risk asset ratio for each individual 
institution to reflect considerations which cannot be 
incorporated within the simple structure of risk 
weightings applied to assets. The minimum ratio is 
reviewed in the regular prudential discussions of the 
Bank of England with the management of the supervised 
institutions and is subject to periodical adjustment in 
the light of the continuing supervisory process. The 
policy of the Bank of England is to establish bounds 
within which the risk asset ratios of institutions which 
undertake similar types of business can move according to 
skills and experience of managements. Thus, the UK 
authorities assess the solvency of each supervised 
institution according to the particular circumstances of 
the institution concerned.
By contrast, other European countries have banking laws 
that always specify solvency ratios.
In Germany, the banking Law* establishes specific 
definition of capital and statutory provisions on capital 
adequacy. Broadly speaking, capital includes paid-up 
share capital, plus reserves to the extent that they are
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shown in the balance sheet, and net profits allocated to 
the capital. Banks may also include participation 
certificates in their liable capital up to an amount 
equivalent to 25% of the capital, reserves and allocated 
net profits component of liable capital. The loans and 
participation of banks should not exceed 18 times its 
liable capital.
In France, for supervisory purposes, capital is defined 
to include share capital, reserves and retained earnings, 
general provisions and subordinated debt, provided that 
the characteristics of such debt are close to that of 
equity capital. The value of capital for supervisory 
purposes is determined after deduction of certain 
elements, eg. the unpaid portion of share capital, 
losses, goodwill and start-up expenditures. Banking 
institutions are required to observe a minimum ratio of 
5% between net own funds and the risks arising from their 
business.
In Italy capital is defined as paid-up share capital plus 
reserves. Banks are required to maintain a minimum 
capital ratio (8%) between their capital base and risks. 
The Banking Law also specifies the different weights 
attached to various categories of risks.
The controls over solvency is one of the major
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differences between the UK's and continental countries, 
supervisory systems.
As with many items of the balance sheet, the definition 
for solvency purposes of a bank's capital varies 
significantly across Member States. This state of 
affairs largely reflect differences in philosophical and 
practical (mainly accounting) considerations and up to 
now a consensus has not emerged within the supervisory 
community as to the conditions of eligibility for 
inclusion in the capital base of a number of potential 
components of capital. In a number of continental 
European countries there is a strong belief about the 
conditions for considering potential constituents of 
capital as elements of the capital base: they must be
permanently available to absorb losses. By contrast, 
UK supervisors treat in practice other elements as 
components of capital for supervisory purposes even if 
they do not possess the characteristics described above.
Indeed, where country practices and philosophies differ 
considerably is with regard to the treatment of 
subordinated debt. British banks are allowed to 
strengthen their capital base by substantial issues of 
subordinated loan stock both in sterling and in foreign 
currency. The UK authorities take the view that such 
debt may provide support to the bank funding and
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protection to depositors in the event of liquidation. On 
the other hand, the German authorities argue that 
subordinated loanstock does not necessarily have any of 
the essential attributes of capital : it is not
permanently available to meet current losses of an on­
going concern and it usually carries contractual 
servicing obligations. The effective amount of capital 
which is used for solvency calculations should not be 
affected by the addition of low quality items vis-a-vis 
the primarily constituents of capital.
The definition of capital for supervisory purposes could 
possibly be a major issue which the UK authorities will 
find themselves debating with their Community partners in 
the context of the Second (draft) Coordination Directive. 
A major effort is underway at the European level, to 
improve comparability of countries' definition while at 
the same time preserving a needed degree of flexibility 
in the allocation of the various component of capital, in 
the light of a proposal for a Council Directive on the 
harmonization of the concept of own funds. However, the 
fact that this move has remained since 1985 only a 
proposal highlights the difficulties to promote 
convergence of philosophies and practices in this 
particular area.
As regards the measurements of capital international
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comparisons are conditioned not only by the diversity of 
approaches and coverage of risks across countries but 
also by the application of different weights attached to 
similar categories of risks. In this area, too, it would 
be unrealistic to expect a rapid convergence of legal 
requirements and supervisory practices.
However, where the UK practice and philosophy differ most 
with those of the other European countries are with 
regard to non-statutory supervision. The Bank of England 
holds the view that the prudential control on solvency 
should be as flexible as to take account of the 
particular character of each institution. No single 
solvency measure can incorporate the whole range of 
considerations which affect a bank's capital adequacy so 
that it can ensure that the capital position of the 
institution concern is regarded as acceptable by its 
depositors. Any action aimed at strengthening capital 
adequacy requirements in the UK would be constrained by 
considerations relating to banks' competitiveness and 
their capacity to adjust to changes in market structures.
Furthermore, time is needed to enable banks to undertake 
the necessary structural adjustments and considerable 
attention should be paid to the existing constraints on 
banks' ability to raise new capital funds.
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On the other hand, the principle that great emphasis 
should be placed on capital adequacy as a means for 
strengthening supervisory safeguards receives strong 
support from the authorities of the continental Member 
States. The need to adopt explicit measures of capital 
adequacy with a view of sustaining the soundness of 
individual banks and the system as a whole has become a 
major consideration. The continental countries apply 
sound capital ratios as a practical means for 
strengthening prudential safeguards, while the British 
practice borders on the reckless. There should, 
therefore, be no illusion that significant advances 
towards harmonization of capital adequacy could be 
achieved in the foreseeable future.
However, harmonization of capital adequacy requirements 
is a necessary prerequisite for the adoption of the home 
country control principle : a principle upon which the EC 
strategy designed to integrate the national financial 
markets is based. In the absence of harmonization the 
German authorities, for instance, might argue that there 
is not in the UK an equivalent safeguard in respect of 
solvency control and the German depositor would be 
exposed to significantly greater risks in the absence of 
supervision by the German authorities. Without some 
harmonization of solvency requirements it is very 
difficult to allow the activities of foreign banking
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organizations to be governed by the regulatory 
authorities of the head office country, since most of the 
continental countries would consider that the degree of 
protection provided to their residents is inadequate and 
unacceptable.
Furthermore, the issue of capital adequacy for 
supervisory purposes cannot be disassociated from 
considerations relating to the competitive positions of 
banks. A bank subject to lower capital standards not 
only enjoys a higher leverage potential but also has a 
pricing advantage over its competitors. Capital 
divergences give rise to "unfair advantages" for banks 
with lower capital base. In highly competitive markets, 
such as the future European market, harmonization of 
solvency requirements is necessary to eliminate the 
imbalance in competitive conditions.
Freedom of banking services demands, therefore, a certain 
degree of harmonization over solvency controls. 
Precisely because freedom of services requires this 
degree of harmonization it is difficult to be achieved. 
In the UK there is a considerable opposition to any 
additional control. In the continental countries there 
is a great fear of the UK as competitors and a genuine 
belief that strict statutory supervision is the only 
effective method of depositor protection. It is
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difficult to see where there is room for compromise 
particularly within the timescale.
In the UK the Banking Law does not incorporate any 
statutory control on risks' concentration. The policy of 
the Bank of England towards large credit exposures is
determined on a case-by-case basis and takes into account
the particular characteristics of individual banks 
including the nature of their business and experience of 
their management. The level of exposure in relation to 
capital base which may be considered prudent for one bank 
may not be for another.
The Bank of England expects each bank to set out its
policies on large exposure including exposure to
individual customers, banks, countries and economic 
sectors in a policy statement. These policies should be 
formally adopted by the bank's board of directors and be 
reviewed during the discussions with the Bank of England. 
Through these discussions appropriate levels of credit 
exposure would be agreed on a case-by-case basis. The 
banks may not implement significant changes in their 
policies without prior notification to, and discussion 
with, the Bank of England. Each bank should also satisfy 
the authorities that it has at its disposal the necessary 
control systems to give effect to a bank's policy on 
large exposures.
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The Bank of England also requires specific justification 
to the individual exposures exceeding 10% of a bank's 
capital base. Indeed, the Bank of England requires 
reports on all exposures above 10% of the capital base in 
order to ensure that such large exposures are given 
proper consideration.
Exposures that exceed 25% of a bank's capital base are 
required to be notified to the Bank of England before the 
respective bank becomes committed to the counterparty. 
Exposures above 25% of the capital base are not normally 
regarded as prudent. However, the Bank of England 
recognizes that there may be particular circumstances 
which justify the exposures above that level. Where a 
bank, for instance, is acting as a manager for an issue, 
its total exposure to the issuing company may need to 
rise above 25% of the banks capital base. A bank may be 
prudently exposed to a particular sector even if the
level of its exposure exceeds 25% of its capital base
because the respective bank specialises in certain types 
of lending.
The Bank of England also monitors the exposure of
individual institutions to movements in exchange rates 
flexibility taking into account the particular character 
of each institution. The prime responsibility for
controlling the exposures arising from foreign currency
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operations lies with a bank's own management. The Bank 
of England tries to be informed about the extent of each 
bank's exposure and the bank management techniques to 
control such exposures during the regular process of 
supervision. As a general rule the net open dealing 
position in any one currency may not exceed 10% of the 
adjusted capital base and the net short open dealing 
position of all currencies taken together should not 
exceed 25% of the adjusted capital base.
In stark contrast to the UK, the continental countries 
impose strict statutory controls on banks' risk exposure.
In Germany, banks must report to the Bundesbank "large 
loans” extended to a single borrower. "Large loans" are 
defined as the sum of claims on a single customer which 
exceed 15% of the banks' capital. No single "large loan" 
may exceed 50% of the bank's capital while the total 
amount of a bank's large loans should not exceed eight 
times its capital. Furthermore, banks' net open foreign 
exchange positions at the close of each business day must 
not exceed 30% of their capital.
In France, risk exposure to an individual customer, or to 
different customers having interests in common, may not 
exceed 5% of a bank's capital, while the aggregate of all
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individual risk exposures exceeding 25% of the bank's
capital should not amount to more than eight times the 
bank's capital. Banks are not permitted to take open 
foreign exchange positions up to 40% of their capital.
In Italy, banks are subject^ to lending limits designed to 
avoid excessive risk concentration. The limit up to
which banks can grant loans of more than one fifth of
their own funds without authorization is 40% of their
customer deposits. Furthermore, additional portfolio 
restraints are applied with respect to foreign exchange 
risk exposure. Banks are required to balance daily their 
foreign exchange positions vis-a-vis residents and non­
residents. Positions in US dollar, EEC currencies and 
other currencies have to balanced separately. Open 
positions to some other currencies are subject to 
specific ceilings.
Diversification of risk exposure has traditionally 
been one of the most important elements of on-going 
prudential supervision. And the differences in the rules 
relating to the concentration of risks could possibly be 
another issue which the UK authorities will find 
themselves debating with their Community partners in the 
context of the Second (draft) Banking Coordination 
Directive.
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Many continental countries take the view that excessive 
concentration of exposure is the primary factor behind 
financial difficulties encountered by banks facing 
changing economic conditions. The emergence of severe 
disequilibria in a wide range of industrial sectors and 
the much greater volatility of exchange rates that has 
been experienced for more than a decade are factors 
contributing to a sharp deterioration in portfolio 
quality and to a generalised rise in risk and problem 
loans. As a result, statutory limitations on the size of 
exposure arising from claims on individual or associated 
customers and open foreign exchange positions is a matter 
of great concern for continental supervisors, especially 
in the light of structural changes in economic and 
financial environment taken place in the recent years and 
the consequent rise of the potential forms of risk.
The UK authorities, on the other hand, hold the view that 
a certain degree of concentration is unavoidable and 
necessary in practice since individual banks tend to 
specialise in specific market segments or economic 
sectors. A certain degree of specialization may be a 
considerable asset for an individual bank which possesses 
the necessary expertise and knowledge of the functioning 
of certain markets. Indeed the diversification into 
areas with which the respective bank is not familiar 
could be a factor that involves risks. It is therefore
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unrealistic to believe that an acceptable degree of 
convergence of approaches in the field would be reached 
in the not too distant future.
The lack of harmonization with respect to controls on 
risk concentration would constitute a formidable 
impediment on the way of granting parental supervision on 
foreign banking organizations. Without some
harmonization the adoption of home country control 
principle would lead to significant competitive 
imbalances while some continental countries could 
consider that the degree of protection provided to their 
residents is inadequate and unacceptable. It is, 
therefore, perfectly apparent that a Common Market in 
banking in its most liberal sense will be very difficult 
to come about.
Common Market is usually held to mean a Community 
wide market having the characteristics of a national 
market. The existing markets differ significantly in the 
nature and amount of regulation. The problem which the 
Commissions confronts is how to reconcile the objective 
of dismantling the barriers to freedom of banking 
services with that of satisfying the authorities in all 
the Member States that there is adequate
protection for the depositors. The reconciliation 
of this objective can take place only through the
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mutual recognition of regulatory standards. However, 
the need for "prudence" constantly propounded in the 
case of banking undermines the principle of mutual 
recognition upon which the success of '92 depends.
In the view of the wide divergence of national rules and 
practices with respect to diversification of risk 
exposure the Commission recognizes the fact that it would 
be very difficult to produce a measure which would bring 
about home-country control at a stroke and in the Second 
(draft) Banking Coordination Directive proposes that 
until further coordination host Member States should 
control risks arising out of open positions. However, 
host country control on risk exposure will possibly be 
unworkable if at the same time solvency control rests 
with the authorities of the head office country. 
Controls over concentration of risks are expressed in 
terms of a relationship between the size of exposure and 
the bank's capital, because it is ultimately from 
this source that any loss arising from the exposure has 
to be made good. The line between home and host 
responsibility is not clearly defined.
In the UK the monitoring of banking liquidity takes place 
flexibly and in the context of regular discussion with 
the management. The prime responsibility for regulating 
banking liquidity lies with a bank's own management. The
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Bank of England does not impose any liquidity ratio which 
the individual banks should observe. It rather tries to 
ensure that the supervised institutions have prudent 
policies with respect to liquidity and adequate internal 
control systems. The authorities consider that adequate 
liquidity is based upon three elements: an institution's
expected cash flow, its capacity to borrow in the market 
and its stock of readily available high liquid assets. 
The main supervisory objective is to ensure that banks 
management policies pay considerable attention to these 
three elements. These elements may vary between banks 
according to the type of their business and the 
individual institutions are generally expected to 
maintain a prudent mix of different sources of liquidity 
appropriate to particular circumstances.
The measure of liquidity is based on a cash-flow approach 
according to which liabilities and assets are inserted in 
a "maturity ladder" with the net positions in each time 
period being accumulated. This measure by comparing 
sight and near sight liabilities with cash and assets 
capable of generating cash immediately in the first 
maturity bands on the ladder is similar to a simple 
liquid asset ratio. However, this measure takes also 
into account of the development of liability or asset 
management techniques for controlling liquidity through 
cash-flows. It also takes into account of assets which
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are capable of generating cash in particular 
circumstances.
By contrast other European countries set specific 
liquidity requirements.
In Germany, the authorities apply two liquidity ratios 
for prudential purposes. The long term liquidity ratio 
("Principle II") implies that the sum of certain long 
term assets (fixed assets, unlisted securities, 
participation, balances and loans with agreed maturities 
or periods of notice of four years and over) should not 
exceed longer term resources as defined in the principle 
(they include varying proportions of longer term 
liabilities) . The ratio must be met at all times and is 
calculated on a monthly basis. According to Principle 
III, the total of prescribed shorter-term assets should 
not exceed the total of shorter-term resources as defined 
in the Principle (they include varying proportions of 
deposits and interbank balances).
In France, the Committee on Bank Regulation imposes two 
ratios to ensure adequate liquidity. On the basis of the 
long-term ratio the total loans must not in principle 
exceed three times the total of own resources plus 
certain long-term liabilities. If the ratio is exceeded, 
the bank has to satisfy an alternative requirement
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whereby own resources and medium and long-term
liabilities plus interbank borrowing with a maturity of 
more than two years account for at least 80% of lending 
with a maturity of over two years. The ratio is 
calculated on a quarterly basis. The short-term
liquidity ratio which applies on a daily basis, relates 
prescribed liquid assets to short term liabilities and 
should not fall below 30%.
In Italy the Banks are not subject to any formal
liquidity requirement for prudential purposes and the 
observation of balance-sheet relations is used as an
indicator in the assessment of individual banks 
liquidity. These controls are similar to the UK ones. 
However, the liquidity position of Italian banks is also 
affected by the cash reserve ratio against deposits set 
for monetary policy purposes.
The controls over liquidity is one of the most important 
differences between the UK's and continental countries' 
supervisory systems. Liquidity ratios setting statutory 
proportions between certain liquid assets and prescribed 
liabilities are applied in a large number of continental 
European countries in stark contrast to the British 
system where no formal liquidity requirements or 
statutory ratios exist. It is therefore evident that to 
allow the highest level of freedom and give all banking
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institutions the right to operate throughout the 
Community subject to supervisory regulations of their 
head office country is very difficult. The wide 
divergence of practices in the field of liquidity control 
would be deemed to constitute unfair competition and some 
continental European countries could consider that the 
degree of protection provided to their residents is 
inadequate and unacceptable.
Furthermore, harmonization of the liquidity controls 
appears to be difficult particularly within the 
timescale. Most of the continental European countries, 
which believe that statutory liquidity requirements are 
important as tools for prudential supervision, would 
argue that the observation of balance-sheet relations as 
an indicator in the assessment of individual banks' 
liquidity is irrelevant and ineffective. On the other 
hand, the UK would argue that strict statutory 
requirements compel banks to retain more liquidity than 
necessary, (the freezing of an excessive volume of assets 
for liquidity purposes may impose an unreasonable cost on 
banks' operations restricting their profitability) and 
may bear more heavily on some institutions than others as 
a result of institutional and structural differences 
amongst banks. It will, therefore, be very difficult to 
achieve equivalent standards of liquidity supervision. 
As a result, the principle of home country control would
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clash with the wish of some governments to ensure that 
' they are in a position to protect their consumers and the 
rival principle of host country control would have a 
strong following.
In some countries - such as Italy and Belgium - monetary 
controls are perceived as having important prudential 
connotations, since they have an impact on a bank's asset 
structure, and are used as a substitute to liquidity 
controls. As a result, the adoption of the principle of 
home country control in the banking field would require 
the harmonization of the national monetary policies- 
i.e. a Monetary Union.
The Commission believes that the unification of the 
economic and monetary policies will be the next step 
after the integration of European financial services. 
The integration of the financial sectors of each 
Community country would advance the Commission's agenda 
for the monetary integration in Europe. However, the 
present analysis leads to the conclusion that monetary 
unification is a prerequisite for the integration of 
financial services. Monetary unification should, 
therefore, go hand in hand with the integration of the 
financial sectors.
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BARRIERS TO THE PROCESS OF LIBERALISING BANKING 
SERVICES IN THE DEVELOPING EC COUNTRIES :
THE CASE OF GREECE
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ESTABLISHMENT, OPERATION AND MARKET ACCESS OF BANKING 
INSTITUTIONS IN GREECE : CONDITIONS AND CONTROLS IN 1989
1 Regulatory provisions and administrative practices
governing the entry and establishment of indigenous 
banking institutions
i '
According to the Greek Banking Law (5076/1931) banks are 
defined as those enterprises whose customary business, 
irrespective of any other business conducted by them, is 
to receive deposits from the public and to extend loans 
for their own account. They must be set up under the 
legal form of limited companies. Firms carrying out 
banking business and operating under any other legal form 
are not permitted to use the word "bank".
The day-to-day supervision of the banking system is 
entrusted to the Bank of Greece which is the nation's 
central bank. This supervision is carried out in 
accordance with the provisions of Law 1665/1951 relating 
to the operation and control of banks. Generally 
speaking the Bank of Greece is responsible for 
supervising compliance with banking laws and monitoring 
banks' financial conditions. However, the operations of 
the Bank of Greece are carried out on behalf of the
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government and under the directives issued by the 
Ministry of National Economy.
Indeed, the ultimate responsibility for bank supervision 
and for the proper functioning of the credit system rests 
on the Ministry of National Economy. This Ministry is 
responsible for maintaining public confidence in the 
operation and stability of the credit system. The Bank 
of Greece is, therefore, a dependent public institution 
subject to instructions from the Ministry of National 
Economy; it does not enjoy much freedom of action; and it 
is the Ministry of National Economy which has the last 
word concerning the Bank's responsibility.
The undertaking of banking business requires 
authorization. The authorization is granted by the Bank 
of Greece according to the provisions of the basic 
banking laws 5076/1931 and 1665/1951. The criteria for 
authorization are related to minimum capital and 
management qualification requirements.
Indeed, any banking institution seeking an authorization 
is required to have a sufficient level of share capital 
in order to safeguard the interests of its depositors. 
The minimum level of share capital required for the 
establishment of a new bank is fixed at the discretion 
of the Bank of Greece and currently has been set at the
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amount of 2 billion drachmas (49). While existing licence 
holders which do not meet the requirement are allowed a 
period of time to comply. The share capital must be 
deposited with the Bank of Greece and the receipt of the 
deposit is attached to the application (for the 
establishment of the new bank) submitted to the 
authorities. The capital deposited with the Bank of 
Greece can be withdrawn only after the establishment of 
the new bank.
In the two basic banking Laws there are no explicit 
requirements as regards the professional qualifications, 
trustworthiness or nationality of the management of an 
applicant bank. Only the Decision 1360/5 of March 3rd 
1965 of the currency committee contains the requirement 
that the majority of the board of directors of a Greek 
bank have to be Greek nationals residing permanently in 
Greece and that they should participate in the share 
capital (and therefore on the voting power) of the bank 
by at least 60%. Two exceptions of this rule have been 
granted to the Arab Hellenic bank and the International 
Hellenic Bank. In these two cases 40% of the share 
capital is covered by Greek nationals while the remaining 
60% is covered by foreign nationals (but of Greek origin 
in the case of International Hellenic Bank).
Even though there are no specific regulations or
180
administrative provisions which set specific minimum 
standards as regards the technical competence and the 
trustworthiness of the persons who determine the policy 
of a credit institution, when an application for 
authorization is examined by the authorities their 
reputation is considered and possibly affects the 
granting of the authorization. An authorization may be 
refused on the grounds of lack of reputable management. 
The authorities also try to assess the professional 
qualifications of the proposed managers, their working 
experience in banking, industry or commerce and their 
adequate knowledge of the Greek laws and regulations 
with regard to banking. An authorization may be refused 
on the grounds that the management is not sufficiently 
qualified to run its business properly and able to 
benefit the economy. However, in practice this has never 
been used as a reason for refusing an authorization.
In general it can be said that any banking institution 
seeking an authorisation has to prove that its management 
is reputable and capable of running its affairs smoothly. 
The above requirements apply equally to foreign nationals 
and to controlling personnel of branches of foreign 
banks. On the other hand, the Bank of Greece enjoys full 
discretionary powers in taking a decision to accept or 
refuse applications and in interpreting the authorization 
criteria (because they are not laid down specifically)
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and deciding whether the applicant meets them. 
Furthermore, the Greek authorities have not adopted the 
principle that a bank must be effectively managed by at 
least two persons (this is the so-called "four eyes" 
principle) as a requirement for authorization; and two 
years ago the Bank of Greece permitted the entry of a new 
banking institution in the form of sole proprietorship 
(Bank of Crete).
The Greek authorities before granting any authorization 
also take into consideration the general or local 
"economic need" for a new bank, but this concept is 
discussed elsewhere.
The Greek authorities also exert considerable control on 
domestic branching by already authorised credit 
institutions. A licence from the Bank of Greece is 
required for the opening of any new branch of existing 
banks operating within the country? and the Bank of 
Greece enjoys substantial discretionary powers in taking 
a decision to grant or refuse the licence after taking 
into particular account the local or regional economic 
needs of the proposed branch. The Bank of Greece could 
also use its discretionary powers to exert prudential 
control - for instance in some cases the authorization of 
new branches has been granted upon condition that the 
banks concerned would increase their share capital up to
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a specified level.
The analysis of the authorization requirements with 
respect to entry of indigenous banks indicates that the 
national authorities enjoy significant discretionary 
powers to interpret and apply the provisions of the 
banking laws. However, the controls over entry are 
motivated solely by prudential considerations. They are 
not applied with the intention of prohibiting entry of 
those institutions which would succeed? they are rather 
designed to cut out only those institutions which would 
have failed. As a result, the control over entry of 
indigenous banks do not have a bearing on the size and 
structure of the Greek banking industry, if the 
authorities judgement is right.
2 Regulatory provisions and administrative practices
governing the entry and establishment of branches 
bv foreign banking organisations
The entry and establishment by foreign banking
organizations of branches in Greece is, in principle,
subject to the same regulatory provisions applied to
domestic credit institutions. The granting of
*
authorization to foreign-owned establishments is subject
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(as in the case of domestic banks) to specific 
requirements concerning the legal form of the 
institution, minimum capitalization, nationality and 
competence of the management and the general or local 
economic needs. Reciprocity tests are not applied when 
considering foreign banks application for entry.
Foreign banks are required, for the establishment of 
their first branch in Greece, to import, in foreign 
exchange, the equivalent of 2 billion drachmas. This 
amount should be converted into drachmas and be used as 
the branch's capital as long as it remains in 
operation. If the branch's capital is reduced, because 
of operational losses, below this level the shortages 
have to be covered through the imports of foreign 
exchange which will again be converted into drachmas 
(50) .
The foreign banks' branches are subject to the 
same management requirements as domestic banks. The 
Bank of Greece would need to be satisfied that the 
management is well experienced, trustworthy and properly 
qualified. The managers should also be resident in 
Greece. Even if there are no separate provisions in 
the Greek banking law concerning the nationality of 
those responsible for the management, the Bank of Greece 
would like to see some Greek national involved in
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the management for their knowledge of domestic laws, 
regulations, market practices and implicit conventions 
regarding "the rules of the game”. On the other hand, a 
quota system applies for each bank on the work permit 
which should be obtained by foreign nationals (other 
than EEC) before taking up a position.
The Greek supervisory authorities , before granting an 
authorisation, need also to be satisfied that the de-novo 
entry and establishment of a banking institution is 
justified by the general and local economic needs. This 
requirement, relatively subjective in nature, gives the 
authorities a considerable degree of discretionary powers 
in deciding whether to grant or refuse an authorisation. 
They can refuse authorisation even if all the conditions 
we have prescribed before are fulfilled.
Where a market is fragmented and characterised by 
numerous institutions competing for a limited amount of 
business, the resulting competitiveness may be 
destructive. Governments might seek to remedy this 
problem by prohibiting new entrants. Restrictions on a 
new banking facility upon evaluation of the "economic 
need" may be erected when the degree of competition in 
the domestic (or local) market is considered the 
appropriate one in terms of the banking system's ability 
to perform its intermediary function and to provide an
185
adequate range of services (51). In this case, the 
establishment of new banks is considered dangerous since 
it could create conditions of excessive competition (ie 
overbanking) and therefore enhance the risk of banking 
failures.
Sir
However, Greece is considered by some bankers, as 
underbanked. According to them the demand for banking 
services in Greece (estimated on the basis of income per 
capita) is well above supply of these services and a 
significant amount of resources are not attracted by the 
banking system. Furthermore, a relatively large "black 
market" in banking services operates in a well organised 
manner and the limited amount of the official supply of 
banking services is considered the main cause of its 
existence (52). Indeed, the evidence of this black 
market is used to highlight the poor quality and quantity 
of services offered by the official banking sector. The 
same bankers estimate that another 300 new branches are 
necessary in order to bring supply into line with demand. 
The concept of "economic need" is therefore used for 
other reasons than to avoid "overbanking" situations.
In the case of indigenous banks setting up operations for 
the first time in Greece, or for expansion of these 
operations, authorisation is granted relatively easily. 
However, in the case of foreign banks the Greek
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authorities, before granting an authorisation, take into 
consideration the possible adverse developments on the 
indigenous institutions of the future activities of 
foreign banks. Despite the considerable efforts made in 
the past few years the Greek institutions are still 
uncompetitive and technically less developed in relation 
to better equipped organised and experienced foreign 
banks. If these institutions were subject to rigourous 
competition their prospects for growth, or, in many
cases, even survival would be dim.
The above considerations in favour of restrictions on 
foreign banks penetration into the domestic market are 
similar to the familiar infant industry argument.
Furthermore, protective measures designed to diminish the 
competitive advantages enjoyed by more developed banking 
organisations are justified for other reasons. The
banking industry seems to play an important role in the 
development of other sectors of economic activity and the 
government has endorsed the concept that "the
strengthening of the domestic banking organisations is an 
essential characteristic of economic growth”. A strong 
national banking industry is therefore deemed desirable 
for many reasons.
The Greek authorities point out that in the last few 
years the Commercial banks (and especially the two
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largest ones) made considerable progress towards 
reorganization. The Commercial banks completed various 
construction works at a large number of branches to 
ensure operational improvements and expanded their 
national and international network with the establishment 
of new branches.
Furthermore, the recognition that the Commercial banks 
will be called upon to operate within a highly 
competitive market which is developing freely and rapidly 
in the context of the European Communities forced them to 
step up their efforts towards reorganization. The 
reorganization programmes include a wide range of changes 
covering basic aspects of planning and programming, 
modernization of transactions, introduction of new types 
of operations and adoption of new systems concerning 
internal audit and security of transactions (53). The 
authorities believe that these programmes when completed 
will give them the ability to compete successfully with 
the foreign banks.
However, at present, as we have seen above, some form of 
protection is considered necessary in order to protect 
the development of indigenous credit institutions. In 
these respects the foreign banks wishing to set up 
operations for the first time in Greece are asked to 
specify in detail the type of foreign banking business,
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the programme of operation and the number of branches 
they are planning to open in Greece. The authorities 
seek to ensure that the activities of foreign banks will 
not compete directly with those of the indigenous banks. 
Furthermore, the state-owned Commercial banks are asked 
unofficially to comment on whether they believe that the 
respective foreign banks will attract a significant 
proportion of business away from them and restrain their 
activities.
Limitations on new entry may also be felt necessary not
only for avoiding direct competition between foreign and
indigenous institutions and therefore keeping the latter
in a position to provide competitive services to their
customers, but also for financial protection. Indeed,
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the Greek authorities also express concern that the 
foreign banks by virtue of their operations could 
circumvent relatively easily the Greek exchange controls 
which are necessary for the implementation of domestic 
monetary policy. The foreign banks have close links 
with foreign enterprises (operating within the country) 
which are their main customers. These foreign 
enterprises concentrate mainly in export activities and 
therefore can escape domestic exchange controls through 
an appropriate management of export earnings. The Greek 
authorities therefore fear that the foreign banks may use
l e f t ' s )
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domestic savings to participate in speculative activities 
of foreign enterprises against the drachma. They seek 
therefore to ensure that the above prescribed activities 
will not be carried out by the foreign bank wishing to 
operate within the country,
The objective of restrictive policies is both to protect 
domestic savings being used for speculative purposes and 
to promote indigenous institutions and not to avoid 
"overbanking11 situations. The concept of "economic need" 
is used as support for protectionism of the domestic 
banking system and financial protectionism. Such 
protectionism takes usually the form of restrictions on 
the number of branches the foreign banks are allowed to 
operate within the country.
In fact, there are no distinctions in the Greek Law 
between indigenous and foreign banks with respect to the 
expansion of branch networks. The Greek banking Law 
establishes a policy of national treatment and the 
foreign banks have to meet the usual requirements of 
authorization for the establishment of any new branch. 
However, the national authorities, through the 
application of "economic need" criterion, place limits on 
the expansion of foreign branch networks restricting 
foreign banks, ability to compete directly with 
indigenous institutions.
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According to the First Banking Coordination Directive the 
"economic need" criterion will be legal until 15 December 
1989 as a condition for the entry into the market and 
whenever applied in Member States should aim at promoting 
security of savings, higher productivity in the banking 
system, greater uniformity of competition between the 
various banking networks and a broader range of banking 
services in relation to population and economic activity. 
Obviously, according to this Directive the "economic 
need" criterion should be used for prudential 
considerations. One, therefore, might argue that the 
authorities' objectives of using the economic need 
criterion violates certain provisions of the First 
Banking Coordination Directive.
An authorization is also necessary for the entry and 
establishment of representative offices by foreign 
banking organizations in Greece. Requests by foreign 
banks to establish representative offices are liberally 
treated provided that the representative offices do not 
directly engage in banking business and are not serving 
as intermediaries between credit institutions and 
local customers. The representative offices should 
operate only as economic observers and their role 
is limited to collecting and issuing information. In 
these respects the Bank of Greece if it is deemed
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necessary, may require that the parent bank submit 
reports or material concerning the activities to be 
conducted by the representative office.
The above analysis leads to a number of conclusions. The 
Greek banking Law establishes a policy of national 
treatment with respect to foreign bank entry in the 
Greek banking system. In Greece the first branch of a 
\foreign bank is considered as a new entity and not as an 
extension of banking business. So, a minimum capital 
is required for the establishment of the first foreign 
branch and its level is equal to the minimum capital for 
any new domestic bank. The requirements regarding the 
qualification and competence of the management and the 
application of the "economic need” criterion are also 
the same, in principle, as those imposed on the 
establishment of any new domestic banks.
However, the application of national treatment 
constitutes an important obstacle to foreign bank 
entry. Especially, the set of minimum standards for 
branches' capital is a significant impediment to the 
potential expansion of banking business in Greece from 
a foreign banking concern. The size of initial capital 
requirements deters, according to some foreign bankers, 
foreign-owned institutions from establishing local 
organizations since the expected volume of business
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does not seem to justify such a capital outlay. The 
Bank of Greece also applies specific requirements on 
the nationality of part of the management. Even if 
these requirements are applied in order to ensure 
that some directors have adequate knowledge about 
domestic laws and banking regulations, their existence 
could be another potential restriction against foreign 
bank entry.
As it has been pointed out elsewhere there are a number 
of instances where the impact of uniform requirements is 
uneven/ It is, therefore, quite evident that only by 
adopting the principle of "home country control" - can a 
truly common banking market come into existence. And 
indeed, this is the EC policy designed to integrate the 
twelve national markets by 1992.
Even more important is the fact that the Greek 
authorities enjoy considerable discretionary powers to 
limit foreign bank entry through more stringent 
enforcement of apparently non-discriminatory regulations. 
The economic need criterion applies, in principle, 
equally to both domestic and foreign banks. In practice, 
however, discriminatory treatment against foreign banks 
arises in the actual application of this requirement 
since there is considerable lack of transparency in 
respect of the criteria used for assessing the general or 
local economic needs for a new bank.
193
3 Regulatory provisions and administrative practices
governing the entry and establishment of majority 
and minority owned subsidiaries bv foreign banking 
organisations
The Greek authorities also limit foreign banks' access to 
the domestic market through the acquisition of 
participations in the indigenous banks. Indeed, foreign 
access to the domestic banking system through equity 
participations in indigenous banks is subject to specific 
restrictions as to the maximum degree of foreign 
ownership allowed by the decision 1360/65 of March 3, 
1965 of the Currency Committee. According to this 
decision nonresident participation is not allowed to 
exceed 40% of the capital stock of a bank established in 
Greece. However, exceptions to this practice were 
authorized by the Greek authorities in two cases so far : 
to the Arab Hellenic bank and to International Hellenic 
Bank both only 40% owned by Greek interests.
In principle the banks with foreign interests are subject 
to the same requirements as domestic banks with regards 
to nationality and competence of management. The 
majority of the members of the board of directors should 
be of Greek nationality, permanently resident in Greece
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(with the exception of the Arab Hellenic bank and the 
International Hellenic bank) while the competence of 
personnel in control - is assessed in the same way as for 
Greek credit institutions.
As in the case of de-novo entry and establishment of 
foreign banking organization, no requirements are laid 
down with regard to guarantees or "letters" of comfort
from parent institutions, but the Bank of Greece in
examining applications may stipulate specific 
requirements. When a foreign bank applies for permission 
to own less than 40% of the total share of capital
it might be necessary to provide evidence that it
intends to promote the activities and the competitive 
position of the subsidiary through the application 
of modern banking techniques. Guarantees with regard to 
the foreign investment were required only in the two 
cases where the foreign institutions acquired 
controlling interest.
Recently, the Greek authorities have started encouraging 
the acquisition by foreign banking organization of 
minority interest (less than 40%) in indigenous banks. 
This significant shift in attitude reflects the 
authorities views that some foreign participations would 
facilitate the introduction of new services, techniques, 
instruments and management strategies which will foster
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the efficiency of domestic banks and enable them to 
compete successfully with their foreign counterparts in 
the single financial market of 1992. In particular, some 
degree of foreign ownership is seen as a means of 
introducing innovations such as the use of cheques, and 
business consultancy? and stimulate the growth of banking 
related specialised services such as leasing factoring 
and consumer finance. In the above activities the 
foreign banking organizations hold a strong comparative 
advantage in terms of know-how and experience.
On the other hand, the establishment of subsidiaries 
through the acquisition of majority interests by non­
residents banks is prohibited as a general rule. The 
reasons for forbidding non-resident acquisitions of 
majority holdings in indigenous banks are broadly the 
same as for limiting de-novo entry. The authorities' 
objective of placing such a strict rule (decision 
1350/65) was to protect the domestic banking system from 
foreign competition and to avoid foreign majority 
participation in a sector which is regarded of vital 
importance for the general attainment of economic policy 
goals. The regulation which set a ceiling on the maximum 
level of participation is.the most serious obstacle since 
it limits directly the scope for foreign access to the 
Greek banking sector. Other impediments such as 
regulations with respect to nationality and competence of
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management are considered of relatively minor importance.
Broadly speaking, restrictions on the entry and 
establishment of foreign subsidiaries are substantial. 
Foreign banking organizations are faced with the position 
of introducing new services, techniques, instruments and 
management strategies with little control and with most 
of the profits going to local interests. It seems that 
the countries which restrict the establishment of foreign 
branches, are those where establishment of foreign 
subsidiaries is also difficult. Countries applying a 
strict policy with respect to de-novo entry cannot offer 
foreign banks a viable alternative to establishment in 
the domestic market via the acquisition of indigenous 
banks.
It is rather surprising that while the Commission made 
significant attempts to eliminate impediments to the 
establishment of foreign branches, it did not do so with 
regard to foreign subsidiaries. Indeed, some banking 
organizations (especially the German ones) are 
specialized in the entry into foreign markets through 
subsidiaries so that they obtain a given portfolio and 
then they try to expand it. The adoption of Directives 
designed to abolish restrictions with respect to 
acquisition by foreign banking organizations of 
participations in indigenous banks is, therefore,
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essential for the creation of a Common market in banking.
Even if the difficulties facing the Commission in its 
task are recognised, it is considered that its strategy 
does not appear to be a comprehensive attempt to 
integrate the twelve national markets in one unit. 
Despite the intention of the Directives government action 
will be able to inhibit entry even after their 
implementation.
4 Regulatory provisions and administrative
practices limiting the market access bv 
foreign based banking organisations
The Greek exchange control regulations substantially 
preclude external banks from conducting banking business 
in the country with Greek residents or companies.
Under these regulations the outward transfer of capital 
originating from lending abroad through the acquisition 
of financial assets including bank deposits by bank and 
nonbank residents requires authorization by the Bank of 
Greece. Non-bank residents are not generally permitted 
to open deposit accounts with external banks. The 
opening of such accounts might be authorised only on an
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exceptional basis in the case of state-owned companies or 
some other enterprises when justified by their external 
operations. Authorizations are not normally granted to 
resident banks for capital outflows in order to create 
balances with foreign banking institutions for reasons of 
domestic monetary policy.
The borrowing by banks and non-banks residents from 
foreign-based banks is also subject to exchange control 
regulations. Greek residents are normally prohibited 
from borrowing from external banks unless an 
authorization is granted by the Bank of Greece. The 
authorization is granted only if the loan is raised with 
a view to financing export credits, raw materials and 
mechanical equipment and to paying royalties on imported 
know-how. The Bank of Greece recently permitted 
borrowing from foreign based banks by manufacturing, 
mining and hotel firms without prior approval but on 
specific terms regarding the period of the loans and the 
interest rates.
The Greek residents banks are subject to exchange control 
regulations insofar as operations on their own account 
are concerned. Commercial banks may accept deposits in 
convertible drachmas or foreign currencies from non­
resident banks on terms established by the Bank of 
Greece. The terms usually refer to the period and to the
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interest rate paid on the loans. Moreover, Commercial 
banks and investment banks may borrow convertible 
currencies abroad, provided that they extend medium-term 
and long-term loans of equal amounts in foreign currency 
(or drachma loans with a foreign exchange clause) to 
productive enterprises established in Greece. As a 
general rule, foreign investments in Greece by non­
residents banks are liberalised and may be subject to 
preferential treatment if aimed at the promotion of 
national production or otherwise contribute to the 
economic advancement of Greece. However, other banking 
services are not allowed freely.
As a general rule, Greek residents are not permitted to 
enter into arrangements with foreign based banks for 
services provided abroad on the basis that the underlying 
transactions clash with the exchange control 
requirements. Indeed, the limitations on market access 
by banks operating from outside the country are not 
primarily motivated by the intention to discriminate 
against the activities of these banks. They have been 
basically introduced because of the desire to minimize 
capital outflows. This provides a clear indication of 
the strong links between the controls on capital flows
t
and the barriers to trade in banking services. Indeed, 
the discrimination against banking organizations on the 
grounds of the fact that they are established in a Member
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State other than that in which the services are to be 
provided constitutes a serious barrier to tr<ade in 
banking services.
One of the main objectives in the imposition of foreign 
exchange controls on capital flows is the enhancement of 
the domestic capital market. The enhancement of the 
domestic capital supply is of enormous importance to the 
country as a means of supporting domestic economic 
development. The funds channelled into the domestic 
capital market can be used for investment in government 
securities and for financing industrial projects in the 
private sector of the economy. The foreign exchange 
control regulations have been introduced and maintained 
for various reasons, to safeguard the effectiveness of 
the domestic monetary policy and to achieve certain 
macroeconomic policy goals. However, even if the 
exchange control regulations belong to the domain of 
domestic monetary policy, the importance of such 
obstacles to international banking activity is evident.
5 Regulatory provisions and administrative 
practices restricting the domestic operations 
of established foreign-owned banking 
organisations
The extent to which foreign banking institutions
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authorized to operate in the national market can compete 
on an equal footing with indigenous banks depends in the 
first instance on the non-discriminatory character of the 
regulatory provisions concerning the scope of banking 
business. And in Greece there are only a few regulatory 
provisions which relate to the scope of banking business 
and distinguish between indigenous and foreign owned 
banks.
Foreign banks established in Greece are not subject to 
the requirement to devote 15% of their total deposits for 
long term loans to finance productive investments. In 
this respect the foreign banks are subject to a 
preferential treatment. Instead, their operations are 
subject to the requirement that their loans for working 
capital cannot exceed four times their endowment funds- 
ie. the sum of their foreign currency deposits with the 
Bank of Greece and the total of their long term foreign 
currency financing of the Greek State, public 
corporations and investment banks. Obviously, this 
requirement restrains intentionally the foreign banks' 
lending activities and (according to some foreign 
bankers) outweighs the preferential treatment outlined 
above.
With the notable exception of these two regulations, 
foreign banking organizations established in Greece have,
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in principle, to meet the same requirements as indigenous 
ones. Indeed, the regulatory provisions applied to banks 
make little distinction between banks of different
treatment against foreign banks arises from the lack of 
transparency in the exercise of discretionary powers by 
the responsible supervisory authorities.
With respect to prudential supervision there are no legal 
provisions that in any way distinguish between indigenous 
and foreign banks. The Greek authorities point out that 
they have adopted the principle of national treatment 
with respect to prudential controls. However, some
foreign bankers believe that in practice discriminatory 
treatment against foreign banks arises in the actual 
application of such controls.
The prudential supervision in banking is exercised on a 
non-statutory basis and the Bank of Greece is empowered 
with considerable discretionary powers to impose 
compulsory increase in the capital of banks within 
specified periods in relation to the risks assumed by the 
banks concerned. However, this is an area where the 
foreign bankers detect unequal treatment due to more 
stringent or more restrictive enforcement of apparently 
non-discriminatory regulations. In Greece there are
no specific solvency ratios and the Bank of Greece
nationalities. However, a form of discriminatory
imposes higher solvency requirements on foreign banks 
especially when they try to attract business away from 
the indigenous ones. The lack of transparency with 
respect to prudential supervision and the 
considerable discretionary powers enjoyed by the 
Greek supervisory authorities may therefore hinder 
foreign banking institutions and limit their 
capacity to compete on equal terms with the 
indigenous banks.
Thus, the EEC Commission's call for transparency with 
respect to prudential supervision in banking is relevant 
in the case of Greece. Furthermore, it is fairly evident 
that the principle of host country control could be 
discriminatory against foreign banking institutions. 
This is one of the main reasons behind the Commissions' 
decision to promote integration in the financial markets 
by transferring the responsibility for supervision of the 
respective institutions to the competent authorities of 
the country where the head office has been established.
Of much greater concern are a number of rules and 
requirements which, while applying uniformly to both 
indigenous and foreign banks, fall with particular 
severity on the latter.
4c
Many foreign bank managers have complained that the Greek
Co
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banking system is over-regulated by a plethora of legal 
and administrative practices. Indeed, in Greece, as it 
is pointed out elsewhere, the Monetary authorities are 
intended mainly to control commercial bank behaviour, 
through a wide range of rules and regulations. The 
regulatory structure consisting of a combination of 
direct restrictions on the portfolio policies of 
Commercial banks, interest rate ceilings on deposits and 
loans and ceilings on the supply of certain types of 
credit, reflect the authorities' objectives to influence 
the composition of real expenditure and real resource 
allocation rather than market preferences.
The administrative determination of interest rates and 
the control of the banking financial operations do not 
permit the banks - both indigenous and foreign - to 
pursue an independent and autonomous policy. However, 
even if the existing regulatory framework does not 
intentionally discriminate against foreign-owned banks, 
it limits their competitive opportunities. The foreign 
banks established in Greece would be able to perform 
better than their rivals among the big state-owned banks 
in the case of the free market in which the price 
mechanism governs the use of real resources and profit 
motives dictate the allocation of investments and 
lendings. Foreign banks are relatively better equipped, 
organized and more experienced to operate under the
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conditions of the free market.
Moreover, the direct controls of the banking financial 
operation, even if they apply equally to both domestic 
and foreign banks, may give rise to discriminatory 
treatment against foreign banks due to the different kind 
of activities they carry out. More specifically, the 
foreign banks mainly try to meet the financial needs of 
large multinational enterprises established in Greece and 
would not get involved in the financing of the small 
scale manufacturing in the case of absence of direct 
controls of the banking financial operations. In 
contrast, the indigenous banks would extend loans to the 
small scale manufacturing and to productive industrial 
investments, even in the case of absence of direct 
controls of the banking financial operations.
Some foreign bankers believe that the compulsory reserve 
requirements of 10% on bank deposits for credit to small- 
scale, industry are excessive for foreign banks. This 
argument is based on the view that foreign banks are not 
familiar with domestic market practices and thus the keen 
competition with indigenous banks to make use of funds 
earmarked for loans to small scale industry-owning to the 
harsh penalty represented by the very low interest rate 
on unused balances with the Bank of Greece - takes place 
on unequal terms at the expense of foreign banks. As a
result the foreign banks' unused balances of funds 
compulsorily deposited with the Bank of Greece for 
financing small-scale manufacturing are relatively high 
in relation to those of the indigenous banks. This 
entails a substantial cost on the foreign banks since the 
yield of funds remaining unused at the central bank is 
about 8 percentage points lower than the average cost of 
accumulating deposits. And the loss incurred by the 
foreign banks due to unused balances of funds earmarked 
for the financing of small-scale manufacturing and 
productive industrial investment, is relatively higher 
than those incurred by the indigenous banks for the same 
reasons.
The regulatory provision regarding the compulsory use 
of certain percentages of private deposits to finance 
small-scale manufacturing must be seen as a particular 
disadvantage against foreign banks and prevents them from 
making intensive efforts to accumulate private deposits. 
An increase in their private deposits would increase 
their unused balances of funds compulsorily deposited 
with the Bank of Greece resulting in a substantial 
loss. As a consequence the foreign banks already 
established in Greece do not make substantial 
efforts to expand their borrowing activities. The 
administrative interventions to absorb resources for 
the purpose of financing certain sectors of economic
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activity restrain the borrowing activities of foreign 
banks in Greece.
Lastly, foreign bankers believe that the application of 
exchange control regulations even if they do not 
constitute an exception to national treatment and apply, 
in principle, equally to both indigenous and foreign 
banks, bear more heavily on foreign banking 
organizations.
The foreign exchange control regulations restrict the 
private investors ability to transfer funds abroad and to 
use the services of the international money markets. The 
foreign banks would be able to provide an excellent link 
with the international money markets through their 
international networks. The existence of exchange 
control regulations restricts also the foreign banks 
ability to transfer funds abroad and to use them for more 
profitable investments. In general it can be said that 
the exchange controls restrains the introduction of more 
services in connection with capital market, money market 
and foreign exchange market operations. The existing 
worldwide networks of foreign banking organizations 
provides an excellent basis to expand this range of 
activities. The discriminatory effects of the 
applications of the exchange control regulations on 
foreign banks are also illustrated by the fact that while
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the indigenous banks have proportionally more clients the 
foreign banks tend to go for wealthy individuals who 
express a relatively high demand for international money.
Furthermore, the exchange control regulations apply to 
the repatriation of profits and contribute to the overall 
expenses of the foreign banking organizations.
The repatriation of the after-tax profits 
requires authorization by the Bank of Greece.
Foreign banks are granted the authorization to
repatriate after-tax profits up to the amount of
foreign exchange imported from their offshore
operations. The Bank of Greece may also approve 
repatriation of larger amounts if the respective 
foreign banks show substantial economic benefits to 
Greece from their operations. Some foreign bankers
stated that it has proven difficult for foreign banks to 
demonstrate such substantial net economic benefits.
The existence of regulatory and administrative practices, 
which even if they do not constitute an exception to 
national treatment, may influence the competitive balance 
as between foreign and indigenous banks indicates that 
the mere fact of treating banking institutions from other 
member States in the same way as indigenous banks could 
not ensure fair conditions for competition and the
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existence of a common market. This highlights the need 
for harmonisation with the EEC.
The analysis so far leads to the conclusion that the 
Greek banking market is almost isolated from abroad since 
freedom of international banking operations is severely 
restricted due to application of foreign exchange control 
regulations. Within this isolated market the national 
authorities limit the entry and establishment of branches 
and subsidiaries of foreign banking organizations as 
support for protectionism of the domestic banking system 
and financial protectionism. Furthermore, the 
authorities also restrict the operation of established 
foreign-owned banking organizations for the same purpose.
Any classification of identified obstacles by order of 
importance is a difficult and subjective exercise. It 
would, nevertheless, appear from the analysis of 
obstacles that the most serious category of impediments 
relate to limitations to the granting of right of 
establishment to foreign-owned banks. The existing 
regulatory provisions and administrative practices 
provide scope for some foreign banking presence but the ' 
right of establishment is severely limited. The 
restrictions on the operation of established foreignowned 
banks are considered as the second serious category of 
obstacles. The fact that the foreign banks, despite the
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small number of their branches, account for almost 15% of 
the overall banking activity in Greece, may provide an 
indication of the degree of severity of the different 
kinds of obstacles thus justifying the above presented 
order of importance.
In the field of international banking transactions the 
impediments that exist are not intended to discriminate 
against foreign based banking institutions and result 
from measures the authorities have taken in pursuit of 
other policy objectives. It is difficult to form an 
opinion of the extent to which the restrictions on the 
market access by non-resident banks effectively limit the 
scope of international trade in banking. One might argue 
that the pursuit of proper banking business requires a 
physical, operative presence and only through 
establishment can a foreign banking organization compete 
effectively with indigenous banks. As a result, the 
impediments on the market access by foreign based banks 
are not considered as important as the other two 
categories of obstacles.
The analysis of the impediments on trade in banking 
services reveals that the Greek authorities ignore 
certain provisions of First Banking Coordination 
Directive (since national economic interests are 
involved) and impose numerous restrictions on the foreign
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banking organizations. The question is whether this 
picture will be reversed in the years to come. Will 
Greece implement the provisions of the First Banking 
Coordination Directive? And even more important, will it 
operate in a unified European market based on the 
Commission's strategy which means that almost all the 
controls (except those associated with the establishment 
of foreign majority owned subsidiaries) would be 
eliminated? These questions are answered in the next two 
sections.
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AN INTEGRATED BANKING MARKET : PROBLEMS FOR THE GREEK
BANKING INDUSTRY AND ECONOMY
At the centre of the Greek financial systein is the Bank 
of Greece, the country's central bank. Around it there 
is a thin complex of governmental and private financial 
institutions which include commercial banks investment 
banks and government-owned specialized credit 
institutions. There are, however, no building societies, 
hire purchase and finance houses nor any other kind of 
organization (apart from insurance companies) which could 
be characterized as a financial intermediary. Non­
banking institutions do not play an important role in 
financing investment mainly due to the underdeveloped 
nature of the capital market. The banking system is the 
most important institutionalized means of mobilizing and 
allocating private and financial resources. In order to 
highlight the development and the operation of the Greek 
banking industry within an integrated banking market, it 
is necessary that the structure of the Greek credit 
system first be discussed.
The Commercial banks constitute the main part of the 
Greek banking system and play an important role in the 
accumulation and allocation of savings. Through their 
operation absorb the largest part of deposits in drachma 
and foreign exchange (around 70% according to Table 7)
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and finance almost all sectors of the economy with the 
notable exception of agriculture.
The National Bank of Greece holds a predominant position 
in the whole banking system. It accounts for more than 
50% of commercial bank deposits and 40% of all deposits 
and provides more than 45% of all commercial bank loans 
and advances. It also controls a number of other banks 
such as the National Investment Bank for Industrial
Development, the National Housing Bank, the Trader Credit 
Bank and the Arab Hellenic Bank (54) . It also owns or 
has interests in a wide range of other sectors of the 
Greek economic activity such as finance, manufacturing, 
insurance and tourism.
The Commercial Bank of Greece is the second largest bank 
in Greece. It accounts for almost 16% of commercial bank 
deposits and more than 10% of all deposits and covers
almost 8% of total credit supply, (see Table 7). It also 
controls a number of other banks such as the Ionian and 
Popular Bank, and Bank of Piraeus, the Bank of Attica and 
the Investment Bank (55). Similarly with the National 
Bank of Greece, the Commercial Bank of Greece has
interests in a number of important sectors of economic
activity such as insurance, manufacturing and tourism. 
These two banks have a small number of branches abroad to 
serve the Greek community established there.
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The National Bank of Greece and the Commercial Bank of 
Greece are under public ownership and for this reason all 
other banks and subsidiaries controlled by them are 
state-owned. There is also a small number of smaller 
domestic banks which are under private ownership. 
Moreover, at present, 20 foreign banks operate in Greece 
with total deposits of around 15% of overall commercial 
banking activity. Their main customers are a small 
number of foreign enterprises operating within the 
country (56). The operation of foreign banks is, 
therefore defensive in nature and derivative of the 
operation of foreign enterprises.
DEPOSITS HELD AND LOANS AND ADVANCES MADE BY GREEK AND 
FOREIGN CREDIT INSTITUTIONS IN 1987 (DRS MILLIONS)
TABLE 7
Commercial banks Deposit Loans/advances
National Bank of Greece 
Commercial Bank of Greece 
Ionian Popular Bank of
1,366,523
362,715
191,532
679,821
182,875
99,421
Greece 
Credit Bank 
Other Domestic Banks 
Citibank 
Bank of America 
Continental Bank 
Other Foreign Banks
101,780
207,920
75,523
67,136
52,398
123,456
51,192
103,975
92,759
44,972
38,791
121,207
Total 2,548,989 1,408,013
Special credit institutions 561,127 765,283
Investment banks 
Total
125,172 152,588
3,235,288 2,325,884
Source : EPILOGHI, September 1988
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The Investment Banks are state-owned financial 
institutions specialised in investment financing and 
their principal task is to boost the country's economic 
development. Their main operation consists of selecting 
and financing the investment programmes of manufacturing 
and other firms such as mining, tourism and shipping 
(57) . These banks participate in the equity capital 
of these enterprises and provide technical assistance to 
them. The operation of these banks take place in 
accordance with the government's industrial policy. In 
recent years, for instance, the Investment Banks have 
stepped up their efforts to support viable firms with 
temporary financial problems (the so-called "problem 
companies") on the basis of a plan set out by the 
government. This provides a further evidence of the 
strong state involvement in the banking sector. The state 
intervention is further enhanced through the operation of 
Specialized Credit Institutions.
Specialized Credit Institutions are State-owned
institutions which extend credit to specific sectors 
of economic activity whose attractiveness to banks is 
limited due to comparatively low return offered and the 
rigidities they impose on bank managements. The most 
important of them are the Agricultural Bank of Greece 
and the National Mortgage Bank which extend loans to
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farmers and to low income groups for house 
construction respectively; on terms determined by the 
government on the basis of its agricultural and social 
policy (58). The government determines directly the 
operation of these institutions.
The structural information concerning the functions of 
the Greek banking system that are provided above lead us 
to the conclusion that the Greek authorities are 
advocates of strong state ownership in the banking 
system. The major principle of the strong public 
ownership in the banking system is to affect the 
allocative efficiency of the market. The national 
authorities believe that there are considerable 
divergences between private and social costs and 
benefits. It is considered that private lenders 
operating commercially look only at the returns to 
themselves in considering an application for a 
loan whereas the investment financed by the loan 
might bring benefit not only to the borrower but also 
to the whole economy in terms of higher GDP or to 
employees in the form of higher wages and greater 
employment opportunities.
Public control through public ownership is essential to 
ensure that the necessary volume of external finance is 
available to finance a sustained increase in specific
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industrial investment. The availability of external 
finance is considered by the authorities as a constraint 
on investment of small and medium size firms and risky 
projects necessary for the national economic development. 
Public ownership is therefore essential to arrange the 
allocation of funds according to social priorities rather 
than criteria of short term private profits.
The above considerations, however, are incompatible with 
the principle of an integrated financial market. In an 
integrated financial market interest rate parity would 
emerge as borrowers in high rate markets turned into 
savers in low rate markets to reduce their cost of 
capital. As a result, capital would flow to areas where 
the returns are the highest. Obviously, in principle, 
the philosophy of control over the Greek banking system 
conflicts with the philosophy of a Common Market in 
financial services.
In an integrated European financial market the allocation 
of funds would be arranged according to criteria of 
short-term private profits and this may have detrimental 
effects for the domestic industry. In an integrated 
financial market the ability of a government to guide a 
flow of savings into preferred channels of investment is 
significantly reduced. This conflict between financial 
integration and independence in controlling the
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allocation of credit is magnified because the structural 
goals that are the object of allocational credit policy 
differ from country to country. In short, a high degree 
of financial market integration inevitably reduces the 
efficiency of a credit policy designed to produce a 
desired allocation of real resources. The Greek 
government (with the other Member States governments) was 
assigned the task of creating a Common Market in 
financial services by 1992, but it seems that it did not 
realize the implications of this.
Another feature of the Greek banking industry is its 
highly oligopolistic structure. As we have seen the 
greater part of banking activity is accommodated by the 
two commercial banks, namely, the National Bank of Greece 
and the Commercial bank of Greece. They both cover 
around 60% of commercial banking activity and along with 
their subsidiaries it is estimated that they hold over 
7 5% of the Greek banking market. The marked 
concentration in the Greek banking market may be 
described as a high degree of oligopoly at the producers 
level.
However, the implementation of the First Banking 
Coordination Directive would significantly undermine the 
state-owned banking organizations oligopoly position.
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The First Banking Coordination Directive (if incorporated 
into the Greek banking Law) would abolish the economic 
need criterion as an entry requirement and significantly 
diminish the discretionary powers enjoyed by the national 
supervisory authorities to prevent the establishment by 
foreign banking organizations of branches in the domestic 
market. The elimination of the economic need criterion 
which is the most important impediment to establishment 
and at present operates almost as an absolute entry 
barrier ruling out new entry whatsoever, would
substantially change the balance as between foreign and 
indigenous banking institutions in favour of the former. 
A great deal of "new entry" would take place in the
market putting an end to the monopoly position enjoyed by 
the big state-owned banking organizations. Over time the 
number of foreign banks established in the country would 
substantially increase since the supply of banking 
services falls short of the needs of the domestic economy 
and there are still considerable resources remaining 
untapped by the banking system.
The elimination of the economic need criterion as an 
entry requirement would change the market share picture
between foreign and indigenous banks, presented in
Table 7. Foreign banks can develop more efficient 
marketing and production systems and therefore are 
relatively quick in exploiting opportunities and able to
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perform better than their slower-moving big state-owned 
banking organizations. The former would therefore 
attract a significant amount of business away from the 
latter.
Of course, the elimination of the economic need criterion 
does not imply that the national supervisory authorities 
would lose their ability to restrict the entry and 
especially the operation of foreign banks already 
established in the country. The authorities will still 
be able to impose relative entry barriers which place a 
potential new entrant at a disadvantage but not an 
insurmountable one. These barriers concern authorization 
and other operational terms on which the authorization is 
granted such as licensing procedures, requirements for 
minimum earmarked capital, restrictions on who can own a 
bank and regulatory and administrative provisions on 
nationality, language requirements and competence of 
personnel and management. The above impediments 
effectively limit the scope for international trade in 
banking.
Even more important is the fact that the Greek 
authorities would still be able to apply impediments on 
the operations of established foreign-owned banking 
organisations. These impediments concern restrictions on 
the type of services that can be offered and on the range
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of activities in which foreign banks can engage and 
restriction with respect to administrative prudential 
controls that are applied in a discriminatory manner 
against foreign-owned banks.
Even if the Greek authorities could always invent and 
rely on new ways of restricting the operation of foreign 
owned banking organizations (especially through more 
stringent enforcement of apparently non-discriminatory 
regulations), the elimination of the economic need 
criterion as an entry requirement would significantly 
increase the market share of foreign banks at the expense 
of the:indigenous banking institutions. This criterion
is currently used as a powerful instrument of 
protectionism of the domestic banking system so as to 
prevent direct competition between foreign and indigenous 
institutions keeping the latter in a position to provide 
competitive services to their customers.
Such protectionism usually takes the form of restrictions 
on the number of branches the foreign banks are allowed 
to operate within the country; its elimination would 
provide foreign banks with an opportunity to expand 
through the establishment of a greater number of 
branches. Up to now foreign banks have not ventured 
beyond Athens, Thessaloniki and Piraeus. There are, 
therefore, strong reasons to believe that certain main
222
provincial centres like Patra, Heraklion, Volos etc., 
could be the new target for foreign banking expansion in 
Greece.
The analysis so far leads us to the conclusion that 
the implementation of the First Banking Coordination 
Directive would imply a substantial reduction in the 
market share of the state-owned banking organizations 
and an absolute reduction in their business. The 
former effect is considered to be stronger than the 
latter due to the underbanking aspect - ie. the
supply of banking services falls short of the needs of 
the economy.
Next to this problem there would also be another one: 
the opening up of Europe's financial service markets to 
ensure that the best available operator within the 
Community is providing given services in any location. 
This means that no government regulations should obstruct 
the neutrality between buying financial services from a 
domestic bank, buying them domestically from a 
domestically established bank, or importing them from 
abroad. As a result, the state-owned banking 
organizations would have to cope with severe competition 
within their national boundaries from giant multinational 
banking institutions enjoying benefits of scale from 
their extensive global operations, having relatively easy
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access to international capital markets (and therefore 
acquiring factor inputs, such as capital, at a lower cost 
than the state-owned banking organizations) and operating 
(as it is pointed out elsewhere) under a favourable 
supervisory system. The state-owned banking 
organizations would, therefore, be squeezed by freedom of 
competition.
Indeed, the analysis of the structure of the Greek 
banking system leads us to some conclusions about the 
possible implications of the Second (draft) Banking 
Coordination Directive and the consequent unification of 
the European banking markets. The traditional structure 
of the large state-owned companies which have never faced 
effective competition and with an extensive home base and 
a small number of establishments abroad would undergo 
drastic changes within an integrated European banking 
market.
The change which in theory would merge the twelve 
independent markets into one market is the proposal that 
once a banking organization has been sanctioned to 
establish and operate somewhere in the Community, it 
would have the right to establish and operate anywhere in 
the Community according to the rules of the country where 
the head office is established. Even if the Second 
(draft) Banking Coordination Directive does not bring
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about absolute home country control its adoption would 
eliminate potential sources of discriminatory treatment 
against the establishment of foreign banking 
organizations that arise from provisions as regards the 
fixing of minimum standards for branches' capital and the 
nationality and competence of personnel.
The Greek authorities would not also be able to impose 
any restriction on the type of services that can be 
offered and on the range of activities in which foreign 
banks can engage and at present constitute important 
obstacles to the potential expansion of business. 
Furthermore, the prudential supervision with respect to 
solvency would no longer be applied in a differential 
manner to foreign-owned banks. The use also of the 
concept of the capital of the bank as a whole, rather 
than the branch capital, for supervisory purposes would 
eliminate an important hindrance to the potential 
expansion of the foreign branch business.
Obviously, the integration of European financial markets 
would substantially increase the opportunities for the 
establishment of EC banks in Greece. Given the freedom 
of establishment that will prevail and the equal terms of 
competition that will exist with regard to these 
institutions the Greek banking industry will have to 
cope with severe competition. However, this industry is
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uncompetitive and relatively underdeveloped.
In order to demonstrate the relatively low level of
development of the domestic industry is essential to
state that the Greek banks undertake only a limited
number of banking services from those included in the
/
relevant list of qualifying bank activities which is 
annexed to the Second (draft) Coordination Directive. 
More specifically, Greek banks are not involved in money 
market instruments, participation of share issues and the 
provision of services related to such issues, credit 
reference services and safe custody services, while 
factoring and leasing is undertaken only to a very 
limited extent. The Greek banking industry would 
therefore be squeezed after the elimination of barriers 
to freedom of banking services.
The compression of the state-owned banking industry would 
also have significant repercussions for the rest of the 
national economy. Indeed, as it is pointed out 
elsewhere, the state-owned banking sector plays an 
important role for the development of the Greek economy. 
This explains the fact that the Greek government 
considers it necessary to have a specific policy with 
regard to the size and structure of the state-owned 
banking industry. Its compression would jeopardize the 
development of important sectors of the economy and
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particularly the medium and small scale industry. The 
Greek authorities are advocates of a strong public 
ownership in the financial sector and would not remain 
indifferent to the developments at the European level.
The Greek government have perfectly legitimate fears 
about the effects of the freedom of banking services on 
the domestic banking sector. This sector could be 
overwhelmed by complete freedom of competition. Of 
course, one might argue that all these are the 
implications of the creation of a real Common Market and 
that if Greece is entitled to export light industrial 
goods then it is only right that other countries should 
be able in return to provide in Greece banking services. 
However, Greece is able to experience a relatively good 
export performance in light industrial goods due to a 
strong domestic banking sector. Indeed, the domestic 
banking sector is very important for the development of 
other sectors of the economy. This is the main reason 
behind the^ fact that freedom of trade in services lags so 
far behind freedom of trade in goods and will possibly
continue to lag behind in the future.
The Greek banking organizations may be able to cope to 
some extent with the severe competition that the
integration of financial markets implies if they
accelerate their modernization efforts in order to
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strengthen their international competitiveness. Indeed,
recently the Greek banks started undertaking a
significant modernization effort and they are in the 
process of introducing new operating methods, expanding 
their communication systems and undertaking personnel 
programmes. Many bankers believe that the political 
will is there to continue modernizing the Greek banking 
system. However, there is a number of difficulties on 
the way of modernising the banking system.
The modernization programme does not have a set timetable 
since the pace of the modernization depends on the state 
of the economy in general. The exogenous limitations on 
the modernization effort are related to strict government 
regulations which restrain competition in the financial 
market and has given the Greek banking industry very 
little incentive to innovate. Indeed, as it is pointed
out elsewhere, all interest rates are determined by the 
authorities in a governmental process of controlling 
money flows while the public sector deficit is financed 
through compulsory reserve requirements on the banks. As 
a result the size of bank profits are, in effect, 
dictated by the government. The modernization effort
cannot be successful if it is not accompanied by a 
gradual change of the current highly regulated 
environment. The gradual full deregulation of interest 
rates and freedom for the allocation of funds are
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necessary with a view to ensuring efficient operation of 
the market mechanism and releasing the forces of 
competition. However, as it is demonstrated elsewhere, 
it would be very difficult to abolish all government 
regulations in the not too distant future.
Next in line is the union. The bank employees' union, 
Otoe, strongly opposes any move towards modernization, 
since in many cases this involves great staff reductions. 
This union is strong and militant. On a number of 
occasions it has virtually brought the country to a stop 
by striking and it is capable of bringing considerable 
pressure on the government. Recently, it took a rather 
extremely critical view against the integration of 
European financial services pointing out that the Second 
Banking Coordination Directive if adopted would lead to 
the "destruction" of the domestic banking system.
The view is generally held that a strong foreign presence 
through acquisitions of participations in indigenous 
banks would give a boost to Greece's modernization 
progress. Indeed, it seems almost certain that 
foreigners would move in, even in that way, since Greece 
has a lot to offer to foreigners. Despite a significant 
increase in deposits there are still considerable 
resources remaining untapped by the banking system. The 
dynamic shipping and tourist industries promise a
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substantial expansion of banking- business. However, the 
Greek authorities are generally reluctant to see the 
control of the domestic financial system moving into 
foreign hands. For some Central Bank's officials 
liberalization of foreign participations in indigenous 
banks could mean colonisation for the majority of Greek 
banking institutions.
The elimination of restrictions on market access by 
foreign banking organizations not established in the 
country will have considerable repercussions for the 
Greek economy.
The adoption of capital movements Directive of 1988 
will put an end to the fairly restrictive Greek exchange 
controls on movements of capital. There is considerable 
risk that capital will flow outside the country not only 
because of relatively low interest rates but also because 
of lack of confidence in the home currency, since its 
bop suffers from chronic deficit. On the other hand, an 
increase in direct investment in Greece is probable 
because foreign investors will not be subject to 
restrictive rules with respect to re-exportation of 
capital and repatriation of profits. However, one 
would normally expect the long term inflows to rise
less steeply than the short term outflows. A 
deterioration of the capital account due to short term
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capital flows would not be offset by increased long term 
capital inflows.
The abandonment of foreign exchange controls would tend 
to shift investors towards assets with higher expected 
returns. As a result, the country's macroeconomic 
performance would be severely affected by a prolonged 
outflow of domestic capital. Capital flight is a 
perverse exportation of domestic savings and foreign 
exchange that (given the insufficiency of both) would 
severely hinder the potential for growth. The first 
consequence would be the intensification of the shortage 
of foreign exchange and to finance investment. This will 
restrict the growth potential of GNP and employment. It 
will also create an inflationary bias if the country 
fails to scale back its investment efforts accordingly.
The extent of capital outflows (and therefore the 
severity of the consequences on the national welfare) 
will depend considerably on how much confidence the Greek 
economy will inspire and in particular on the 
developments of the bop. In the recent years the country 
has experienced a considerable improvement in its bop 
position (59). Thus, one might argue that the problem 
that liberalization of capital movements would widen the 
scope for capital flights prompted by lack of confidence 
in drachma would become manageable as Greece establishes
231
a stronger bop position.
However, there are considerable difficulties on the way 
of putting the Greek bop on a sound footing. The 
completion of the internal market for industrial goods by 
the end of 1992 implies an elimination of tariffs and 
other barriers to trade and a significant deterioration 
in the current account of the bop. Trade liberalization 
would lead to significant changes in the levels of 
exports and imports, but the volume of imports would 
expand quite rapidly in relation to the volume of 
exports. This will lead to a steep increase in the 
current account deficit.
This deficit can be restored by the appropriate 
adjustment in the exchange rates. Indeed, the exchange 
rate can be used as an instrument of protection replacing 
the use of the barrier to trade. However, the exchange 
rate realignments and the expectations associated with 
them would motivate considerable capital outflows under a 
free capital movements regime. Given the climate of 
general uncertainty within which these developments take 
place it is inevitable that the short term capital market 
would take on a speculative character. And we will 
possibly witness massive capital flights out of Greece.
The above analysis leads us to the conclusion that the
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Greek authorities would not be able to accept the 
disadvantages that arise from the need to implement the 
EC regulations especially with respect to capital 
movements. Furthermore, it appears that the completion 
of the EC internal market for industrial goods would 
constitute an important obstacle towards capital 
movements liberalization. The present level of 
confidence in the drachma cannot be maintained with an 
increasing current account deficit. The deterioration in 
the current account would lead to severe capital outflows 
in the absence of foreign exchange controls. One might 
argue that the main factor which would contribute to the 
restoration of overall confidence in the home currency 
is the successful implementation by the national 
authorities of the monetary and fiscal measures which 
should be taken in order to combat inflationary 
pressures.
Indeed, the pursuit of policies of monetary discipline is 
the basic factor creating confidence and preventing 
speculation and capital flights. However, the
adoption of strict monetary and fiscal policies 
designed to curve out the speculative motives does not 
appear acceptable. Fiscal and monetary restraint could 
cope with speculative pressures against the drachma but 
would result in a cutback in domestic output and 
investment. Internal financial programs will make the
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achievement of full employment problematical and would 
halt the development process at the time that the 
authorities try to achieve faster growth rates in order 
to match the levels of economic development of other 
European countries.
The Greek government would therefore be unwilling to take 
the necessary steps to adapt its domestic monetary and 
fiscal policies to accommodate a free capital movements 
position, because the country may expose itself to a 
reduction in economic welfare. Alternatively, the goals 
of full employment and a satisfactory growth rate could 
be achieved in free capital movements position through 
a realignment of the exchange rate. In theory, a
flexible exchange rate regime can accommodate capital 
flows without preventing the pursuit of full
employment and economic expansion. However, exchange rate 
depreciation requires a decline in real wages which 
involves high political cost.
Furthermore, the national authorities believe that the 
current account difficulties originate from the 
supply side and in non-price factors for which price 
adjustment is not appropriate. Indeed, Greece
concentrates on the production of commodities of 
inferior design and style to those of other countries and 
it tends to export relatively low valued products and to
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import relatively high valued products due to the stage 
of development of the domestic industry. They therefore 
express doubts about the extent to which the long-run bop 
could be improved by continual exchange rate 
depreciation. The apparent inability and failure of 
currency depreciation to reconcile the conflict between 
full employment and bop equilibrium would lead to the 
call for foreign exchange controls.
The standard economic theory reveals that free trade (or 
more trade) is preferable to autarchy (or less trade). 
However, this theory is based on some important 
assumptions that do not hold in practice. The respective 
theory assumes that unemployment and bop problems do not 
exist. However, in real life unemployment and bop
problems do exist and by reducing imports the 
tariff barriers stimulate employment directly and
improves the bop. Of course, one might argue that 
unemployment and bop problems can be solved in a flexible 
exchange rates regime. However, the effectiveness of 
such a regime requires a flexible real wage which is not 
often the case. Furthermore, a defence for a policy of 
limiting trade can be mounted by the desire to protect 
certain industries which are vital to national economic 
development and/or to encourage "infant" industries to 
develop.
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Another possibility could be that the government may 
finance the capital flights by borrowing abroad. However, 
the budget would have to adapt to the requirements of 
servicing the external debt. The cost of the external 
debt would open a wide fiscal gap that the government 
would find it very difficult to close since it is hard to 
raise taxes and/or to cut in public investment and social 
spending. The remaining route would inevitably be money 
creation to finance the budget deficit. However, this 
would lead to even higher capital flows due to the 
expansion of money supply.
On the other hand, the EC budget could play an important 
role as cushioning the impact of external pressures on 
the domestic economy. It could be an important supplier 
of resources in support of the bop adjustment process and 
strengthen the confidence in the domestic currency. The 
EC budget could therefore provide a double easing of the 
foreign exchange constraint. It could put the Greek bop 
on a sound footing and combat speculation against the 
drachma.
Indeed, the Member States have recently decided to 
increase to a considerable extent the EC resources for 
redistributive purposes. However, the doubling of these 
resources over the course of four years are not adequate 
to alleviate the new process of integration. The size
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of the resources available for redistributive purposes 
might be an important determinant of the level of 
integration that can be achieved. Since the supply of 
resources for redistributive purposes are insufficient 
to accommodate the demand for foreign exchange a case 
would be made for selective measures for controlling 
capital movements. According to capital movements 
Directive, Greece (and the other developing countries) 
should eliminate the exchange controls by the end of 1992 
unless severe problems arise. The Commission recognizes 
the Greek bop problems but is hoping that the free flow 
of capital will be completed by 1992. However, changes 
will not be as great as the Commission hopes. Greece 
would not be able to open up its capital market in the 
near future. Complete freedom of capital movement does 
not therefore appear achievable.
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IMPEDIMENTS TO THE ADOPTION OF THE HOME COUNTRY
CONTROL PRINCIPLE
In this chapter we discuss other motives that have a 
major influence in determining whether Greece is prepared 
to operate in a unified banking market based on the 
principle of home country control in the not too distant 
future. These motives are mainly related to regulatory 
provisions and administrative practices that are imposed, 
at present, on banking organisations established in 
Greece for economic considerations. These regulatory 
provisions and administrative practices impose a heavy 
burden on the functioning of indigenous banking 
institutions and substantially affect their ability to 
compete on an equal footing with foreign-owned banking 
organizations operating abroad or in Greece under the 
principle of home country control.
The study also provides some indications about the extent 
to which these regulatory provisions and administrative 
practices can be harmonized with those in the other 
Member States. The analysis leads to the conclusion that 
the national authorities would be reluctant to remove the 
economic protection that the national system provides and 
adopt the principle of home country control.
In implementing the monetary and credit policy (as they
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are formed by the government) the Bank of Greece controls 
directly the interest rates. Ceilings on rates paid to 
depositors and charged to borrowers are set in an attempt 
to influence the demand for various types of deposits and 
loans. The structure of deposit and loan rates reflects 
the authorities objectives and are subject to periodical 
review. The present rates are presented in Table 8. The 
structure of the interest rates bank borrowing and 
lending is in accordance with the importance the monetary 
authorities attach to each type of activity and can 
hardly be justified on the grounds of banking criteria.
The interest rate on savings deposit with the 
Agricultural Bank and the Postal Savings Bank are a bit 
higher than the rate on savings deposit with commercial 
banks. This reflects the authorities objective to make 
these specialised credit institutions able to attract 
private deposits and reduce their dependence on Central 
Bank's funds. Commenting on this difference an official
of the National Bank of Greece pointed out that the 
Commercial Banks can offer rates on savings deposits at 
least 2 percentage points higher than these which can be 
offered by the Specialized Credit Institutions because 
the former are better organized, they have lower 
operational cost and their lending rates are higher. 
However, the authorities would like to see the Bank of 
Greece treating these institutions in virtually the same
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way as Commercial Banks? a development which would
enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy since these 
institutions are usually financed by monetary expansion.
TABLE 8
INTEREST RATES ON BANK DEPOSITS 
Types of Deposit 
Savings:
With commercial banks 15
With the Agricultural Bank 15.25
With the Postal Savings Bank 15.5
On three months notice 15.5
Time:
3 to 6 months 15.5
6 months to 1 year 16
1 year and over 17-19
Up to lmil Dr 17
1.000.001 Dr - 5mil Dr 18
5.000.001 Dr and over 19
Bank Lending Rates (maximum rates)
Type of credit
Working capital:
General rate 20.5
Small scale industry from special funds 17
Long term loans:
General rate 18
Small scale industry from special funds 15
Agriculture:
Short term loans 16-18
Long term loans 15
Housing loans 21.5
Source: Monthly Statistical bulletin (Bank of
Greece)
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Similarly, the differences in lending rates cannot be 
justified on the basis of banking criteria. The policy 
of interest rate differentiation is according to the 
contribution of the various types of loans to the 
country's economic development.
Long-term loan rates are 2 to 2.5 percentage points lower 
than working capital rates, conforming with the 
authorities' efforts to encourage formation of fixed 
capital and to discourage the financing of speculative, 
non productive activities. The lending rates to small 
scale industry are 3 to 3.5 percentage points lower 
reflecting the authorities view that this sector is of a 
high priority. Most of the Greek industrial firms have 
adopted inefficient methods of operations and therefore 
suffer from high production costs while their export 
potential is relatively insignificant. The authorities 
(especially the Ministry of National Economy) believe 
that the small scale industry if it grows will offer new 
competitive products in the international market carrying 
out the adequate adjustment of domestic production to 
changes in economic conditions and solving the persistent 
bop problem.
If the banks had selected their loans according to the 
contribution of these loans to their own profits and not 
to the country's economic development the lending rates
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would have been quite different. The long term lending 
rates should have been higher (around 2 to 3 percent 
according to some bankers) since long term lending means 
higher credit risks to be assumed by the banks. Long 
term lending also affects negatively the liquidity 
position of the banks. Furthermore, the lending rates to 
small scale industry should also have been higher on the 
grounds of security and cost criteria. As one might have 
expected the small firms suffer from high economic 
instability.
According to a KEPE study (60) closing down rate of the 
small firms is relatively very high and can reach the 17 
percent per annum. Another 30 per cent change management 
and possibly operation in the market. As a result the 
reliability of the small firms is put to a question. 
Relatively higher credit risks have therefore to be 
assumed by the banks when they lend to small scale
industry. The lending to small scale industry also
imposes higher administrative cost to banks due to the 
small size of every loan and to their large number.
From the above analysis it is fair to say that the
authorities use an interest rate policy as a means of
influencing bank lending favouring certain sectors which 
are considered to be of high priority irrespective of the 
profit considerations of banks. It is worthwhile
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mentioning that the administrative determination of 
interest rates concerns only their highest rate 
(ceiling). However, since there is excess demand for 
credit from all the sectors of the economy the highest 
rate is also the lowest.
Since the banks can select their loans not according to 
the contribution of these loans to the country's economic 
development but on the basis of the contribution to their 
own profits and (since there is excess demand for credit) 
finance only the sectors whose lending interest rate has 
been at a relatively high level. The authorities tried 
to influence directly the amount of credit extending by 
the Commercial Banks to these activities (61).
The authorities require the Commercial banks to devote 
10% of their private deposits for loans to small scale 
industry and another 15% for long term loans to finance 
productive investment. The part of the funds in question 
that the Commercial banks are unable to invest according 
to the above requirements must be deposited to the Bank 
of Greece. The interest rate applicable to a part of 
unused funds deposited with the Bank of Greece is 8% per 
annum. Since the interest rates paid by the Bank of 
Greece on the unused funds deposits are rather low and 
since the State gives its guarantee for a considerable 
portion of credit to small-scale industry and of long
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term productive investment financing, the Commercial 
banks have a strong interest to invest the total amount 
of the funds in question as required by the national 
authorities.
The administrative regulations to absorb resources for 
the purpose of financing certain sectors (small-scale 
industry, productive investment) gives rise to 
divergences in comparison with market requirements and 
led to considerable difficulties regarding the Commercial 
banks' credit operations and profitability. In the 
Report of the Governor of the National Bank of Greece for 
the year of 1987 (the largest Commercial bank) it is 
stated that there are clear signs that the compulsory 
requirements for cridit to small-scale industry (10% of 
bank deposits) are exceedingly high in comparison with 
the reasonable needs they are intended to meet. This 
view is based mainly on the diminishing number of 
applications for new loans submitted each year to the 
National Bank of Greece for approval, less 5% of which 
was rejected. The loss incurred by the National Bank of 
Greece owing to unused balances of funds earmarked for 
the financing of small scale industry was over 4 billion 
drachmas. Note that the net profits of the bank for the 
same period was of the same amount.
Even if the authorities are in the process of withdrawing
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the requirement providing that the banks should devote 
15% of their deposits for long term loans to finance 
productive investment the view is generally held that the 
authorities use a wide range of regulations to give 
financial support to economic sectors or activities that 
are considered by them as productive. The Greek 
authorities strongly believe that the credit policy is a 
powerful weapon which would promote domestic economic 
development and solve the Bop problem.
Indeed, the Greek economy suffers from a strong bop 
problem. It is worthwhile mentioning that this problem 
forced the government to adopt in 1985 a severe 
stabilization plan (62), which involved a reduction in 
real wages and high political cost to the government. 
Even if the bop recorded a significant improvement it did 
not cease to constrain the conduct of economic policy and 
the country's economic development. The authorities 
believe that the bop problem is rather structural and 
reflects the adjustment of domestic production to changes 
in economic conditions (63). This adjustment can take 
place mainly through the growth of small-scale industry 
and therefore the authorities encourage the channelling 
of funds to these activities.
The authorities also restrict the expansion of bank 
credit to the construction industry and trade for bop
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considerations. Loans to housing are usually granted by 
the specialized credit institutions for social reasons 
and are subject to severe restrictions : they are granted 
only in the case of the first house and a ceiling exists 
of up to 4 million drachmas. Loans to trade are 
permitted only in the case of exports.
According to a report (64) of the Ministry of National 
Economy the level of private investment in buildings is 
very high in comparison with the level of investment in 
the manufacturing sector (see Table 9) . The investors 
preferred to invest more in buildings than in industry 
and if we compare the marginal and average capital 
stock/cash flow in the industrial sector and building 
(Table 10) , that preference seems out of line with usual 
investment decisions based on profitability. The main 
reason for this is the lower risk which has to be taken 
investing in buildings. The high demand for real estate 
leads to a price increase in this sector. This results 
in an increase in nominal wages in every sector of the 
domestic economy including the manufacturing sector since 
the prices of real estate influence the estimation of 
real income because of the economic and social importance 
of the real estate. Of course, the preference for real 
estate did not stop because of the speculation that its 
rate of appreciation would exceed inflation. The vicious 
circle of inflation and investment in real estate has
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been a constant factor. Furthermore, also according to 
that report, the excess demand for this non-tradeable 
sector absorbed resources for the tradeable (industrial) 
sector with significant repercussions for the bop. The 
above considerations explains the authorities reluctance 
to permit banks to expand credit to the construction 
industry.
TABLE 9 
INVESTMENT DISTRIBUTION
1978 1981 1984
Agriculture 9.1 5.9 8.5
Mining and quarrying 1.9 6.8 3.9
Manufacturing 15.0 14.5 13.9
Energy 7.1 5.6 10.2
Transport 19.9 20.1 18.6
Real estate 30.6 24.2 19.7
Public activities 0.7 1.6 1.1
Other 15.7 21.3 24.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Ministry of National Economy 1987
TABLE 10
AVERAGE RATIO CAPITAL STOCK/CASH FLOW
in the whole economy industrial sector
1977-79 3.91 2.38
1980-82 4.07 2.52
1983-85 4.22 2.67
MARGINAL RATIO CAPITAL STOCK/CASH FLOW
industrial sector buildings
1977-79 1.82 15.57
1980-82 -0.18 7.40
1983-85 -0.21 2.20
Source: Ministry of National Economy 1987
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The 1992 concept in essence means the transformation 
of the EC from a fragmented to a pan-EC domestic market. 
This transformation will be based on the principle of 
home country control. However, there are strong reasons 
to believe that this transformation will be very hard to 
attain in the next few years. The analysis so far leads 
to the conclusion that, in Greece, strong restrictions 
are imposed on portfolio policies of the Commercial banks 
and the latter can do very little to influence the 
selection of their lending. The existing regulatory 
regime acts as a straitjacket on the banking 
organizations in the pursuit of profits and growth and 
substantially restrict their ability to compete 
internationally. If foreign banking organizations were 
free to operate in Greece without complying with the 
above-mentioned regulatory regime this would result in 
unfair competition and eventually undermines the 
effectiveness of the monetary and credit policy. The 
adoption of the Second (draft) Banking Coordination 
Directive is, therefore, considered highly unlikely.
The effects of substituting the methods of mutual 
recognition for that of prior harmonization are rather 
unclear. This method obviously results in minimum 
harmonization and therefore brings into competition not 
only financial undertakings but also national regulatory 
regimes. The Commission believes that the strictly
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regulated States would reduce their regulatory 
constraints as their own domestic operators would be 
severely handicapped in the face of more flexible 
competitors. However, the strictly regulated Member 
States may well retain their controls (especially if, as 
in the case of Greece, there are important economic 
interests behind them) and resist the principle of home 
country control. This principle clashes with the wish of 
the Greek government to protect its own domestic 
operators and to provide financial support for certain 
economic sectors or activities. The relatively low level 
of development of the domestic industry and the poor 
performance of the Bop (especially the current account) 
seem to constitute important obstacles to freedom of 
banking services in the case of Greece.
In order to ascertain the exact degree to which the 
authorities put pressure on commercial banks to give 
priority to their lending to certain sectors or 
activities and therefore affect their profitability, it 
is necessary to examine the extent to which banks may own 
shares in industrial and commercial enterprises.
According to Article 16 (3) of Law 5076/1931 banks
are forbidden to own shares in any one company which 
exceeds 20% of their banks' capital and for larger 
participation the authorization of the Ministry
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of Commerce is necessary. There is no limit to banks 
holding shares in companies in respect to the total of 
all participations in relation to the capital of the 
bank. Furthermore, Article 16(5) of the same law states 
that the limitation does not apply to participations in 
companies established abroad or have as their main 
objective the promotion of their bank activities.
However, this law is very old, in some parts rather
unclear and has, to a large extent, lost its value.
*
Central bank's officials pointed out that banks' 
equity participations in any one company requires 
case-by-case authorization by the Ministry of 
Commerce. Before granting the authorization the
Ministry tries to ensure through a "gentlemen's
agreement" with the respective bank that the latter will 
use sound banking criteria in supplying credit to the 
company in which it is asking to participate. The 
aim of the Ministry in pursuing this policy is to 
protect both the interests of the banks and the 
companies against excessive resource to bank borrowing 
since this could have a severe negative impact on 
future capital structure and its growth prospects. 
Furthermore, the Ministry of Commerce tries to ensure 
that the respective banks will continue to supply credit 
in other companies that may compete with those in 
which the banks are asking to participate. The
IS 88)
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main objective is obviously to ensure fair competition.
However, even more important is the fact that the 
Ministry of Commerce tries to ensure that the banks' 
investment in companies will not undermine the 
government's credit policy. Indeed, as some bankers 
commented, the Ministry shows an unwillingness to
grant authorization to investment in commercial 
enterprises while such authorisations have been granted 
relatively easily in cases of industrial 
enterprises. These controls substantially restrict the 
ability of banking institutions to pursue an 
independent and profitable investment policy with
respect to acquisitions in other enterprises.
The state-owned banking institutions enjoy less freedom 
as to their equity participation investments since 
the authorities impose special requirements on them. 
These are perhaps most obvious in the area of what are
known as the "problem companies" - ie. large
enterprises suffering from long-term structural losses. 
Totalling more than 3D, these have been nationalised 
while the state-owned banks were forced to participate 
in these over-indebted enterprises through converting 
their debt into equity. New management has been put in, 
but the view is generally held that it will be very 
difficult to restore the respective companies to health.
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The issue of the problem companies rebounds on the 
strength of the state-owned banks since the debts 
involved gradually have to be written off. Moreover, the 
state-owned banks are required to support the respective 
enterprises by financing (at a relatively low interest 
rate) their new investment and commercial activities and 
by helping them to change their administrative structure 
to organize their cash management and to produce more 
satisfactory results in order to turn the companies 
round. The burden for resolving the problem companies 
issue falls on the two major banking groups and in 
particular the National Bank of Greece.
Obviously, the authorities impose special requirements on 
the state-owned banking organizations with regard to 
their investments. These special requirements have 
significant repercussions for their profitability and 
severely affect their ability to compete with foreign- 
owned banking organizations operating even under the 
principle of host country control. As a result, the 
national authorities have adopted regulatory provisions 
and administrative practices designed to influence the 
competitive balance as between state-owned and foreign 
banking institutions in favour of the former. As long as 
they continue to impose special requirements on the 
state-owned banking institutions, they would also
252
continue to put restrictions on foreign banks entry and 
operation.
The Greek banking system has various peculiarities in its 
structure which are directly related to the stage of 
development of the Greek economy. The inadequate 
development of the Greek capital market implies that a 
substantial proportion of private savings that would 
otherwise have been invested in securities go instead 
either into real estate or into bank deposits. This has 
encouraged the country's large firms to develop strong 
ties of interdependence with the commercial banks. The 
relatively limited self-financing of business firms, 
combined with their high working capital requirements, 
increases the dependence of borrowed funds that can be 
supplied only by the banking system. This kind of 
dependence is usually transformed to equity 
participations by banking institutions in the respective 
enterprises.
As a result of the government policy and the inadequate 
development of Greece's capital market the Commercial 
banks have accumulated substantial business interests in 
a large number of industrial enterprises. Indeed, the 
Greek Commercial banks participate in the share capital 
and management of more than 200 industrial enterprises. 
The National Bank of Greece owns about 90 industrial
253
firms. These shares value about 33 million drachmas; 
ie. they correspond approximately to the 80% of the 
bank's capital which accounts for 41.9 billion drachmas 
(65) . The Commercial Bank of Greece owns shares in 
about 30 industrial enterprises. These shares value 
about 12.5 billion drachmas - ie. they correspond to 
more than 50% of the bank's capital which accounts for 
22.3 billion drachmas (66). The larger part of these 
shares concern the acquisition of the Commercial bank in 
"Nafpigia Elefsinos” which is a problem firm. The shares 
in this firm value 8 billion drachmas (almost 45% of the 
bank's capital).
However, the above situation contradicts certain 
provisions of the proposals for the Second Banking 
Coordination Directive. According to these provisions 
(which rather adopt the model of the British banking 
system) the credit institutions shall not own shares in 
any one non-credit company which exceeds 10% of their own 
funds. Furthermore, the total value of the shares 
acquired by a credit institution shall not exceed 50% of 
the respective institution's own funds. If the total 
value of the shares acquired by a credit institution 
exceeds the above percentage a corresponding increase in 
the institution's own funds shall take place.
As one might have expected, the above provisions will
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have significant repercussions for the Greek banking 
system which has adopted the model of the German banking 
system, having considerable business interests in 
industrial enterprises. The Greek Commercial banks 
should increase significantly their own capital in order 
to comply with the respective provisions. Considerable 
opposition to these provisions of the Second (draft) 
Banking Coordination Directive are therefore expected 
from the Greek authorities.
The Greek authorities also force the Commercial banks to 
give priority in the lending facilities to the public 
sector. Indeed, the Commercial banks are required to 
invest a certain percentage of their funds from private 
deposits in three month interest bearing treasury bills 
issued by the government and they are not allowed to 
sell them or to discount them at the Bank of Greece. 
The compulsory investment in treasury bills represents a 
considerable amount of the private deposits (at the time 
of writing 38%). The interest rates paid on the 
investment of these assets are normally well below the
average of bank lending rates, currently 16%.
/
Furthermore, Commercial banks are permitted to invest, 
in interest-bearing treasury bills, part of the unused 
balance of funds earmarked for long term financing of 
productive investment (up to 4% of total deposits with 
the banks) ? and they are allowed to invest, in three-
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month interest-bearing treasury bills, part of their 
compulsory reserves with the Bank of Greece (2.5% of the 
banks, total deposits) . These regulations were designed 
to provide an incentive to Commercial banks to invest in 
treasury bills issued by the State.
The raising of funds through the purchase of treasury 
bills by banks is usually a major source of financing 
the public sector borrowing requirements (Table 11). 
The purchases of treasury bills by Commercial banks are 
compulsory or under the incentives presented above. 
The Commercial banks consider that the optional 
purchases of treasury bills are not profitable.
TABLE 11
SOURCES OF FINANCING THE PUBLIC SECTOR BORROWING
REQUIREMENTS
1985
amount %
1986 
amount %
Domestic borrowing
Treasury bills purchased 
by banks
539,578 66.6 541,313 71.1
336,086 41.5 215,573 28.3
Treasury bills and bonds 
purchased by private
savers and enterprises 8,852 1.1 16,131 2.1
Loans and advances from 
specialized credit 
institutions and 
commercial banks 119,646 14.8 238,458 31.3
Bank of Greece 74,994 9.2 71,151 9.4
Foreign borrowing 270,330 33.4 220,217 28.0
Total 809,908 100.0 761,530 100.0
Source: Bank of Greece (1987)
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Obviously, the restrictions imposed on banks to give 
priority in the lending facilities to the public sector 
further limit their profitable investment operations and 
their ability to compete internationally. As a result, 
the Greek authorities would find it very difficult to 
allow the highest level of freedom and give foreign 
banking organizations the right to establish, operate 
and/or market their products in Greece subject to 
the supervisory regulations of the country in which the 
head office is situated. Without coordination of the 
rules applied to banks the indigenous banking 
institutions would suffer a severe disadvantage and 
would be unable to compete on equal terms with the 
foreign ones which are subject to more liberal rules.
In Greece there will possibly be considerable opposition 
to any move towards the adoption of the home country 
control principle, that is that a banking institution 
need concern itself only with the rules of the country 
where he is originally established.
The budget deficit is a major problem. Faced with a need 
to improve living standards Greece has undertaken 
ambitious programmes to accelerate the rate of economic 
growth to provide more government services. These 
programmes involved not only the expansion of public 
investment in transportation, power and sanitation,
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but also higher government expenditures on education, 
public welfare and other services to meet the rising 
expectation of population. At the same time that 
expenditures were rapidly increasing, the revenue system 
was not structurally capable of supplying a rapid 
increase in financial resources. The resulting budget 
deficits were covered by government borrowing from the 
domestic banking system. Even if at present there is an 
explicit desire to cut in the size of public spending and 
to increase revenue, this is not considered as feasible 
as a consequence of political factors. The budget deficit 
seems to constitute a serious obstacle to trade in 
banking services.
The analysis so far leads to the conclusion that strong 
restrictions are imposed on portfolio policies of the 
Commercial banks and the latter can do very little to 
influence the selection of their lending. Indeed, more 
than 60% of the bank deposit should be used compulsory to 
finance certain economic sector while the allocation of 
the rest is influenced mainly by the authorities' policy. 
Without eliminating these restrictions the freedom to 
allow foreign banking organizations to establish and 
operate domestically subject to the supervisory 
regulations of the country in which the head office is 
situated could undoubtedly be deemed to constitute unfair 
competition against the indigenous banks. It is
258
therefore perfectly apparent that within the timescale 
the Greek authorities cannot possibly accept a measure 
which would bring about "home country" control at a 
stroke.
The Commission believes that the regulatory provisions 
would be eliminated by the Greek State itself. By 
substituting the methods of mutual recognition for that 
of prior harmonization it reflects the question of 
regulatory distortion of competition to the Member 
States. In order not to penalise their own operators the 
most strictly regulated States will have to undertake a 
"narrowing revision" of their national provisions.
As a result, harmonization of government regulation will 
take place at a later stage. Obviously, the Commission 
considers that the government involvement within the 
financial markets are solely motivated by prudential 
considerations.
However, a rationale for government involvement within a 
financial market can be based not only on the stability 
of the financial system but also on the need to attain 
particular macroeconomic and social objectives. This is 
particularly true in the case of a developing country 
such as Greece. The goals of full employment and long 
term economic growth could be achieved through many 
forms, but in the case of Greece the financial
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assistance of particular sectors of the economy through 
manipulation of the domestic financial market is
considered as the most effective one.
The Commission does not take into account that in the 
developing countries government regulation can be used to 
influence investment behaviour and promote macroeconomic 
stability. The harmonization of this kind of regulation 
will be very difficult to be attained particularly within 
the timescale since it reflects vital economic interests. 
In the case of Greece, integration in the banking field 
would require the reconsideration of the whole spectrum 
of state regulation, with a view to ensuring efficient 
operation of the market mechanism and realising the
forces of competition. However, this requires a 
substantial reduction in the current account and budget 
deficits. Any move towards this direction is considered 
as highly unlikely to take place in the near future. As
a consequence, the "home country" control would clash
with the wish of the Greek government to ensure that it 
is in a position to protect its own operators. The rival 
principle of "host country" control would, therefore, 
have a strong following.
Another difficulty in the way of integrating the Greek 
banking sector could relate to prudential considerations.
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The Bank of Greece retains full responsibility for 
prudential oversight of banks and is empowered to 
issue any regulation with the view of promoting the 
conditions for safe and sound banking and maintaining 
public confidence in the stability of the overall 
financial system. Prudential supervision in banking is 
administered informally along non-statutory lines 
based on close cooperation with the banks concerned. 
This kind of supervision, according to some central 
bank officials, enables the supervisory authority to 
adjust their requirements to specific circumstances such 
as the type of business carried out by the respective 
banking institutions and the inherent risks.
Even more important is the fact that the extensive use of 
direct controls has rendered the use of prudential 
controls unnecessary. In a country where the banks are 
sub j ect to a wide range of compulsory investment 
requirements, there is really very little need for 
controlling the levels of credit exposure and setting 
solvency ratios. If ratios between liquid assets and 
deposits are set by the authorities for monetary purposes 
the control of banking liquidity for prudential 
considerations become unnecessary. Furthermore, the 
application of foreign exchange controls restricts 
considerably banks' foreign exchange transactions and 
have indirect, though important, supervisory implications
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on foreign exchange risk exposure. The introduction of 
direct controls apart from achieving the government's 
macro-economic targets can also sustain to some extent 
the soundness of individual banks.
The important supervisory implications of direct 
controls, the limitations in the scope of permissible 
banking activities and the little importance of private 
banking (since the state-owned banks hold a predominant 
position in the whole banking system) made the issue of 
prudential supervision of very little importance. The 
Greek authorities took these factors for granted and 
neglected to formulate an effective and general structure 
of prudential supervision. This explains the absence of 
statutory prescriptions and rules for the prudential 
behaviour of banks in the Greek Banking Law. This is 
particularly true with respect to prudential control on 
solvency.
The banking law does not set any statutory provision in 
relation to capital adequacy and no specific solvency 
ratios are imposed. Instead, the central bank's 
supervision of capital adequacy is administered rather 
flexibly on a case-by-case basis. The Bank of Greece is 
empowered to lay down solvency regulations which 
stipulate banks to maintain a specific level of capital 
in relation to their deposits or to increase their
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capital base. Before issuing these regulation the Bank 
of Greece takes into consideration various factors such 
as the banks' business volumes, the type of banks' 
business and the inherent risks.
However, the solvency controls are rather imprecise, 
difficult to be applied by an unexperienced staff and 
therefore could lead to a flabby and complacent 
supervision. The power of the Bank of Greece to impose 
compulsory increases in the capital of the banks were 
rather rarely used in the case of Greek banks and the 
latter are characterised by a relatively low capital 
base. Undercapitalization is a major problem for the 
Greek banks.
Banking supervisors usually recognise that the 
establishment of appropriate solvency ratios play a 
central role in the prudential supervision of banking 
institutions. Furthermore, the development of common 
standards of capital adequacy in relation to assets is 
one of the essential areas of harmonization necessary for 
the achievement of mutual recognition and the completion 
of the internal market in banking. In this respect a 
ratio of capital to assets of 8% is expressed as a 
common minimum standard which European banks will be 
expected to observe by the end of 1992.
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This will have critical effects on the Greek banks. At 
best, they will have to double their capital and to 
restrict the expansion of their balance sheets over the 
next few years, putting them at a competitive 
disadvantage. The Greek banks are expected to suffer 
considerably from the imposition of the capital ratio. 
On the other hand, the national authorities might 
strengthen their prudential controls in order to maintain 
sound banking practices especially in those areas where 
greater freedom of action will be conferred to banks. As 
it is pointed out out elsewhere the authorities are in 
the process of loosing the exchange controls and to 
withdraw the requirement providing that the banks should 
devote 15% of their deposits for long term loans to 
finance productive investment. These developments will 
broaden the range of business and result in new and 
additional elements of risk. Even if, however, the 
authorities reassess their supervisory framework and 
adopt stricter solvency requirements in the next few 
years in order to face these new developments, the higher 
demand for capital due to the imposition of the EC 
standard capital ratio is expected to face considerable 
opposition from Greece.
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P A R T  2 : I N S U R A N C E
265
UNIFYING THE EUROPEAN INSURANCE SECTORS
EC PROPOSALS FOR DISMANTLING BARRIERS TO THE 
LIBERALISATION OF INSURANCE SERVICES
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The insurance industry is vast and immensely important in 
terms of the services it provides, the funds it makes 
available for investment, the people it employs and the 
general impact it has on Members economies. It is one of 
the largest industries in the world.
The operation of the insurance industry involves the 
large scale channelling and accumulation of funds. 
Indeed, the development of the insurance industry means 
that it cannot be seen only in terms of its "insurance" 
function since firms in insurance operate in the market 
for savings, primarily from individuals or through group 
pension schemes, in the market for supply of funds for 
investment in both the public and private sectors and in 
the market for management of funds on behalf of other 
institutions (pension funds, unit trusts, investment 
trusts). It is no longer appropriate especially in the 
case of the life assurance business, to regard insurance 
as the "object" of the business and investment as a side 
result. The insurance industry has become a major part 
of the capital market transforming individual savings 
into interest bearing capital.
The Rome Treaty provides that restriction on the right of 
establishment and on freedom to provide services within 
the Community shall be progressively abolished, even if 
other provisions recognize that the liberalization of
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banking and insurance services connected with the 
movement of capital shall be effected in step with the 
progressive liberalization of movements of capital. 
Turning to the legislation of the six original Member 
States it is fair to say that insurance had become an 
increasingly regulated activity with the result that 
neither freedom of establishment nor freedom of services 
was the general rule in Europe before the Treaty began to 
take effect.
Indeed, the insurance industry operates in a series of 
markets which are of crucial importance for the 
functioning of the whole economy. Insurance has intense 
social importance, requiring a sense of security and 
stability. Market failures have severe economic, social 
and political consequences to which governments are 
naturally very sensitive. The protection of the users of 
such services is an important issue for governments which 
control this industry for prudential considerations - ie. 
to ensure that insurance undertakings remain solvent and 
always able to meet their financial commitment.
The importance of insurance companies as channels for 
savings and investment, the way in which these savings 
are used, where the investment takes place and in what 
areas, become important for economic growth and the 
control of the insurance sector for economic
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considerations is an issue of high importance for almost 
every government. There is also a bop aspect especially 
since these services play an important role in 
international trade. Government controls over entry, 
establishment and market access of foreign insurance 
concerns could be justified on grounds of bop.
Moreover, the degree of concentration in insurance is 
likely to be higher than in other branches of the 
economy. Insurance companies usually socialise their 
risks and the industry itself is therefore characterised 
by extensive coinsurance, reinsurance and a variety forms 
of reciprocity and interdependence which might lead to 
fairly high levels of concentration and to 
anticompetetive behaviour. Indeed, the existence of a 
group of dominant companies with the power to dictate 
terms to the rest of the industry and to the customers 
restrains the benefits of free competition, such as 
better and more efficiently produced products with lower 
premiums than would otherwise be charged. On the other 
hand, contracts in most kinds of insurance (especially 
life insurance) are usually long term, a substantial part 
of the market is consequently tied up for long periods 
and the benefits cannot be specified in advance in real 
terms and comparisons between policies cannot be easily 
made. By their nature insurance products are more 
difficult than other goods and services to test at the
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time of purchase. Government controls on the insurance 
industry therefore take place because competition 
presents some specific features and problems.
It is generally agreed that for economic social and 
political reasons regulation of insurance is important to 
ensure solvency and misappropriation of funds and to 
contribute to an orderly and disciplined market and to 
national economic growth. However, the extent and the 
way in which the insurance is regulated differed from one 
Member State to another, the right of establishment is 
severely restrained, while many restrictions or even 
prohibitions are applied on the right of a customer in 
one Member State to deal, with an undertaking in another 
Member State.
The main objective of the Rome Treaty is the achievement 
of a common market. In order to apply this principle to 
the insurance sector, in 1961, the Council adopted an 
ambitious programme (67) for the abolition of 
restrictions on freedom of establishment and freedom to 
provide services. The programme was designed to move 
progressively towards the dismantling of barriers to 
insurance transactions by removing the economic 
protection which the national supervisory system provides 
and to bring about the harmonization and coordination of 
laws and practices which would facilitate freedom of
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establishment and services, through the realization of 
successive rapid stages.
In accordance with the general programme for the 
abolition of restrictions on freedom of establishment and 
freedom to provide services, a Directive (68) was 
adopted on 25 February 1964 requiring the abolition of 
restrictions to establishment and provision of services 
in the field of reinsurance and retrocession (re­
reinsurance) .
A number of reasons explain the early adoption of a 
Directive in this field. Reinsurance is an arrangement 
between insurers to insure the risks they have entered 
into in their direct insurance business (69). It is a 
type of risk spreading which has become increasingly 
important as the increasing size of risks and 
technological developments have caused insurers to run to 
reinsurance as additional protection. It is also a way 
of sharing business rather than risks and there has been
a tendency for insurance companies to expand
internationally by way of reinsurance rather than by
direct operations which involve the establishment of
expensive offices and in many cases are restricted.
Moreover, captive insurance companies (which have been 
formed mainly by multinational non-insurance companies to 
handle their insurance business in full or part) have 
come to rely on
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reinsurance protection for their very large risks and 
exposures. The growth in captives has in turn helped to 
expand the size of the reinsurance market. There was, 
therefore, a considerable growth in the importance of 
reinsurance.
Even more important was the fact that reinsurance is 
international in character (because the ability to meet 
large scale risks may demand resources greater than are 
available from one country) and was subject to little 
control in the original six Member States. The first 
stage of the programme could, therefore, be easily 
achieved. Indeed, this Directive, as in the case of the 
early Directives with respect to capital movements 
liberalization and Banking, achieved little more than the 
confirmation of an existing position.
This was the only measure adopted within the traditional 
period originally envisaged by the Treaty. That period 
expired in 197 0, by which date both freedom of 
establishment and freedom of services should have been 
accomplished. In fact, it was not until 1973 that 
effective measures were agreed in respect of freedom of 
establishment and provision of services. Obviously, the 
ambitious programme proved to be unsuccessful.
Two Directives were adopted by the Council on 24 July
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1973. One Directive (70) abolishing restrictions on 
freedom of establishment in the business of non-life 
insurance which even if it eliminated some particular 
discriminatory treatment of the nationals of the other 
Member States, it is considered of minor importance. On 
the other hand, some progress has been made, especially 
in freedom of establishment and national regulatory 
systems have been to some extent brought into conformity 
with the First Council Directive (71) on the coordination 
of laws, regulations and administrative provisions 
relating to the taking up and pursuit of business of 
direct insurance other than life assurance.
Indeed, the Directive recognizes that in order to 
facilitate the pursuit of the business of insurance with 
the EEC it is essential to eliminate certain divergences 
which exist between national supervisory legislation , 
because continuance of this divergence after the 
abolition of restrictions on the right of establishment 
would mean that obstacles to establishment would continue 
to exist? while in order to achieve this objective and at 
the same time ensure adequate protection for insured and 
third parties in all the Member States it is desirable to 
coordinate the provisions relating to the financial 
guarantees required of insurance undertakings.
The Directive provides that each Member State shall
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make the taking up of the business of direct insurance 
subject to an official authorization and that any 
undertaking for which an authorization is sought should : 
1) adopt a certain legal form, 2) limit its business 
activities to the business of insurance and operations 
arising therefrom to the exclusion of all other 
commercial business, 3) submit a scheme of operations 
which shall concern mainly the nature of the risks which 
the undertaking proposes to cover, the tariffs which it 
is proposed to apply for each category of business, the 
guiding principles as to reinsurance, the items 
constituting the minimum guarantee fund and estimates 
relating to the expenses of installing the administrative 
services and the organization for securing business; and 
in addition, for the first three financial years: 
estimates relating to expenses of management other than 
costs of installation, and in particular current general 
expenses and commissions, estimates relating to premiums 
or contributions and to claims, a forecast balance sheet, 
estimates relating to the financial resources intended to 
cover underwriting liabilities and the solvency margin, 
and 4) possess a minimum guarantee fund.
The authorization should be given for a particular class 
of insurance and an undertaking seeking an authorization 
to extend its business to other classes should submit a 
scheme of operations as regards such other classes and is
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t
required to show proof that it possesses the solvency 
margins with regard to such other classes.
However, these coordinating measures do not prevent 
Member States from maintaining or introducing laws, 
regulations or administrative practices requiring 
directors and managers to have technical qualifications 
or requiring articles of association, general and special 
policy conditions, tariffs and any other documents 
necessary for the normal exercise of supervision to 
be approved; but these provisions shall not require that 
any application for an authorisation shall be dealt with 
in the light of the economic requirements of the market.
Any undertaking having its head office in a territory of 
a Member State and seeking an authorization to open an 
agency or branch in another Member State should submit 
its statutes and a list of its directors and managers, 
produce a certificate issued by the competent 
authorities of the head office country, attesting the 
classes of insurance which the undertaking is entitled 
to carry on and that it possesses the minimum guarantee 
fund or, the minimum solvency margin and stating the 
risks which it actually covers and the financial 
resources. It should also submit a scheme of operations 
and designate an authorized agent having his permanent 
residence in the host country, and possessing
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sufficient powers to bind the undertaking in
relation to third parties. However, the Member
States may apply additional measures if these are 
considered necessary to achieve an effective level 
of protection and if these measures are not applied in 
the light of the economic requirements of the market.
There also are provisions referring to the conditions 
for exercise of business. Indeed, the Directive provides 
that the home supervisory authorities should verify the 
state of solvency of the undertaking with respect to 
its entire business. Each Member State should require an 
undertaking to establish sufficient technical reserves. 
The amount of such reserves shall be determined according 
to the rules fixed by the State where business is 
carried on.
Furthermore, the home supervisory authorities should 
require the establishment of adequate solvency margins 
in respect to the entire business. The solvency 
margins correspond to the assets free of all 
obligations (liabilities and intangible items) and 
enable the undertaking concerned to meet unforseen 
needs.
The supervisory authorities, on the other hand, should
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have considerable powers to intervene if the solvency 
margins fail to reach the prescribed level. In this case 
the home authorities should require a plan for the 
restoration of a sound financial position. If the 
solvency margin falls below the guarantee fund the 
supervisory authorities shall require the undertaking 
concerned to submit a short-term finance scheme for its 
approval. It may also restrict or prohibit the free 
disposal of the assets of the undertaking.
The Directive contains even stricter sanctions. It sets 
the conditions which lead to the withdrawal of 
authorisation. The competent authorities may withdraw 
the authorisation if the undertaking: 1) no longer
fulfills the conditions of admission, 2) has been unable, 
within the time allowed, to take the measures contained 
in the restoration plan or finance scheme and 3) fails 
seriously in its obligations under the national 
regulations.
In the event of the withdrawal of the authorisation the 
home authority should notify such withdrawal to the 
supervisory authorities of other Member States which have 
issued an authorisation to the undertaking? they shall 
thereupon withdraw their authorisation. The home 
authorities, in conjunction with other authorities, 
should take all the adequate measures to safeguard the
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interests of the insured and in particular shall restrict 
the free disposal of the assets of the undertaking if 
such restriction has not already been imposed.
An authorisation granted to an agency or branch of an 
undertaking whose head office is situated in another 
Member State may be withdrawn if the agency or branch: 1) 
no longer fulfills the conditions for admission, and 2) 
fails seriously in its obligations under the regulations 
of the country where business is carried on, with respect 
in particular to the establishment of technical reserves. 
The host authorities should consult the home supervisory 
authorities before withdrawing the authorisation.
The Directive also contains rules applicable to agencies 
or branches established with the EEC and belonging to 
undertakings whose head offices are outside the 
Community.
According to these rules the access to the business by 
any undertaking whose head office is outside the 
Community should be subject to an authorization. The 
authorization shall be granted by a Member State if the 
undertaking : 1) is entitled to undertake insurance
business under its national law, 2) establishes an agency 
or branch in the territory of such Member State, 3) 
undertakes to establish account specific to the business
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which it undertakes, 4) designates an authorized agent to 
be approved by the competent authorities , 5) possesses, 
in the country where it carries on its business, assets 
of an adequate amount, 6) keeps a margin of solvency, and 
7) submits a scheme of operations similar to that we 
described above. Furthermore, the Directive provides 
that the law of the Member States shall be applicable to 
the calculation of technical reserves the determination 
of categories of investments, and the valuation of 
assets. It is quite obvious that the Directive considers 
the agencies and branches established with the EEC and 
belonging to undertakings whose head offices are outside 
the Community as new entities rather than as the 
consequence of the operations of the respective 
undertakings worldwide.
The Community may by means of agreements concluded with 
one or more third countries, agree to the application of 
provisions different to those for the purpose of ensuring 
under conditions of reciprocity adequate protection for 
insured persons in the Member States. Here it is 
essential to add that Switzerland had expressed an
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interest in concluding such an agreement with the 
Community. The Commission negotiated a text with the 
authorities of that country and proposed a Directive (72) 
on the implementation of the agreement. According to 
this proposal the insurance undertakings of the Member 
States would be able to operate in Switzerland under the 
same rights as in the Community while Swiss insurance 
undertakings will enjoy similar rights. This proposal 
has not been adopted yet.
The Directive contains a model set of state control laws 
for implementation by the Member States. It has 
influenced legislation and regulation in the Member 
States especially with regard to freedom of establishment 
and it had considerable effects on improving intra-EEC 
penetration of insurance services. The Directive has 
made the granting of an authorization generally riot 
discretionary. The responsible authorities should 
consider whether the prescribed conditions have been 
fulfilled, in which case the authorization must be 
granted. The Directive does not prevent Member States 
from applying additional provisions, but these provisions 
shall be designed to safeguard the interests of the 
insured persons and may not reguire that any application 
for an authorization shall be dealt with in the light of 
the economic requirements of the market. The scope of 
supervision should, therefore, be purely prudential.
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Far from setting up a common procedure for the granting 
of authorization, the Directive provides a firm basis for 
coordination between the Member States as regards the 
conditions for exercise of business and especially the 
maintenance of financial security by prescribing common 
standards for calculating the minimum solvency margins. 
The Directive does not attempt to create a central 
controlling authority responsible for insurance 
supervision. Powers and responsibilities are not
transferred to the Community bodies but to the home 
supervisory authorities. The coordinating model adopted 
by the Directive leads to the reallocation of 
responsibility with regard to insurance supervision among 
the Member States and in favour of those where the head 
office is situated - ie. the Member States whose
insurance industry is relatively strong and competitive. 
However, the adopted supervisory system does not rely on 
complete decentralised control - ie. making each
individual Member State responsible for ensuring these
rules. Instead, the system of control is based upon 
cooperation and consultation among the responsible 
authorities in the Member States because control is to be 
exercised partly through the home authorities and partly 
through the host authorities.
Further consideration of the Directive leads to the
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conclusion that the it suffers from some major 
shortcomings. Even if it provides a great deal of 
coordination as regards the nature of insurance 
undertakings and their satisfactory running, especially 
concerning the maintenance of their financial security so 
as to prevent unfair competition? some of its provisions 
are very general and especially those which refer to 
technical reserves. The level of adequate technical 
reserves is left to be determined by the different 
national supervisory authorities and this contributes to 
the problem of an insurer operating internationally due 
to the obligation to comply with different requirements. 
This was mainly due to the fact that the Member States 
were unable to agree on a precise form for the Directive.
The original Member States were not exporters of 
insurance services and they have no significant share in 
the world insurance market. The Six had strict control 
operations in their territories. However, the case for
the UK was exactly the opposite. The regulatory regime
on insurance companies was liberal. The interested 
parties in the UK felt that if Britain joined the EEC and 
a Directive providing for strict control laws was 
adopted, the insurance earning would seriously be 
restrained. The UK pressed therefore for the adoption of 
a more liberal form of control. The Directive being, 
therefore, a compromise could not contain a precise
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coordinating model.
The Directive also provides that Germany may maintain the 
provisions prohibiting the simultaneous undertaking in 
its territory of health insurance, credit and suretyship 
insurance or insurance in respect of resource against 
third parties and legal defence either with one another 
or with third classes. The above provision seems to 
create distortions since German companies undertaking 
insurance business in these classes can establish
themselves in the other Member States while companies
undertaking combined insurance business in these classes 
in other Member States and wish to carry on their full 
range of business in Germany they are put to the trouble 
and expenses of creating separate subsidiary companies to 
engage in these classes which are subject to 
specialisation requirements (73).
The Directive also does not bring any harmonization of 
"material control" (policy conditions, premium rates, 
wording forms etc) (74) ; while it allows Member States to
apply any rules as to the choice of the assets in excess
of those representing the technical reserves.
In the course of the attainment a Common Market in 
insurance services, the Council after the Commission's 
proposal introduced in 1979, adopted the First Council
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Directive (75) on the coordination of laws, regulations 
and administrative provisions relating to the taking up 
and pursuit of the business of direct life insurance. 
The Directive was necessary to eliminate the divergences 
which existed between national control laws and intended 
to abolish restrictions on the freedom of establishment 
in the business of direct life insurance.
The significant time lag between the adoption of the 
coordination Directive in the field of non-life insurance 
and the life coordination Directive was necessary to 
solve the problems connected with life assurance than 
those of other types of insurance. The life insurance 
industry is dependent on the savings of the general 
public, manages funds on behalf of the insured persons 
over a long period and, therefore, is subject to strict 
control in the various Member States. The diversity and 
inequality of the strict national control regulations 
made the task of coordination even more difficult.
Even more important was the dispute over composites. 
Member States have different regulations and practices as 
to the simultaneous carrying on of life assurance and 
non-life insurance. Some Member States (such as France, 
Germany and Italy) have adopted the so called "principle 
of specialization " by setting rules which provide that 
the same undertaking could not carry on both types of
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insurance because of prudential considerations. There 
are fears that the life insurance funds might be used to 
support the risk of insurance operations other than life 
insurance. On the other hand, in the UK, Belgium and 
Luxembourg companies could carry both types of business.
In dealing with this problem the Directive provides that 
newly formed companies should no longer be authorized to 
carry on these two activities simultaneously and should 
be specialised in one type of business or the other. On 
the other hand, pre-existing companies which transact 
both life and non-life business may continue to do so, 
provided that they observe strict rules on separate 
management in order that the respective interests of life 
policyholders and non-life policyholders are safeguarded 
and the minimum financial obligations in respect of the 
one of the activities are not borne by the other 
activity. An undertaking could set up a new branch or 
agency in another Member State only for its non-life 
business; for the conduct of life insurance it would need 
to create a separate subsidiary company. Moreover, 
Member States are given the option of requiring those 
existing undertakings established in their territory 
which carry on life insurance and non-life insurance 
simultaneously to put an end to this practice.
Generally speaking, the Directive moves along the
285
same lines as the first non-life coordination 
Directive, and its main provisions cover.
the legal form of insurance undertakings 
the restriction of their activities to 
insurance and operations directly arising 
therefrom
coordinating authorization procedures making 
it easier for an insurance company in any 
Member State to set up a branch or agency in 
another Member State
the requirement that all classes of insurance 
must be subject to state supervision 
the issues leading to the withdrawal of an 
authorization
close cooperation among national supervisory 
authorities
the attribution to the home supervisory 
authorities the sole responsibility that the 
undertaking concerned maintain the adequate 
solvency margin and guarantee fund 
the attribution to the host supervisory 
authorities the responsibility for 
supervision of technical reserves
The branch or agency will be subject to local laws of the 
host country. The local laws may cover requirements on
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the premium rates and policy conditions which may be in 
force in the host country. In addition it may be subject 
to restrictions on its investment policy and have to 
maintain its assets in the form prescribed in the host 
country. Although the Directive recognizes that these 
various subjects should be coordinated, it provides that 
this is not essential at the present stage. The 
principles governing the solvency margin are the same as 
in the first non-life coordination Directive. Moreover, 
the levels of the minimum solvency margin are determined 
according to the classes of insurance underwritten.
However, even before the adoption of the life 
coordination Directive further developments had taken 
place.
According to the Treaty of Rome, all discriminatory 
treatment based on nationality with regard to 
establishment and to the: provision of services is
prohibited from the end of the transitional period. The 
principle of such national treatment applies in 
particular to the right to join professional 
organizations where the professional activities of the 
person concerned necessarily involve the exercise of 
this right. In view of these considerations the Council 
after Commission's proposal introduced in 1976, a 
Directive (76) on measures to facilitate the effective
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exercise of freedom of establishment and freedom to 
provide services in respect of insurance agents and 
brokers and, in particular, transitional measures.
The Member States used to impose different provisions for 
the taking up and pursuit of activities of insurance
agent and broker. In some cases there was freedom to 
take up and pursue such activities but in other cases 
there were strict conditions making access to the 
profession conditional upon possession of formal evidence 
of gualifications. The main scope of the Directive was 
the adoption of measures in order to avoid undue
constraint on the national of Member States in which the 
taking up of such services is not subject to any 
conditions.
Article 57 of the Rome Treaty provides that in order 
to make it easier for persons to take up and pursue 
activities as self-employed persons, Directives are to 
be issued for the mutual recognition of diplomas, 
certificates and other evidence of formal qualifications
and for the coordination of the provisions laid down by
law, regulation or administrative action in Member 
States. The Directive is therefore transitional in 
character and it is necessary in the absence of mutual 
recognition of diplomas or of immediate coordination. 
Its purpose will disappear if ever the coordination of
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conditions for the taking up and pursuit of the 
activities in question and the mutual recognition of 
diplomas, certificates and other formal qualifications 
is achieved.
The Directive adopts procedures necessary to ensure due 
recognition in one Member State of a broker or agent from 
another Member State. In doing so it sets standards of 
experience, based essentially on time spent in the 
profession, although recognition and weight are given to 
the possession of professional qualifications.
The Directive lays down the procedures and the 
documentation to be produced when a national of one 
Member State wishes to work in another Member State 
either by establishment or by offering services. The 
effect in practice is that, an intermediary wishing to 
work in another Member State whose national 
intermediaries are required to register, must register 
likewise. To do so he must obtain the documentation 
described in the Directive and go through the procedures 
there outlined. Thus, brokers operating in Europe on a 
services basis in insurance or reinsurance, life or non­
life, should, as of now, take care to ensure that they 
and their staff as individuals are duly registered in 
those countries requiring registration of their own 
national brokers. However, all these bureaucratic
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procedures could be considered as an important barrier 
to the establishment or freedom to provide services with 
respect to intermediaries.
Some progress towards the achievement of a common 
market in insurance was made in 1978 through the adoption 
of a Council Directive (77) on the coordination of laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions relating to 
Community co-insurance. Co-insurance means the
insuring by two or more insurance undertakings one of 
which is the leading insurer acting without joint and 
several liability of a single risk under a single 
contract at a single premium and for a single period. 
The lead insurer will commonly take a larger proportion 
of the risk than any of the others? but not
necessarily so, because he may occupy the leading 
position due to his recognized skill or due to a 
longstanding business relationship with the 
policyholder.
The Directive recognises that the effective pursuit 
of Community coinsurance business should be facilitated 
by a minimum of coordination in order to prevent 
distortion of competition and inequality of treatment. 
It constitutes a first step towards the coordination 
of all operations which may be carried out by virtue of 
the freedom to provide services, since insurance
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companies from Member States would then for the first
time be able to write coinsurance across all EEC
boundaries for certain kinds of non-life risks. It
applies to certain kinds of risks situated with the 
Community covered by a single contract at an overall 
premium for the same period by two or more insurance 
undertakings, of which at least two are established 
within the Community (78).
The Directive also applies to risks which by reason of 
their nature or size call for the participation of 
several insurers for their coverage. For the purpose 
of covering the risk, the leading insurer is 
authorized in accordance with the conditions laid down 
in the first non-life coordination Directive, ie. he 
is treated as if he were the insurer covering the whole
risk. However, this is interpreted by the majority of
Member States as meaning that the leading insurer 
must be established in the State where the risk is 
situated but by the Commission as meaning that the 
leading insurer may be anywhere in the Community provided 
that he is authorised in some Member States, in 
accordance with the provisions of the first non-life 
coordination Directive (79).
Many Member States introduced legislation which prevented 
risks or policyholders from being covered by insurers not
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established in their own territory. They therefore 
insisted that the lead insurer should be established in 
the State where the risk was situated, while the other 
coinsurers could be established in any other State. In 
this case the home State would be able to apply its own 
national regulatory system on the coinsurance contract 
and to ensure that the insurance product is similar to 
the one which would have been available if only insurers 
established in their own territory had taken part. From 
the customer's point of view the participation of foreign 
based insurers would have absolutely no effect.
This attitude of the majority of the Member States which 
introduced legislation in order to require the lead 
insurer to be established within the jurisdiction of the 
State where the risk or the policyholder is situated as a 
necessary condition to transact coinsurance business, 
substantially limits the effectiveness of the Directive. 
However, it was thought that this radical divergence of 
views between the majority of the Member States and the 
Commission would be removed through the speedy 
implementation of the second non-life Coordination 
Directive whose proposal had already been submitted to 
the Council. The second non-life coordination Directive 
was intended to eliminate through coordinating measures 
all the barriers on the effective exercise of freedom of 
services without calling into question the interpretation
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of the Coinsurance Directive or even that of the Rome 
Treaty.
The Coinsurance Directive provides for some coordination 
with respect to technical reserves and the assets 
representing them. The amount of the technical reserves 
shall be determined by the different coinsurers according 
to the rules of customary practice in the Member State 
where they are established. The Directive also calls for 
close cooperation between the competent authorities for 
an effective supervision of the coinsurance activities. 
However, the Directive fails to settle any questions or 
give its guidance with respect to the choice of the law 
to be applied to the contract.
The Directives we have seen so far (and especially the 
two Coordination Directives) succeeded in implementing a 
considerable degree of harmonization. They set up a 
uniform supervisory system throughout the EC. They 
harmonised the requirements to be met with respect to 
granting of an authorisation with respect to guarantees 
and in particular to the most important financial 
requirements imposed on insurers, namely the solvency 
margin and guarantee fund. As a result, insurers within 
the EC have to fulfil broadly similar financial 
requirements in respect of their worldwide activities. 
The Directives also lay down the respective
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responsibilities of each national authority (since they 
consider branches and agencies as the consequence of the 
international operations of the respective insurance 
undertakings) so as the host authorities to recognise 
authorisation granted and supervisory measures undertaken 
by the home authorities, avoiding any overlapping. They 
provide for an international system of supervision based 
on the close collaboration between the Member States and 
their respective supervisory authorities.
However, despite the degree of harmonisation achieved by 
the Directives, considerable obstacles remained with 
regard to freedom of establishment and to provision of 
services. The host supervisory authorities may apply 
additional requirements to the granting of an 
authorisation in order to ensure that a foreign insurer 
is subject to comparable supervisory control with that of 
a national insurer. The host supervisory authorities may 
also impose their own rules on the technical reserves, on 
the matching and localisation of the assets representing 
them and on investments.
In contrast with the field of financial safeguards, there 
has been no Community harmonisation of insurance contract 
conditions although some attempts made by the Commission 
proposing for a Directive (80) on the coordination of 
laws, regulations and administrative provisions
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relating to insurance contracts. The proposal does not 
try to harmonise all the aspects of insurance contracts 
law but only some basic features. Especially the duties 
of the proposer with regard to the declaration of the 
risk and the consequences of an incorrect declaration 
which may lead to considerable differences in the amount 
paid by the insurer in the event of a claim. The
proposal also tries to harmonise the measures to be taken 
by the policyholder in circumstances giving rise to a 
claim. However, this proposal has never been adopted.
In the absence of Community harmonisation of
insurance contracts the Member States exercise varying 
degrees of control over insurance contract conditions. 
The arguments that justify supervision over insurance 
contracts are basically consumer protection - ie. to 
protect policyholders from bad bargains. In doing so 
some Member States impose considerable restrictions
on the terms and conditions of the policies while 
others rely more on self regulation rather than
statutory control. The degree of freedom enjoyed by
insurers to determine the terms and conditions of 
their policies is very important since it reflects 
the degree of competition in the insurance market.
On the other hand, the proposal for a second non-life 
Coordination Directive (81) proposed by the Commission as
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early as in 1975 was calling for complete free choice of 
the law applicable to the contracts. The Commission's 
view was that any insurer should be able to provide 
contracts to which his own national law would apply 
within the concept of freedom of services. However, some 
Member States expressed concern about the substantial 
differences between national laws which affected the
rights of policyholders, the level of premiums and the 
amounts received by the policyholders in the case of a 
claim. There were fears that policyholders may enter 
into contracts with low premiums but subject to a law 
with which they were unfamiliar and found themselves 
covered less well than they had expected. Thus, the 
regulatory regime which denied freedom of choice of the
law applicable to the contracts remained.
Even more important was the fact that Member States
subjected cross-frontier insurers to the requirement of 
prior establishment and authorisation. Foreign insurers 
intending to transact direct insurance business in some 
Member States should establish a branch office or agency 
within their jurisdiction and to obtain an authorisation. 
The requirement of establishment and authorisation 
discriminate against a foreign insurer since he has to 
pay the costs of setting and running his branch office, 
of obtaining his authorisation and of complying with the 
national laws and administrative practices in the host
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State. The discrimination against insurance concerns on 
the grounds of the fact that they are established in a 
Member State other than in which the services are to be 
provided is incompatible with the principle of a common 
market. There can be a common market in insurance only 
when every insurance concern in the Community is 
genuinely able to provide services freely in Member 
States in which it is not established.
During the last years considerable efforts were 
undertaken towards a common market in insurance services 
and there are a number of reasons for this.
First of all, the increasing growth of service industries 
and the rapid technological changes led to the 
internationalisation of the industry. Services are no 
longer an afterthought in international discussions but 
instead the increasing focus of attention. The increased 
realisation that insurance is a major component of 
services as a whole and its importance is likely to 
increase in the future is an important factor.
Even more important is the deadline of 1992. Indeed, the 
Single European Act laid down a timetable for the 
completion of the internal market. The Single European 
Act reiterated the essential aim of the Treaty of Rome to 
organise the free movements of persons, services and
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capital. It was designed to speed up adoption of 
Directives by doing away with the time delays associated 
with unanimity voting. In some areas such as insurance 
and banking, Directives now have to be adopted by 
qualified majority voting accelerating the process of 
integration in these fields.
The Commission's White Paper clearly indicates that 
mutual recognition of norms and standards should be 
applied to financial products. The Single European Act 
substituted the principle of mutual recognition of 
national standards and regulations for that of prior 
harmonisation. Faced with the difficulties encountered 
in arriving at full harmonisation, it is based on the 
principle of minimum harmonisation of legislation and 
reciprocal recognition of supervision as a corollory, on 
the application of a single control at head office level. 
The European Financial Area is going to be set through 
the acceptance of comparability of supervisory controls 
and without prior harmonisation.
It is quite obvious that the difficult task of creating a 
genuinely common market in financial products is left to 
an intergovernmental model of integration. The Community 
does not try to create a supranational control on 
insurance, since no expansion of the role of the 
Community's bodies takes place. Instead, the process of
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integration is based on the reciprocal recognition of 
supervision. The responsibility is attributed to the 
national authorities of the States where the head 
offices of the undertakings are situated. The power is 
reallocated among national authorities while the 
community authorities are excluded from any involvement.
The Single European Act offers, therefore, an alternative 
model to economic integration based essentially on an 
intergovermental structure. It is a model much more 
flexible and it is based on pragmatism. Recognising the 
traditional differences in the level of supervision and 
consumer protection, it provides for suitable means for 
organising a genuinely free market: the mutual
recognition of national standards and regulations and for 
minimum harmonisation.
This process of integration is not new. It is the 
process which the Member States used to achieve political 
cooperation during the 1970s. And this process is now 
used for economic issues.
In this framework the Council adopted in 1988 the Second 
Directive (82) on the coordination of laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions relating to direct insurance 
other than life assurance and laying down provisions to 
facilitate the effective exercise of freedom to provide
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services and amending Directive 73/239/EEC.
The object of the Directive is to supplement the first non­
life Coordination Directive and to lay down special
provisions relating to freedom to provide services for the 
undertaking and in respect of the classes of insurance 
covered by that first Directive. It therefore recognizes 
that in order to develop the internal market, it is 
desirable to make it easier for insurance undertakings
having their head office in the Community to provide 
services in the Member States, thus making it possible for 
policyholders to have recourse not only to insurers 
established in their own country, but also to insurers 
which have their head office in the Community and are
established in other Member States. It also recognizes 
that policyholders who, by virtue of their status, their 
size or nature of the risk to be insured, do not require 
special protection in the State in which the risk is
situated should be granted complete freedom to avail 
themselves of the widest possible insurance market? while 
it is desirable to guarantee other policyholders adequate 
protection.
The Directive sets out specific provisions with regard to 
law applicable to contracts of insurance covering risks 
situated within the Member States. According to these
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provisions, where a policyholder has his residence or 
central administration within the territory of the Member 
State in which the risk is situated, the law applicable to 
the insurance contract shall be the law of that Member 
State. However, where the law of that Member State so 
allows , the parties may choose the law of another country. 
When the risk is situated in another Member State, the 
parties to the contract of insurance may choose to apply 
either the law of the State where the risk is situated or 
the law of the State where the policyholder is situated. 
If the Member States grant greater freedom of choice of the 
law, the parties concerned may take advantage of this 
freedom. Only in the case of special classes of large 
risks (such as aircraft, railway rolling stock, ships, 
goods in transit and aircraft liability), the parties of 
the contract may choose any law. These provisions clearly 
mean that the Member States can maintain restrictions not 
only for "mass risks" (ie. personal lines) but also for 
"large risks" (except in special classes). The Directive 
did not bring about a truly European solution: Free choice 
of EC laws.
The scope of the Directive includes compulsory insurance, 
but requires the contract covering such insurance to be in 
conformity with the specific provisions relating to such 
insurance, as provided by the Member State imposing the 
insurance obligation.
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With regard to freedom to provide services the Directive is 
based on the distinction between "large risks" and "mass 
risks". For the former, the policyholder needs no special 
protection and insurance contracts taken out are therefore 
governed by the principle of home country control. For 
"mass risks" - essentially the risks of individuals- 
maintaining the regulations and controls of the service 
country is fully justified. Therefore, these risks remain 
under host country control and cannot as yet be written on 
a service basis - ie. by means of transfrontier transaction 
concluded on the basis of the regulations and under the 
control of the insurer's country. The scope of effective 
freedom of services is relatively limited.
Other provisions of the Directive state that the Member 
States legislation shall provide that the undertakings 
which have a branch or agency in the country of the risk 
cannot insure the risk through services. This is the so- 
called "Cumul" rule. According to the Directive "Cumul" 
between establishments (agency or branch) and free services 
is possible for large risks and for mass risks for which 
the establishment in the Member States concerned has no 
authorization. The "Cumul" rule penalizes the large 
insurers with branch/agency networks throughout the 
Community; it interferes with free competition because it 
places domestic insurers in an advantageous position. The
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whole concept of limiting the simultaneous pursuit of 
activity by way of freedom to provide services and activity 
by way of establishment is, commercially, discriminatory 
and unjust.
The Directive provides that the taking-up and pursuit of 
freedom to provide services should be subject to procedures 
guaranteeing the insurance undertakings' compliance with 
the provisions regarding both financial guarantees and 
conditions of insurance? while these procedures may be 
relaxed in cases where the activity by way of provisions of 
services covers policyholders who by virtue of their 
status, their size or the nature of the risk to be insured, 
do not require special protection in the State in which the 
risk is situated.
In these respects, each Member State within the territory 
of which an undertaking intends to provide services may 
make access to such activity subject to administrative 
authorization. The authorization should be granted if the 
undertaking: 1) produces a certificate issued by the home 
authorities attesting that it possesses for its activities 
as a whole the minimum solvency margin calculated according 
to the provisions of the first Directive; 2) produce a 
certificate issued by the authorities indicating the 
classes which the undertaking has been authorized to 
practice and attesting that those authorities do not object
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to the undertaking providing services? 3) submit a scheme 
of operations containing: (a) the nature of the risks which 
it proposes to cover, (b) the general and special 
conditions of the insurance policies which it proposes to 
use, (c) the premium rates which applying for each class of 
business, (d) the forms and other printed documents which 
it intends to use in its dealings with policyholders, in so 
far as these are also required of established undertakings.
Any decision to refuse authorization must be accompanied by 
the precise grounds and communicated to the undertaking in 
question. Moreover, each Member State shall institute the 
right to take legal action in the courts against a refusal 
of authorization. These provisions clearly indicate that 
the authorization is not discretionary. However, if the 
undertaking proposes to cover "large risks" it is not 
necessary to submit a scheme of operations, but only to 
state the nature of risks which it proposes to cover.
With respect to "mass risks", these coordination measures 
does not prevent the Member States from maintaining or 
introducing laws, regulations or administrative provisions 
concerning, in particular, approval of general and special 
policy conditions, of forms and other printed documents for 
use in dealing with policyholders, of scales of premiums 
and of any other document necessary for the normal exercise 
of supervision provided that the rules of the Member State
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of establishment are not sufficient to achieve the 
necessary level of protection and the requirements of the 
Member State of provision of services do not go beyond what 
is necessary in that respect.
However, with respect to "large risks” the Member States 
shall not lay down provisions requiring approval or 
systematic notification of the above conditions. They may 
require only non-systematic notification of these 
conditions.
The Directive also provides that technical reserves should 
be subject to the rules and supervision of the Member 
States receiving services where the provision of services 
involves risks in respect of which the States receiving 
the service wish to provide special protection for 
policyholders. If, however, such concern to protect the 
policyholders is unjustified, the technical reserves 
continue to be subject to the rules and supervision of the 
Member State in which the insurer is established. For 
large risks, the non-localisation rule applies, which means 
freedom from rules in force in the country of the risk as 
regards the representation of assets and evaluation of 
reserves. For the "mass risks" compliance with the 
national law of the Member State of provision of services 
is required, blocking freedom of services for all practical 
purposes. Here again the Community missed a good chance to
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bring about a truly European solution: the application of 
non-localization rule for all classes of insurance.
The Directive also provides for special cooperation with 
regard to freedom to provide services between the competent 
supervisory authorities and contain provisions for a system 
of penalties to apply where the undertaking providing the 
services fails to comply with the provisions of the Member 
State of provision of service.
According to these provisions, if the host supervisory 
authority ascertains that an undertaking does not comply 
with the legal rules in force, they may request the 
undertaking concerned to put an end to the irregular 
situation. If the undertaking fails to comply with the 
request the host authorities may inform the home 
authorities so that the latter can take all the appropriate 
measures to ensure that the undertaking concerned puts an 
end to the irregular situation. These provisions do not 
affect the right of Member States to punish irregularities 
committed within their territory.
The Directive also recognizes that the provisions in force 
in the Member States regarding the forms of indirect 
taxation differ widely. The divergence in the structure 
and rate of these taxes and contributions lead to 
disturbances of competition in insurance services between
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Member States.
Here it is essential to give some brief indications about 
certain specific aspects of the taxation treatment of 
insurance business. Some countries do not subject 
insurance transactions to any form of indirect taxation? 
others allow the policyholder to deduct from his taxable 
income all or part of the premiums paid for insurance of 
certain classes, especially life assurance? while others 
impose a tax on insurance premiums at a rate varying 
according to the class of insurance or/and a tax on
receipts for payment of benefit or indemnity or of loans on 
policies. These taxes are levied directly on the
policyholder and form part of the cost of insurance. In 
the absence of harmonization of taxes, the costs borne by 
the policyholders vary - everything else being equal- 
creating a degree of distortion of competition.
Lastly, the Directive allows for relatively long
transitional periods in the cases of Greece, Ireland, Spain 
and Portugal. Until 31 December 1992, they may treat 
"large risks" as "mass risks". From 1 January 1993 to 31 
December 1994, the regime for "large rieks" shall apply to 
risks where the policyholder is engaged professionally in 
an industrial or commercial activity or in one of the 
liberal professions, and the risks relate to such activity, 
and risks relating to some classes of insurance (such as
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railway rolling stock, aircraft, ships, goods in transit, 
aircraft liability, and liability for ships). For the 
risks relating to other classes even longer transitional 
periods apply exceeding well the deadline of 1992.
The Directive is considered as an important milestone on 
the road to the completion of the single European market, 
even if many of its provisions restrict significantly the 
effective exercise of freedom of services.
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BARRIERS TO THE PROCESS OF LIBERALISING INSURANCE SERVICES 
IN THE DEVELOPED EC COUNTRIES : THE UK CASE
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ESTABLISHMENT, OPERATION AND MARKET ACCESS OF INSURANCE 
CONCERNS IN THE UK : CONDITIONS AND CONTROLS IN 1989.
1. Regulatory provisions and administrative
practices governing the entry and establishment 
of indigenous insurance concerns
The Insurance Companies Act 1982, which is the main UK 
insurance law makes a fairly detailed classification of 
insurance business providing at the same time a clear 
definition of the term "insurance business". The terms 
"long term business" and "general business" correspond 
respectively to the terms "life" and "non-life" insurance 
business as they are used in the Community Directives.
Domestic insurance concerns must be constituted in the form 
of incorporated companies limited by shares or by 
guarantee or unlimited. Obviously, we refer to insurance 
companies as opposed to friendly societies, trade union or 
employer's associations and Lloyd's which was exempted from 
certain provisions of the Act. The regulation of the 
insurance industry in the UK is the responsibility of the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI).
Insurance concerns may not simultaneously carry on long
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term business and general business. Authorization for new 
composite companies (which transact both long term business 
and general insurance business) is not possible.
Insurance concerns should have fully paid up share capital. 
The share capital is not required to be any specific amount 
but the DTI will need to be satisfied that adequate 
financial resources will be available to support the 
business. It is generally believed that insurance 
companies should possess a higher initial share capital 
than ordinary companies since they must remain solvent and 
always be able to meet their financial commitments. The 
amount of the minimum share capital required varies 
according to the class of insurance business to be 
transacted. Presently, a share capital of £5m upwards (or 
£10m upwards if substantial amounts of marine, aviation and 
transport business are to be transacted) could be 
considered a reasonable minimum.
A key requirement of authorization is that directors, 
controllers and managers of all applicants together with 
their agents are fit and proper persons. This involves an 
extensive investigation into financial and moral integrity 
of the applicant and its management. In particular the DTI 
considers any information covering qualifications, 
experience, court convictions and public criticism. It 
also examines whether the persons concerned have been
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declared bankrupt or failed to discharge debts, or found 
guilty of fraud or misconduct, or been a director or 
controller of a company that has been wound up or ceased 
trading.
The DTI have to be satisfied that, if a class of business 
requires reinsurance, the reinsurance arrangements will be 
adequate and suitable. It does not normally allow more 
than 20 per cent of the insurance company's liabilities to 
be reinsured with one company. The DTI considers the 
suitability of the reinsurance arrangements relating to the 
worldwide activities of the applicant.
The entry requirements include the submission of a properly 
organized Business Plan required by the DTI as part of the 
process of applying for authorization. The Business Plan 
should contain:
1) A brief summary of the object of the company and a 
statement showing the amount by which assets are expected 
to exceed liabilities at the date of authorization.
2) Details of any association between the directors,
controllers and anyone acting as an insurance broker or 
agent.
3) Details of the classes of business for which the
company is already authorized in the UK and which it wishes 
to be included in the new authorization.
4) Details of the source of business and the approximate
312
percentage expected from each source.
5) The nature of the commitments the company plans to 
take on and general and special policy conditions it plans 
to use.
6) Guiding principles on reinsurance.
7) The assets which will represent the Minimum Guarantee 
Fund and whether they are admissable under the value in 
line with the Assets Valuation Regulations.
8) Estimated costs of installing administrative services 
and sales organizations and the financial resources planned 
to cover these.
9) Financial projections for each of the three financial 
years covering:
a. a forecast balance sheet (on both optimistic and 
pessimistic assumptions)
b. a plan (on the same bases) setting out detailed 
estimates of income and spending on direct business 
and reinsurance business, and
c. estimates of the financial resources intended to 
cover underwriting liabilities and the solvency 
margins.
10) A statement showing the type of investments expected 
to comprise the insurance funds and the estimated 
proportion represented by each type of investment.
For life companies the Business Plan has also to include:
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1) A statement for each of the first three years
following authorization for each type of contract, on both 
optimistic and pessimistic assumptions and broken down 
between the UK, other EC states and elsewhere, covering:
a. the number of contracts or treaties expected to be 
issued,
b. total premium income, and
c. total sums assured or amounts of annuity per annum.
2) A certificate by the actuary that he considers the
premium rates suitable, the finances sufficient to cover 
both the technical reserves and the required margins of
solvency for three years.
The Business Plan forms the "nub" of a firm's application 
and is used by the DTI to examine in particular the 
financial projections and the margin of solvency during the 
period covered by the projections. The initial free assets 
are expected to be sufficient to cover the required 
solvency position at the end of the three years covered by 
the projection. The DTI usually gives advice before a 
formal application is filed on the amount of financial 
resources required.
Assuming the application is successful, the applicant will 
be authorized to carry on insurance business in the classes 
for which the application was made. If the concern seeks 
to carry on insurance business in other classes another
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application should be made.
The entry requirements as presented above indicate that the 
UK authorities not only adopted the provisions of the EC 
Directives but also set additional requirements so as to 
ensure adequate protection for potential policyholders. 
Ranking these requirements in order of importance is a 
difficult and subjective exercise. But it seems that those 
referring to the management of the companies are the most 
important. The second most serious type of requirements 
concerns the solvency and reinsurance requirements.
The conditions governing the entry of firms to the 
insurance market, as set out in the Insurance Companies Act 
and as applied by the DTI, involve solely prudential 
considerations. In principle, the authorization is not 
discretionary. The responsible authority considers whether 
the prescribed conditions have been fulfilled, in which 
case the authorization must be issued. However, assessment 
of whether the criteria are met is subjective. This means 
that authorisation is discretionary in practice.
The authorization requirements are not applied with the 
intention of prohibiting entry of those concerns which 
would succeed; rather they are designed to cut out only 
those firms which would probably have failed. As a 
consequence, if the DTI's judgement is right, the
315
authorization requirements neither limit entry nor reduce 
the number of firms in the industry.
2 Regulatory provisions and administrative practices
governing the entry and establishment of brances bv 
foreign insurance concerns
Even if foreign insurance concerns are granted complete 
freedom to supply directly insurance services to the UK 
market, many of them prefer to establish themselves within 
the country. Only through establishment can a foreign 
insurer compete effectively with indigenous companies since 
individuals are reluctant to enter into a contract with an 
insurer which lacks a domestic establishment to offer the 
kind of services they require. Moreover, contracts 
affected abroad fall outside the favourable tax treatment 
and the protection of the domestic law (basically the 
Policyholders Protection Act 1977). Even more important 
is the fact that London plays a dominant role in 
international insurance. London is an unregulated market 
in which foreign insurers can enjoy a share even on risks 
for which their parent may be prevented from writing.
Foreign companies are required to obtain an authorization 
from the DTI in order to operate certain classes of 
insurance according to the standards set out in the 
Insurance Companies Act 1982. The authorisation is not
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discretionary. The responsible authority considers whether 
the prescribed conditions have been fulfilled in which case 
the authorization must be granted. Furthermore, the UK 
authorities have adopted the provisions of the EC 
establishment Directives with respect to management and 
solvency requirements. These Directives have done very 
little more than confirm an existing situation since the UK 
was always an open market.
As far as the reinsurance arrangements are concerned (which 
according to the provisions of the EC Directives are left 
to the discretion of every Member State) the DTI does not 
normally allow more than 25 per cent of the insurance 
companies' liabilities to be reinsured with its parent or 
more than 20 per cent with any other company, neither does 
it allow for more than 25 per cent of the liabilities to be 
reinsured in any one country, other than the country in 
which the applicant has its head office. These 
requirements are set out in order to avoid risk 
concentration and are considered to be of foremost 
importance, even if they are circumvented by the foreign 
companies which place their reinsurance business with 
their subsidiaries (which use different names).
The above analysis indicates that the controls over the 
entry of foreign insurance organizations to the UK market 
are rather weak and are governed by prudential
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considerations. The controls over entry are motivated by 
the desire to remove from entry firms which have a great 
possibility of failure in an industry which at the time of 
sale provides only a promise of future performance.
Furthermore, the UK authorities consider branches and 
agencies of foreign concerns as a consequence of the 
operation of these concerns worldwide. Obviously, these 
considerations do not differ very much from the principle 
of "home country control”. The controls over entry and 
establishment of branches and agencies of foreign banks 
into the UK market are motivated solely by prudential 
considerations and they could easily be abolished if the EC 
moves towards a Common Market in financial services.
3 Regulatory provisions and administrative practices
governing the entry and establishment of minority and 
majority owned subsidiaries bv foreign insurance 
concerns
The insurance law provides for equal treatment for all UK 
concerns, whether foreign or domestically owned. The 
supervisory authorities treat foreign subsidiaries in the 
same manner as domestic concerns.
Acquisitions by foreign insurance organisations of
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interests in indigenous concerns, like any other 
acquisition, are subject to the provisions of the Fair 
Trading legislation which is designed to prevent any single 
company acquiring a dominant position in the market. There 
are not statutory limits on the acquisition of 
participations in other companies.
Moreover, as a matter of general policy the DTI would 
expect to be given prior notification of any intended 
acquisition in an authorised insurance company. The DTI 
generally wishes to be satisfied that the parent company 
has adequate capital and managerial resources to support 
such operations and may require to be furnished with 
specific information.
Foreign subsidiaries are considered in law domestic 
corporations. Their establishment is therefore subject to 
the same requirements as the establishment of indigenous 
insurance concerns. Especially the DTI should be satisfied 
about the financial and moral integrity of the new 
management. However, the above requirements are motivated 
(as in the case of establishment of foreign agencies and 
branches) by prudential considerations. One, therefore, 
might argue that the UK authorities do not restrict the 
entry and establishment of foreign owned subsidiaries.
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4 Regulatory provisions and administrative practices
limiting the market access bv foreign based insurance 
organisations
Generally speaking the UK authorities do not impose any 
provision which prevents or hinders foreign based insurance 
companies from supplying insurance, reinsurance or co- 
insurance in the domestic market. An insurance company may 
export insurance services in the UK in the sense that it 
underwrites, at its head office in another country the 
insurance of risks that may be incurred in the UK.
Foreign insurers who are neither established nor authorised 
in the UK are allowed to write insurance business without 
incurring the costs of establishment or of obtaining 
authorisation, except in the case of compulsory insurance. 
Companies wishing to provide a range of insurance services 
in the compulsory classes should establish themselves in 
the national market and comply with reasonable supervisory 
standards. However this exception is not important because 
the compulsory classes are very few (motor third party 
liability and nuclear liability insurance).
The UK is one of the few countries which allows a 
considerable degree of freedom of international insurance 
transactions. In other EC countries legislation 
prohibiting insuring abroad extends beyond compulsory
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insurance, sometimes covering all classes of insurance. 
Furthermore, the UK residents may enter into insurance 
contracts with an insurer abroad even when this insurer is 
also established and authorised in the UK for the same 
classes of insurance. The UK authorities do not apply the 
so-called "cumul” rule. In addition, the national monetary 
authorities do not impose any exchange control regulation 
or practice which prohibits or restricts the residents' 
ability to obtain the necessary foreign exchange to use for 
the transfer of premiums or for insurance taken out abroad. 
The insurance contracts written in the UK can also be 
expressed in foreign currency.
The UK supervisory authorities not only impose no 
restrictions concerning the placing of contracts but also 
allow complete freedom with respect to conditions applying 
to transactions. However, the fiscal policy has a 
distorting effect on insurance services business and 
inhibit the freedom of insurance transactions even if that 
freedom basically exists. The tax relief for life 
assurance is granted only when a contract is effected with 
an insurer established and authorised in the UK. This 
discriminatory tax treatment clearly discourages the supply 
of foreign insurance and raises the problem of tax 
harmonization with respect to insurance in the EC.
as far as reinsurance is concerned, insurance companies
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established in the UK are allowed to place their 
reinsurances abroad. However, they are subject to some 
controls of prudential nature as it has been pointed out. 
Co-insurance is permitted on an international basis. 
Foreign insurance companies are generally allowed (except 
for the compulsory classes) to participate in co-insurance 
operations covering risks located in the UK without the 
need of authorisation.
Furthermore, the UK authorities do not impose any 
restriction on the entry of the intermediaries to the 
market. The Insurance Brokers Registration Act of 1977 
incorporated the provision of the EC Intermediaries 
Directive providing for the effective exercise of freedom 
to provide services.
5 Regulatory provisions and administrative practices
restricting the domestic operations of established 
foreign-owned insurance companies
The UK market is largely unregulated and the UK authorities 
do not impose any regulatory provision or administrative 
practice which relates to the scope of insurance business 
and distinguish between indigenous and foreign insurance 
concerns. Companies are free to determine their premium 
levels and contract wording and have a free hand when
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formulating their investment policy. The rules on the 
admissibility of certain types of assets and restrictions 
on the extent to which individual holdings of assets may be 
taken into account affect, (as it has been pointed out 
elsewhere) only to a small extent their investment policy 
and profitability. Furthermore, branches of foreign 
companies are allowed to calculate their solvency margins 
in respect of the whole of their business and to establish 
both their solvency margins and guarantee funds at their 
head offices. They can therefore rely upon the financial 
guarantees existing at the head office.
As a consequence, branches and agencies of foreign concerns 
established in the UK are legally integral parts of the 
entities to which they belong and are thus regarded by the 
UK supervisory authorities as being primarily the concern 
of their home supervisory authorities for prudential 
supervision. The principle of home country control almost 
applies with respect to the operation of foreign insurance 
concerns.
The analysis so far leads us to the conclusion that the UK 
authorities have incorporated the provisions of the EC 
Directives which did little more than confirm an existing 
position. The UK insurance market has always been a 
relatively open and unregulated market. As far as entry, 
establishment and operation of indigenous and foreign
institutions are concerned the controls are rather weak and 
motivated solely by prudential considerations. Branches 
and agencies of foreign companies are considered as 
integral parts of the entities to which they belong and are 
primarily the concern of their home supervisory authorities 
for prudential supervision. This approach accords to a 
large extent with the principle of "home country control" 
which is an indispensable part of the 1992 Community's 
strategy for the financial sector. Furthermore, the UK 
authorities do not restrict the acquisition by foreign 
institutions of participations in indigenous ones or the 
international insurance transactions. The UK insurance 
market is already open to free competition and no 
government regulation obstructs the neutrality between 
buying insurance services from indigenous institutions, 
buying them domestically from foreign institutions 
established in the UK, or importing them from abroad.
However, the question remains? will the UK be able to 
create with the other Member States a Common Market in 
insurance in the not too distant future ? In order to 
create one market it is necessary to have "freedom of 
establishment" and "freedom of services". These freedoms 
are already granted in the UK but they are restricted in 
the continental European countries. These restrictions are 
said to be necessary to protect policyholders from 
purchasing policies providing inadequate cover from foreign
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insurers. Indeed, as it has been pointed out elsewhere, 
the harmonization of the essential aspects of prudential 
supervision is an indispensable part of a Common Market. 
Will that harmonization take place ?
An attempt at answering these questions will be made in the 
following sections.
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A COMMON MARKET IN INSURANCE : COSTS AND BENEFITS FOR THE 
UK INSURANCE INDUSTRY AND ECONOMY
There are at present (as Table 12 reveals) more than 800 
individual companies to write insurance business in the UK 
(although this figure includes some with principal business 
abroad). Their size varies substantially. The largest ten 
companies in the life market accounted (as Table 13 
indicates) for some 45.6% of the whole premium income. 
While for the non-life market the respective figure is 56%. 
These figures reveal that the insurance industry is highly 
concentrated within the UK and that the distribution of 
firms size is highly skewed.
TABLE 12 
INSURANCE MARKET IN 1986
Type of Life Non-life Composite Total Market 
companies share %
Domestic 192 431 60 683 95
Foreign 20 122 9 151 5
Total 212 553 69 834 100
Source : ABI UK market statistics
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TABLE 13
Life
TOP TEN INSURANCE COMPANIES IN THE UK IN 1986
Rank Company Premium Market Share
1 Prudential
(£ million) 
2,352 10.8
2 Norwich Union 1,340 6.2
3 Standard Life 1,306 6.0
4 Legal & General 948 4.4
5 Commercial Union 723 3.3
6 Sun Alliance 705 3.3
7 Royal Insurance 692 3.2
8 Eagle Star 634 2.9
9 Guardian Royal 627 2.9
10
Exchange 
Allied Dunbar 569 2.6
Top ten total 9,896 45.6
Industry total 21,692 100
Non-
Rank
life
Company Premium Market Share
1 Sun Alliance
(£ million) 
1,063 9.4
2 Royal 848 7.7
3 General Accident 786 7.1
4 Commercial Union 749 6.8
5 Eagle Star 656 6.0
6 Guardian Royal 592 5.4
7
Exchange 
Norwich Union 501 4.6
8 Prudential 355 3.2
9 Co-operative 307 2.8
10 Cornhill 303 2.8
Top ten total 6,160 56.0
Industry total 11,000 100.0
Notes: 1. These figures show UK premiums only.
Worldwide premiums of these 10 companies is 
nearly £14billion.
Source : ABI UK market statistics
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The British insurance companies play an important role in 
the domestic and international economy. In 1986, the 5 
largest UK insurance companies were numbered amongst the 
world's top 15, and 10 amongst the top 50. Many British 
insurance companies are involved to a large extent in 
branch and subsidiaries operation abroad. They also export 
to a significant degree insurance services in the sense 
that they underwrite, at their head office, the insurance 
of risks that may be incurred abroad. These companies, 
since they are especially active in foreign operations, 
derive a considerable proportion of their business and 
profits from overseas.
The measure of the significance of the overseas activity of 
the British insurance industry in terms of earnings is 
illustrated in Table 14 which presents the overseas 
earnings of the various groups of financial institutions. 
The insurance sector (including Lloyds) is the largest 
foreign earner among the financial institutions with 
earnings in 1988 of £4834 million. Some £1417 million of 
this was underwriting income earned on overseas business 
written in the UK by Lloyds underwriters.
The overseas earnings of the insurance sector are not only 
larger that those in any other financial sector, but they 
also are higher than the foreign earnings from North Sea 
oil - which accounted for about £4200 million. This
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provides some indications of the importance of the industry 
to the national economy and demonstrates the fact that the 
industry is internationally orientated. The insurance 
overseas earnings make a very important contribution to the 
UK's bop position and in particular the UK appears to have 
a competitive advantage in the provision of insurance 
services.
TABLE 14
OVERSEAS EARNINGS OF UK FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
in £ millions
Insurance: underwriting 1082
profits from overseas subsidiaries 663 
property income 24
portfolio investment income 693
Lloyds: underwriting (overseas business 1417
written in the UK) 
portfolio investment income 258
Brokers brokers 717
Total 4854
Debits: direct investment income due to
overseas affiliates 20
Net earnings by UK insurance institutions 4839
Banking: 1399
Leasing 40
Investment trusts 171
Unit trusts 218
Pension funds 732
Securities dealers 554
Commodity traders and export houses 573
Brokerage 858
Total earnings of above institutions 9374
Source: The UK Bop Yearbook 1988
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A further measure of the comparative performance of an 
industry internationally could be the relative structure of 
prices within the industry. And Table 15 presents 
percentage differences in price by territory compared with 
the average of the four lowest prices. This comparison of 
the pricing structures of the insurance industries 
indicates that the UK experiences the lowest price level. 
It is therefore quite obvious that the UK possesses a 
competitive advantage in the provision of insurance 
services.
However, this competitive advantage seems to be based on 
the weak government control of the British insurance sector 
and there is enough evidence to justify this argument.
TABLE 15
PERCENTAGE DIFFERENCES IN PRICE BY TERRITORY COMPARED WITH 
THE AVERAGE FOR THE FOUR LOWEST PRICES IN 1987
Life assurance Large risks
Belgium + 5 8  + 1 1
France + 3 3  + 1 2
Italy + 8 3  + 9
Luxembourg + 6 6  + 1 7
Netherlands 9 - 1
Spain + 5 7  + 2 5
UK - 30 - 5
West Germany + 1 5  1
Source : Prudential Bache Capital Funding
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One of the key issues is the capital mass of companies. In 
other words, to become international, a company might need 
to already hold a good share of its home market. The 
internationalisation of activities involves large firms and 
considerable financial strength. Larger firms may compete 
more effectively internationally since they can market 
their products at lower prices because of lower production 
or distribution costs. This could arise because the larger 
insurer: 1) is able to acquire factor inputs - risk capital 
and reinsurance - at a lower cost than smaller insurers, 2) 
can develop a more efficient production and marketing 
system, and 3) is able to exploit increasing returns to 
scale to a greater degree.
In contrast to other countries, the UK authorities do not 
enforce strict anti-trust laws, something which increases 
the scope for substantial mergers. The main Anti-Trust Law 
in the UK is the Fair Trading Act 1973 and it is designed 
to prevent single undertakings and groups from acquiring an 
unduly dominant position in the market. However, the 
Office of Fair Trading, which is responsible for the 
implementation of the Act, usually takes the view that 
acquisitions and mergers are part of the competitive 
process even if it recognises that they result in a 
reduction in the number of competitive firms and therefore 
reduce competition in the market. The UK authorities do 
not place any restriction on the size of the companies
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while composite companies are still allowed to operate and 
are those which dominate the market. This is an important 
distinction between the UK and other counties and affects 
considerably the ability of the British companies to 
compete internationally.
Furthermore, the UK companies are not faced with 
legislation which affects the way they produce their 
products.
Unlike the practices in other countries insurance companies 
in the UK do not have to apply for approval for premium 
rates neither to comply with rules with respect to the 
bases or assumptions to be used in the calculation of the 
premiums. Companies are free to set the prices of their 
policies at competitive levels according to the exact 
characteristic of the policies. They are able to lower 
specific premiums due to the finer distinguishing of risks 
and target a particular group or groups of policyholders to 
whom they will offer special insurance rates and 
consequently gain a competitive edge over other companies. 
The regulation has considerable effects on the operating 
behaviour of firms and on the premiums level.
UK companies do not have to seek approval for each new 
policy from the supervisory authorities. As a result, 
market participations can adjust flexibly to changes in the
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markets and the range of policies which have emerged has 
been wide. Fierce competition encourages companies to 
experiment and many innovations have flourished. A measure 
of the relative performance of an insurance industry is the 
degree of product variety? and the variety of insurance 
products on offer in an unregulated environment is 
relatively wide. A recent study (83) presenting details of 
the different types of insurance policies that are 
available in different countries concludes that in the UK 
there is one of the most extensive product varieties in the 
world due to the absence of regulatory restrictions.
The form of government regulation can actually affect the 
operating cost levels of companies. The UK regulatory 
environment gives companies virtual freedom to invest their 
funds so as to achieve the highest rate of return. This 
contrasts noticeably with their competitors who face 
regulatory requirements that limit the freedom of the 
companies'investment policies. Free regulation should be 
held responsible for the relatively low level of British 
premiums. And low premiums have a direct impact on market 
share.
The regulatory provisions relating to technical reserves 
are also relatively loose in the UK. While the other 
countries require their companies to hold adequate 
equalisation reserves so that they would be in a position
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to absorb losses which can be anticipated to arise in the 
long term? such reserves are not considered necessary in 
the UK. This difference in the regulatory regimes implies 
a relatively low cost on the operation of British 
companies.
It is therefore fairly evident that the British industry's 
indisputable ability to compete internationally is a clear 
consequence of the UK authorities' gentlemanly approach to 
control of the insurance sector. Operating under a 
favourable regulatory regime, UK insurers face the 
attractive prospects of a market of 320 million people.
Many people believe that UK insurers will be among the 
major beneficiaries if plans go ahead to integrate the 
European Insurance Markets. British insurers have had for 
over 100 years a significant involvement in most national 
and international direct insurance markets. They have the 
tradition of a supervisory atmosphere which encourages 
innovation and responsiveness to customers' needs and 
promises significantly increased earnings. This is a 
tradition not enjoyed by the majority of European insurers. 
Response to the proposal for a future integrated market in 
the UK has been favourable. The Association of British 
Insurers and Lloyds saw it as a major boost. Lloyds 
currently derives less than 10% of its business frbm the EC 
which it regards as an enormous untapped market. The UK
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service industry is strong, self-confident and prepared to 
take advantage of the new opportunities in Europe. With 
the London market in a leadership role will find new 
opportunities to insure the activities of people and 
governments.
The EC is a source of flows of Directives to which the UK 
insurers turn their attention. The services Directive with 
respect to large risks will allow the British insurers to 
take large industrial and commercial risks in other Member 
States. The adoption of services Directive with respect to 
mass risks (which is necessary if freedom of services is to 
be implemented) will remove the economic protection which 
the national supervisory systems provide and create further 
opportunities for British insurers. At the first sight the 
direct market prospects seem to be favourable.
On the other hand, however, an integrated financial market 
does not mean only that companies are able to transact 
business anywhere in Europe on the terms approved in their 
home territory and policyholders are able to buy where they 
wanted, but it also involves a certain degree of 
harmonization of national supervisory standards. The 
principle of "home country control" (upon which the EC 
strategy is based) means that the insurer need concern 
himself only with the rules of the country where he is 
established. Where policyholder protection is a particular
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need there may have to be a significant harmonization of 
national supervisory systems before "home country control" 
could be achieved. Since the need for "prudence" is 
constantly pressed in the case of insurance the principle 
of mutual recognition of regulatory standards can be 
accepted by some Member States only through harmonization.
The EC Council has reached agreement on a services 
Directive with respect to large risks without any prior 
harmonization of the supervisory standards. However, as it 
has been pointed out elsewhere the need for "prudence" is 
rather weak in the case of large risks. Mass risks are at 
the moment limited by the regulations existing in the 
continental European countries. This protectionism is said 
to be necessary to protect policyholders from purchasing 
policies providing inadequate cover from foreign insurers 
(84) .
One would normally expect industrialised countries to be 
characterised by "open markets" while protective barriers 
are a distinctive feature of developing countries. 
However, protectionist measures adopted in many European 
countries are not aimed at reducing external competition 
and increasing profits for the internal market. The 
objective is rather to protect domestic policyholders from 
the insolvency of foreign insurance companies or their 
failure to provide an acceptable standard of service.
336
IA Common Market, where companies would be able to transact 
business anywhere in Europe on the terms approved by the 
home supervisory authority may come about only if the 
supervisory control exercised in the home country is 
comparable to that in the host country. The comparability 
of supervisory controls can be achieved only through 
harmonization. This means that the British would have to 
bring their supervisory system closer to those of the other 
European countries. A strengthening of the supervisory 
control would erode to a significant extent the competitive 
advantage in the provision of financial services that the 
UK has been enjoying for so many years with significant 
implications for the industry and the UK economy as a 
whole.
The new conditions for operating for British insurance 
would be an additional burden on the functioning of 
companies and jeopardise their external development. The 
additional controls would profoundly affect the efficiency 
and profitability of the British insurance concerns. 
British insurance companies would lose the clear cut price 
advantage (which is now credited to them), since many 
instances higher prices on the continent are due to factors 
(ranging from premiums and policy controls to taxation and 
investment constraints) which would affect British insurers 
operating within an integrated insurance market. British
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companies would not be the cheapest. One therefore may not 
accept that British insurance products will necessarily 
sweep throughout an integrated insurance market, neither 
that the UK industry would take significant advantage of 
the new opportunities in Europe.
At the same time the strictly regulated States would reduce 
their regulatory constraints because their own domestic 
operators would be severely handicapped in the face of more 
flexible competitors. Such a tendency will possibly lead 
insurance undertakings conscious to new state of affairs to 
review their structure, increase productivity and 
creativity and compete effectively with the British rivals.
It is widely believed that the freedom of services will 
firstly benefit the so-called "liberal" markets which have 
the least restrictive regulations of which the classic 
example is the British market. However, freedom of 
insurance transactions is closely associated with 
harmonization of insurance regulation. The existing 
markets differ significantly in the nature and amount of 
regulation and they also differ in the nature and variety 
of products that can be offered. A Common Market (which is 
usually held to mean a Community wide market having the 
characteristics of a national market) will therefore 
profoundly change the regulatory framework of insurance 
undertakings operating in the different markets. The
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liberal markets will experience a reinforcement of controls 
while at the same time the more strictly controlled markets 
will develop in a more liberal way. And after this process 
the British insurance companies would be able to make only 
limited gains from the Community's wide market. The EC 
would not provide British isurers with a unique possibility 
for expansion.
Furthermore, the UK insurance industry which is the most 
international in the world, places its main emphasis for 
external expansion on North America, and the former 
Dominion status territories. Indeed, Table 16, presenting 
evidence of the premium income of UK insurers in overseas 
territories in 1986, reveals that the premium income earned 
by UK insurers in USA, Canada and Australia is much higher 
than that earned in the European countries. The fact that 
earnings from the USA accounts for about two-thirds of the
total UK overseas earnings gives a clear indication of the
concentration of the UK insurance overseas business.
Obviously this picture will be reversed within an 
integrated financial market. UK insurers would see their 
non-EC earnings falling, while their EC earnings will 
present a small improvement as trade and integration 
occurs. The UK would become much less dependent on USA
earnings and take a little advantage of the European
market. The extent of this trend will depend on the
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philosophy upon which the legislative base of the European 
market will be constructed, since this philosophy will 
determine the degree of regulatory process of the UK 
market. However, it is considered that any strengthening 
in the controls would significantly damage the UK 
industry's ability to compete internationally.
One therefore might argue that the British would not be 
prepared to accept tighter regulation in return for the 
possibility of readier access to the European Market. For 
the UK authorities the EC is not the centre of the Universe 
and the British industry has substantial economic interests 
in other overseas territories. UK insurers have much to 
lose if EC tendencies to introduce additional controls on 
their operations undermine their standing and market share 
worldwide.
PREMIUM INCOME OF UK INSURERS IN OVERSEAS TERRITORIES
TABLE 16
(1986) (£ million)
General Long term
Belgium
Denmark
France
Germany
Ireland
Netherlands
Australia
Canada
New Zealand
South Africa
USA
other
164
77
144
280
184
400
452
895
60
143
3234
606
13
52
102
145
312
297
377
576
45
99
442
161
Source : ABI
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Furthermore, the London market will have to remain 
relatively unregulated in order to retain its privileged 
position in the international insurance forum.
London's dominance as an insurance/reinsurance centre 
undoubtedly originates from its 19th Century beginnings 
when the UK was at the head of a large and growing empire 
and London had already emerged as an important 
international financial centre. Despite considerable 
changes in Britain's role in the world, London retained its 
pre-eminent position due to relative freedom from 
legislative restrictions enjoyed by those engaged in 
business. The legislative freedom of the British insurance 
market is a major factor underlying the dominance of London 
as a world centre. Foreign insurers have generally praised 
the highly unregulated environment which does not restrict 
their profitability. The question is whether London will 
retain its pre-eminent position within an integrated 
financial market.
Priorities necessary to stay at the top take the form of 
three elements: competitiveness, cost effectiveness and
convenience. However, the factors contributing to the 
attainment of these elements depend very much on the 
autonomy which underwriters in London enjoy. However, this 
autonomy could be lost within an integrated financial
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market, since the UK authorities would have to bring their 
supervisory system closer to that of their EC partners. 
And a strengthening of the government regulation represents 
a potential threat to the London market's prominent 
position in insurance. London would lose its 
attractiveness and a significant amount of business would 
be transferred to other financial centres. Can the UK 
government ever accept that ?
The role that London as an international insurance market 
plays to the benefit of the UK economy is well recognised. 
In view of the growing UK deficit in manufacturing trade 
and the instability in the exchange parity of the pound, 
London's insurance-related contribution to the country's 
bop has grown immensely in its economic significance. The 
government seems to be committed to London's future as a 
worldwide insurance centre. London, in its capacity as 
international insurance centre , may find itself dealing 
with non-EC policyholders under more liberal conditions 
than some member countries might at present visualise for 
EC insurers. Whatever happens in the rest of the EC, the 
UK would not impose additional controls. London would 
continue to be a free, open market in which foreign 
insurers can enjoy a share, even on risks for which their 
home parent may be prevented from writing. It is 
considered as a UK asset whose value should not be eroded 
by common rules. The UK authorities will not possibly
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accept a strengthening of the prudential controls that 
would diminish London's status as an international 
financial centre.
In this section it has been pointed out that there is a 
close association between the removal of barriers to 
insurance transactions and the harmonization of the
regulatory structures and the UK authorities have
substantial interests in rejecting any trend towards 
harmonization. This provides a first indication that a
freedom of services will be very hard to attain in the
years to come. This argument is further strengthened in the 
next sections by demonstrating the conflicts in the 
supervisory philosophies, interests and practices between 
the UK and the continental countries.
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CONFLICTS IN NATIONAL SUPERVISORY PHILOSOPHIES AND
INTERESTS
In most countries insurance companies are subject to more 
stringent control than is normal with the suppliers of 
other goods and services. There are two main reasons for 
this. The first is the obvious importance of the services 
they provide to their customers. The second is that by 
their nature insurance services are more difficult than 
other goods and services to test at the time of sale. 
Indeed, at the time of sale insurance provides only a 
promise of future performance, that is, the insurer 
undertakes, if a claim is made to have sufficient funds to 
settle it in full. This is most obviously true in the case 
of life assurance where the intervening period could be 
more than twenty years. If an insurer for any reason 
defaults, the financial consequences for the policyholders 
would be very serious.
The basic object of government supervision of insurance 
companies is the protection of policyholders from the 
consequences of insolvencies. In this respect, the 
government intervention in insurance conditions should 
focus only on the points where the market place does not 
find satisfactory solutions. However, the supervisory 
authorities in different States have different views about
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the extent to which the market place finds satisfactory 
solutions. The political and economic philosophy of the 
party forming the government may significantly affect the 
extent of intervention applied to the financial services 
sector.
In the UK the supervisory authorities adopted a flexible 
form of state intervention in order to protect the public 
without stifling competition between the financial 
institutions as to lose their customers the advantages 
usually associated with it in terms of price innovation and 
quality and variety of service. Thus, the effort is wholly 
devoted to overseeing the fitness and properness of 
controllers, directors and managers and the solvency of 
insurance companies.
The issue of the fitness and properness of those involved 
in the management of an insurance concern is a key element 
of the UK supervisory process. The supervisory 
authorities' concern has been to keep to a minimum degree 
of interference as possible with the market forces but to 
ensure the competence and quality of the management. 
According to the UK authorities the rules of the game in 
the financial markets need to be formulated by those who 
play it and this has traditionally been the way it has been 
done. Some of these rules, especially those referring to 
solvency, need enforcement by statute but the rest should
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be self-imposed. The case against strict regulation is 
that it may limit competition and discourage the successful 
operation of the market forces.
Indeed, the UK authorities take the view as a government 
committed to the market economy that their role is to get 
the economy operating as efficiently and as fairly as 
possible. Most of the regulatory side can be done on a 
self-regulatory basis by the industries themselves. The 
regulatory role of the government would be very limited. 
In general great emphasis is placed on competition to 
promote both allocative and productive efficiency in the 
market and on self-regulation to protect the consumers 
against the potential consequences of market failure.
Self-regulation is considered as preferable to government 
regulation and is accordingly promoted whenever it is 
regarded as appropriate. Thus, when the UK authorities felt 
the need to control the amount of the commission to be paid 
in order to achieve competitive equality the government 
left to the relevant parties concerned to negotiate the 
agreement under the supervision of Life Offices' 
Association (LOA). The policy conditions and the premium 
rates (ie. the price and quality of financial products) 
while attract strict control in most countries, in the UK 
are self-regulated.
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Another way of preserving both competition and stability in 
the financial system could involve reinforcing by other 
means disciplines inherent in the market process. Ideas 
along this line run from the fact that more frequent 
disclosure of information about the condition of insurance 
institutions reduce their probability of failure.
In fact, a central element of insurance supervision is 
"freedom with publicity”. While there is an absence of 
regulatory constraints in such areas as policy terms and 
premium rates and insurance companies are, to a large 
extent, allowed to conduct their business as they think 
best, the regulations contain certain requirements 
concerning detailed disclosure about the financial 
condition and performance of companies. The Insurance 
Companies Act gave to the DTI considerable discretionary 
powers "to produce such books or papers as may be so 
specified...at any time, if they think there is good reason 
to do so". This information is designed to ensure that the 
responsible supervisory authority or indeed anyone 
interested in doing so, can make a independent assessment 
of the strength of a company. The concept is that if the 
public has access to adequate information about the 
soundness of the institutions it will place its savings 
only in the sound ones. As a result, the responsible 
management will be more sensitive to risk, promoting safer 
and sounder practices. In other words, the availability of
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adequate information develops a market mechanism in which 
sound institutions attract business away from weak ones 
promoting the stability of the whole financial system.
The UK authorities place a great deal of emphasis on market 
discipline as a complement to official prudential 
supervision. They believe that the market place by 
determining the successes and failures of the institutions 
imposes a great deal of discipline on its members.
However, the impact of market discipline depends, to a 
large extent, on the perception by the market of the 
authorities' response to the prospect of failure of an 
institution. The Insurance Companies Act contains a 
considerable number of provisions dealing with the 
sanctions imposed on insurance concerns and grants the 
responsible supervisory authorities cease and desist powers 
against concerns engaging in unsound business practices. 
It also established procedures for dealing with failing 
companies. The authorities can also intervene in problem 
cases in order to limit the scope for counterproductive 
reactions by the market. Indeed, in a crisis situation the 
DTI uses its powers to persuade strong insurance concerns 
to take over the companies perceived to be in financial 
difficulty or provides emergency support facilities in 
cases where insolvency is threatened. These practices have 
been extensively used in 1974: a year when several
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companies suffered severe financial difficulties (85). 
However, the Act does not include any provision of policies 
relating to public intervention in crisis situations. And 
the main reason for the non-existence of policy statements 
and formal conditions for activating an emergency process 
is to enforce market discipline standards.
Furthermore, the existence of a Guarantee Scheme operating 
under the Policyholders Protection Act provides further 
indications that some companies may be allowed to fail and 
enforce risk-taking restraints and market discipline 
standards. The Act provides that policyholders of offices 
which have gone into liquidation or which are in financial 
difficulties may be compensated by up to 70% of any 
liability of the company to the policyholder. The Act does 
not provide for 100% compensations in order to give an 
incentive to policyholders to place their savings with 
sound institutions so as the market mechanism can operate 
effectively.
However, there are doubts about the extent to which market 
forces ultimately are capable of imposing an acceptable 
degree of discipline.
First of all, competition may shift the focus of policies 
away from concerns with safety and towards greater risk 
taking in a quest for larger profits. Competition may well
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turn out to be excessive undermining company solvency and 
thus the security provided for policyholders. Insurers 
when fixing premiums may make subjective judgments 
regarding future conditions and companies wishing to expand 
or sustain their market share could take an over-optimistic 
view of trends in claims and investment yields. The 
activities of fit and proper operators may, therefore, 
involve a degree of risk and create a probability that 
insolvency may arise. The competition in the financial 
services sector should therefore be controlled.
As far as self-regulation is concerned, it is fair to say 
that self-regulatory bodies are rather impotent with regard 
to the regulation since they are voluntary associations 
and do not possess any powers with which to discipline 
their Members. Indeed, the experiences of self-regulation 
are not encouraging. The LOA reached an agreement with its 
members concerning the payment of commission which was 
designed to prevent its influencing the selling of life 
products. However, some companies went in for aggressive 
marketing and did not join the association. Instead, they 
offered better commission rates, something which led other 
members of the LOA to resign in order to compete with them 
on equal terms and as a result the agreement collapsed. 
From a liberal perspective the concept of government 
regulation by means of "freedom with publicity” could be 
considered as effective. Consumers would be able to
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possess adequate information about the activities of the 
insurance companies and judge for themselves the soundness 
of the institutions and as a result, companies would be led 
to prudent policies.
However, in practice, the principle of "freedom with 
publicity" is no more than a formal procedure. Experience 
suggests strongly that consumers find it difficult or 
impossible in practice to make reliable incremental 
appraisals of the degree to which institutions are taking 
excessive risks before the time the consequences of such 
activities become readily apparent (86) . Indeed, 
inexperienced consumers would understand very little if 
they look at the balance sheets of the individual 
companies.
Even more important is the fact that the "freedom with 
publicity" disappears if there is something adverse 
(interesting) to be published. Indeed, the evidence 
suggests that the authorities encourage firms (the Vehicle 
and General Insurance Company for instance) at a weak 
financial position not to publish balance sheets or other 
accounts because they recognise the strong possibility that 
such publicity would be highly damaging to the firms 
concerned. Obviously, "freedom with publicity" is an 
illusory form of regulation which does not work in 
practice.
351
Confidence is one of the most important elements in the 
functioning of the financial markets. The process by which 
financial institutions become insolvent is usually very 
inefficient. If there is the least doubt about the
solvency of an institution this would go bust due to the 
reaction of the public. Furthermore, confidence is a 
public good. A lack of confidence in any institution may 
spread to the whole financial system since the people do 
not usually distinguish between different institutions. 
This would undermine the stability of sound institutions 
and therefore that of the financial system as a whole. 
Indeed, this is the main reason that the DTI stated that 
the principle of "freedom with publicity" should be
substituted with the principle of "freedom with
responsibility". According to this principle companies 
would still have freedom to set premiums and set policy 
conditions and they are also free to make mistakes about 
trends in claims, administrative expenses and investment 
yields. But the DTI must look for a high degree of
responsibility from insurance companies so that mistakes 
are kept to a minimum.
The analysis so far leads us to the conclusion that the 
effectiveness of the market stabilisation effect depends 
very much on the existence of detailed information 
regarding companies' situations and prospects which usually
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is not the case. On the other hand, the market may 
overreact to the existence of such information while the 
public confidence in some institutions would be undermined. 
Furthermore, the market response to signs of strains 
developing in one institution usually spreads to the whole 
financial system and this does not correspond with the 
public policy objective of sustaining the integrity of the 
financial system. Indeed, free markets are not efficient 
by definition. They are efficient only under certain 
conditions which are not fulfilled in the case of financial 
markets. The market failures that exist in the particular 
area lead to a strong argument for state intervention.
There are also other reasons for state intervention in 
insurance. This is related to the term of implicit 
contracts. One of the main characteristics of the 
insurance industry is that people sign what are really 
remarkably vague contracts (87). With profits contracts 
are very good examples of this case. The state 
intervention is therefore necessary in order to close the 
gap between entitlements and expectations. Indeed, the
making of regulations to govern insurance contracts
/
especially in the field of private person's insurance is a 
form of consumer protection commonly adopted in the 
regulation of insurance. These regulations forbid or 
prescribe certain contract terms in order to eliminate the 
possibility that people's expectations turn out to diverge
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from prospective settlements. The intervention for the 
definition of the contract is therefore necessary and 
desirable.
It is generally accepted that insurance cover is a complex 
"product” to buy. The terms of the policy represent its 
quality. The fewer conditions, warranties and exclusions 
in the policy, then naturally the wider the cover and the 
better the product. There should therefore be some form of 
statutory control in order to prevent insurers 
incorporating in their policies as many exclusion clauses, 
conditions and warranties as they consider necessary and to 
ensure fair insurance contract terms and better products 
for the public. Supervision of policy wordings is 
necessary to protect members of the public from being 
mislead into buying unsuitable insurance policies from 
incompetent, or even dishonest, insurers and to tilt the 
balance of the "deal" more in the policyholders favour. 
This balance basically benefits the insurers.
The above considerations are also shared by most of the 
continental European countries which believe that the 
possibility of a disaster - namely an insurance company 
becoming insolvent - outweighs any benefit associated with 
competition in terms of price, innovation, quality and 
variety of service. Indeed, the UK's philosophy and 
practice of insurance supervision is very different from
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those of most of its European partners.
In all countries the underlying principle is that the 
consumer must be protected and that the policyholder should 
be safeguarded from the risk of losing his investment, 
maintaining at the same time confidence in the financial 
system as a whole. However, the way and (even more 
important) the extent to which these are done differ from 
country to country. The UK supervisory system is concerned 
with fitness and solvency. The main aim is to ensure that 
those who carry on insurance business appear to be fit and 
proper persons while the results of the companies are 
monitored to ensure that they set up adequate reserves 
against the liabilities they have taken on and that in 
addition they retain their required margin of solvency.
The returns submitted to the responsible supervisory 
authority are made public so that the financial operations 
are open to scrutiny, not just by the supervisory 
authority, but also by the public. But, the main feature 
of the UK system is that management of insurance concerns 
is given almost complete liberty of action. They can frame 
their own policy conditions and premium rates and the 
authorities leave the maximum scope for competition. Any 
tension between these two aims is resolved by having as a 
back stop the Policyholders Protection Act. The 
policyholders have usually higher returns on their money
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and a wide choice of products but the system does not 
guarantee survival to a company, neither are the
policyholders protected completely from loss. The UK 
authorities take the view that the protection of the
company from failure and the policyholder from loss can 
occur only at a very high price in terms of reducing the 
scope for competition. The UK system is based on 
protective regulation.
In other countries consumer protection takes a different 
form. Germany represents the opposite extreme. Since it 
is between the UK and Germany that the most obvious 
potential for trade and integration exists, it is useful to 
examine briefly its supervisory system. The security of 
the consumer is maintained by strict supervision. Policy 
wording and premium rates are closely monitored by the 
authorities. Solvency rules require insurance companies to 
hold substantial levels of assets and reserves to ensure 
that in any case that the firms will be able to pay claims. 
Insurance regulation requires investments to fulfil the 
condition of maximum security. Competition is restricted 
in order to limit risks incurred by the institutions. The
system offers a very high degree of security to the
company, and a high degree of security for the policyholder 
but at the cost of an indifferent result on their 
investment coupled with a restriction on the choice of 
policy. The German authorities consider that this cost is
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significantly outweighed by the benefits associated with 
the high degree of security provided to policyholders.
The UK and Germany represent the extreme positions and the 
other countries fall in between the two with most of them 
being closer to the German position. Ireland is very close 
to the UK position and Holland not far away. The analysis 
so far leads us to conclude that the UK's supervisory 
philosophy conflicts with that of the continental 
countries. Indeed, the major European states seem to 
believe that the UK market is relatively unregulated and 
that the UK system is weak.
In France, an authorisation is required for large risks to 
be taken out abroad. This authorisation may be granted if 
these risks are insured with continental insurance 
companies but not with British companies. Even if this 
restriction will be abolished in 1990 due to the 
implementation of the non-life services Directive, it is a 
clear indication that the French authorities believe that 
the UK market is unregulated. Germany allows insurance 
taken out abroad but forbids intermediaries to place 
business across frontiers. This restriction applies 
particularly in the case of business placed with British 
insurers where the authorities react immediately to any 
unlawful actions. However, in the other cases the 
authorities remain relatively passive.
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Even more important is the fact that (according to an EC
itself on the defensive during the negotiations for the 
adoption of the non-life services Directive. The other 
delegations, particularly the French and the German, argued 
that the UK has traditionally been devising methods of 
regulation which operate along less formalised lines with 
more emphasis placed on self-regulation and therefore the 
authorities assumed a passive role. However, self­
regulation should not be accepted as a means of preventing 
an undesirable situation developing and that the DTI's 
gentlemanly approach to control of the insurance system is 
dangerously inadequate. The authorities should therefore 
consider it necessary to regulate by legislation and to 
move to a more active role in seeking to foresee and 
forestall eventual insolvency.
Indeed, the delegations of the continental countries argued 
strongly that there is a case for a redistribution of 
responsibilities between government regulation and self- 
regulation. The unfortunate events of the early 70s have 
been mentioned as a proof that the policyholder is 
inadequately protected. The UK's present effort on 
regulation is rather weak and only 60 people in the 
Insurance Division of the DTI are employed on regulation. 
On the other hand, the scale of the supervisory effort in 
most Common Market countries is markedly greater. West
official) in the EC Council the British delegation found
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Germany employs 350, France 200 and Italy 170.
The British delegation counter-argued that comparisons 
between countries' supervisory effort can be easily over­
simplified. The UK supervisory effort for example would 
need to be greater if it were not for the appointed actuary 
system under the Insurance Companies Act, and the strength 
of the actuarial profession in the UK. Major reliance is 
also placed on external auditing. However, even if this is 
the case it is not enough to cover the difference in the 
degrees of supervisory efforts.
On the other hand, the British believe that the continental 
market is over-regulated. A recent unpublished study 
undertaken by the ABI comparing and analysing the effects 
of the differences in the regulatory regimes on the cost 
and price levels and the range of products, points out the 
continental regulation on insurance companies stiffens 
market competition causing a serious loss of efficiency 
without improving the position of insurance consumers. The 
authorities should learn the lesson of the continental 
experience accepting tighter regulation. Even if this 
study does not consider the differences in product quality 
in terms of insolvencies and consumers complaints over 
claims handling, it is believed that the study will 
seriously be taken into account by the UK authorities.
I o
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It is perfectly apparent that the differences in the 
supervisory philosophies are substantial. On the other 
hand, it has been said that differences in philosophies 
often reflect divergent interests and this also holds in 
the case of European insurance. It seems that the UK 
authorities attach a particular priority to the interests 
of the insurers rather than those of the policyholder and 
to the public in general.
The DTI has close and longstanding relations with the 
insurance associations which represent the various sectors 
of the industry. The associations appear to play an 
important role in the supervisory process since the 
practice of the Insurance Division of the DTI is to consult 
widely with these bodies over its methods of operation; 
particularly before submitting any proposal for 
legislation to the Parliament. The main bodies consulted 
are: the ABI, the LOA, the Linked Life Assurance Group, the 
Institute of London Underwriters, the Reinsurance Offices 
Association and the British Insurance Broker's Association. 
The discussions between the DTI and the industry 
associations are of great importance to the latter parties 
since the legislation becomes more flexible after the 
negotiations and does not hinder the liberty of action of 
the management of the insurance concerns.
As a result of this consultative process significant
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changes have taken place in the proposals originally put 
forward by the DTI. The adoption of the Insurance
Companies Regulations 1981 is a clear manifestation of 
this. The adoption of the final paper was the result of 
many years of extensive discussions where the interest of 
the consumers were not represented. The Insurance 
Companies Regulations govern how particular types of assets 
should be valued and impose limitations on the extent to 
which the value of certain assets may be taken into account 
when determining the solvency of an insurance company. The 
original paper attracted considerable criticism from the 
insurance community as being too tight and therefore posing 
a potential threat to the companies' freedom of operations. 
The limitations imposed were considered particularly 
restrictive. The DTI finally stepped back and changed the 
conditions in the last version of the paper allowing much 
more flexibility.
As a matter of usual practice the DTI publishes its ideas 
and allows plenty of time for the interest groups of the 
insurance community to respond and comment before 
finalising its rules so that these do not limit the 
discretion allowed to insurance companies. The extensive 
process of consultation between the DTI and the insurance 
community demonstrates that the insurers' interests are 
considerably taken into account by the national 
authorities.
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As it has been pointed out elsewhere, insurance cover is a 
complex product to buy and as a result most of the 
countries have adopted some form of statutory control over 
what might be considered unfair insurance contract terms. 
However, in the UK, insurance contracts were exempted from 
the provisions of the Unfair Contract Terms Act of 1977 in 
order not to limit the ability of the insurance companies 
to produce innovative products. Yet, discussions during 
1984 with all interested parties on the Law Commission's 
Report on Insurance Law, confirmed the wide divergence of 
opinions between consumers interests who wanted legislative 
reform (because the existing system allows too much 
discretion and that consumers must be safeguarded against 
fraudulent claims) and insurers who considered statutory 
action as greatly reducing the effectiveness of the 
industry. The authorities finally turned the balance of 
the dispute in the insurers' favour and did not adopt any 
form of statutory control. The political pressure to keep 
the industry unregulated outweighed the consumer pressure 
for a measure of statutory protection.
In contrast to the UK, the German authorities attach 
priority to the interests of the policyholders rather than 
those of the insurers. The German insurance market 
disposes an insurance association called the Gesamtverband 
ber Deutschen Versicherungswirtschaft and a number of 
committees which deal with various lines of business.
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However, these groups are not powerful enough to have 
significant influence on the legislative process. The 
geographical spread of insurance centres in Germany with 
over a thousand kilometers between the north and the south 
is a disadvantage and very often tends to become a problem 
for the work of these associations (88).
Furthermore, the insurance buyers also belong to 
organisations such as the Deutsher Versicherungs- 
Schutzverband. These are very influential groups; they are 
in favour of standard policies and of a high degree of 
market regulation to ensure fairness in the conduct of 
financial transaction. The Federation of the German 
Industry is one of these groups and has an important say in 
every negotiation. In Germany the balance of power appears 
to be in favour of the consumer.
Even more important is the fact that the German authorities 
have a strong attitude to the interests of the consumer in 
order to protect him from potential loss. This type of 
"consumer protection" attitude was adopted after the Second 
World War when policyholders lost almost all their 
insurance savings. The insurers used these savings to 
finance the War and thus lost a substantial proportion of 
funds.
It is therefore fairly evident that the authorities of the
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Member States attached different priorities to the 
interests of the different political groups and this 
constitutes the most serious impediment to the creation of 
a Common Insurance Market in the, years to come. Against 
this background, the EC Council has reached an agreement on 
a non-life insurance services Directive which has not 
imposed any additional controls on the UK industry and has 
moved the rest of Europe closer to the UK philosophy by 
allowing companies established in one country to market 
their products for large risks across international 
borders.
In the EC it has been the custom hitherto to produce a non­
life insurance Directive, and then to produce a life one 
incorporating the same provisions of the text of the one 
affecting non-life insurance. Since the non-life services 
Directive has been adopted one might argue that a life 
services Directive will be adopted according to the shape 
of the non-life one. However, the future is not free from 
areas of potential controversy between the UK and its EC 
partners. These areas would constitute serious barriers to 
freedom of insurance services with respect to mass risks. 
The aim of the next section is to identify and evaluate the 
barriers to freedom of services which arise from the 
present situation in order to indicate that complete 
freedom of services for mass risks will be very hard to 
attain in the next few years.
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IMPEDIMENTS TO THE ADOPTION OF THE HOME COUNTRY CONTROL
PRINCIPLE
In the UK the authorities do not impose any direct control 
on the determination of premium levels. The financial 
system in the UK is essentially a market system within 
which insurance companies compete one with another for 
providing services in terms of prices (the returns they 
offer and the premiums they charge). The responsible 
supervisory authority tries to ensure through financial 
statements that premiums calculation must reflect all costs 
such that the long term viability of the firms is 
guaranteed. The DTI has considerable discretionary powers 
to intervene if it considers that the premium levels are 
not the appropriate ones. However this was never the case.
Indeed, in the UK, self-regulation is regarded as 
preferable to government regulation. The LOA sets out 
acceptable codes of conduct in respect of premium rates. 
However, since the LAO is a voluntary association, it is 
unable to force regulatory policies and since membership 
does not offer any benefits there are no sanctions against 
those who do not comply with the codes. There are 
therefore no controls over premium rates in the UK. The 
authorities believe that controls over premium rates reduce 
profitability and efficiency without commensurate benefits
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for the consumer.
In contrast to the UK, in the continental countries the 
authorities regulate the premium rates in order to prevent 
excessive competition in the market which would undermine 
the financial stability of the companies and the interests 
of the policyholders. Firms must calculate their premiums 
in accordance with strict regulatory guidelines. Otherwise 
approval cannot be obtained from the responsible 
supervisory authorities. The normal method of control 
adopted is for the supervisory authority to lay down the 
bases or assumptions to be used in the calculation of the 
premium including both interest and mortality rates and 
this forces the companies to have virtually identical 
premium rates throughout the range.
In Germany there is almost no competition in the pricing of 
life products. The authorities argue that competition 
would lead to insolvency so premiums are kept at 
artificially high levels. The reason given for the high 
level of premiums is that they must be fixed for the whole 
duration of the contract. The authorities therefore like a 
large safety margin. Competition between life products is 
not related to price but to the amount paid back to the 
insured in the form of dividends.
In France and Italy life assurance premium rates have to
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receive prior approval by the responsible supervisory 
authorities for the same considerations. The authorities 
also fix the maximum and the minimum levels of the life 
premium rates.
The controls over premium rates is one of the most 
important differences between the UK's and continental 
countries' supervisory systems. In the UK there are no 
such restrictions and companies can sell policies at 
whatever rate they like allowing very much more competition 
in the UK market at a price basis. It is therefore evident 
that to allow the highest level of freedom and give all 
companies the right to market their policies in other 
countries subject to supervisory regulations of the country 
in which the head office is situated is very difficult. 
Without some harmonization of the supervisory control of 
premium rates this could undoubtedly be deemed to 
constitute unfair competition and some countries could 
consider that the degree of protection provided to their 
residents is inadequate and unacceptable.
It is therefore considered that there is very little room 
for a compromise particularly within the timescale. In the 
continental countries there is a strong consideration that 
strict supervision is the only effective method of consumer 
protection while in the UK there is a considerable
t
opposition to any additional control.
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The UK authorities do not control the policy conditions and 
companies are allowed to issue any policy they like. The 
general policy conditions are part of the insurance
concern's business plan. Before he can obtain an 
authorisation the insurer must submit to the insurance 
supervisory authority the policy conditions. The DTI also 
needs to be notified about any alteration in them.
However, these requirements are not significant since the
authorities try to be informed about the variety of 
contracts available in the market. There is no government 
control , over insurance contracts. In the UK self­
regulation seems to perform some of the functions of 
administrative control. The LOA sets out accepted codes of 
conduct in respect to policy conditions? but it is unable 
to force regulatory policies.
In most continental countries, on the other hand, the 
supervisory authorities control the policy conditions and 
companies are not allowed to issue policies until they have 
agreed the contracts with the authorities. A comparative 
analysis of the insurance contract supervision of the 
Member States is beyond the scope of the study? but it is 
necessary to give a few examples.
In Germany contract regulation is considered as an 
instrument of prudential control. Contracts of both life
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and non-life insurance should be submitted to the 
responsible supervisory authorities for prior approval. 
The authorities try to make contract conditions as uniform 
as possible throughout the industry. This policy is 
considered necessary for curbing non-price competition and 
as a means of reducing the complexity of consumers' 
purchase decisions.
In France, the system of control in insurance contracts is 
less tight. Policy wordings are submitted to the 
supervisory authorities for prior approval. The 
authorities do not try to impose standardised policy 
conditions, but rather to exclude unfair contract 
provisions such as hiding certain "surprising” exceptions 
from liability In the fine print.
Italy also controls policy wordings tightly in order to 
avoid excessive competition between insurers primarily with 
the objective of protecting policyholders' interests. 
Excessive competition may undermine company solvency and 
thus the security provided for policyholders. The control 
of insurance contracts are tighter on life products in 
order to protect individuals from the consequences of bad 
bargains. Due to these considerations the responsible 
supervisory authority may refuse approval of the submitted 
contracts or require drafting amendments on the ground that 
it considers them in the interests of the policyholders.
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In contrast to the UK, in most continental countries the 
supervisory authorities control the policy conditions. The 
result of this different regime has been that the range of 
policies has been much wider in the UK market. Unit linked 
policies are not allowed in most of the European countries 
due to prudential considerations (there is no guarantee on 
the eventual value of the underlying assets). Will British 
insurance companies (who operate under UK rules) be allowed 
to offer unit linked policies in the rest of Europe ? We 
rather doubt it.
Harmonization of the insurance contracts conditions is a 
necessary prerequisite for the creation of a European 
Market in insurance. In the absence of harmonization the 
German authorities, for instance, might argue that there is 
not in the UK an equivalent of safeguards in respect of the 
control of policies and the German policyholder would be 
exposed to significantly greater risks in the absence of 
supervision by the German supervisory authorities. 
Without some harmonization of the insurance contracts 
conditions it is very difficult to allow full freedom of 
insurance transactions (ie. to give all companies the right 
to market their policies in other countries subject to the 
supervisory regulations of the country in which the head 
office is situated) since most of the continental countries 
would consider that the degree of protection provided to
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their residents is inadequate and unacceptable.
Furthermore, the different regimes with respect to controls 
over insurance contracts has led to a greater variety of 
contracts available on the UK market. Indeed the range of 
policies observed is everywhere narrower than in the UK.
Harmonization is therefore necessary if the UK is not
considered by the continental countries to have an unfair 
competitive position.
Freedom of insurance transactions demands therefore 
harmonization over insurance contract conditions. If an 
insurer is free to cover risks in another Member State 
without complying with legislation as regards policy 
conditions, this may result in unfair competition and 
inadequate protection for policyholders. There must 
therefore be ,some harmonization of this aspect. Precisely 
because freedom of services requires this degree of
harmonization it is difficult to achieve. In the UK, on
the one hand, there is considerable opposition to any 
illiberal restrictions. In the continental countries, on 
the other hand, there would be a great fear of the UK as 
competitors and a genuine belief that tight supervision is 
the only effective method of consumer protection. The 
Member States will find it very difficult to reach a 
compromise in the near future.
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The Council of Ministers has reached agreement on a non­
life insurance services Directive which moves most of the 
continental countries closer to the UK philosophy of
supervision, by lifting controls over premium rates and 
policy conditions for large commercial and industrial
risks. Can the same step be taken with respect to "mass 
risks” ?
The controls over premium rates and policy conditions for 
large risks are very weak even in the continental
countries. The principle object of such controls is 
consumer protection. The arguments that justify
supervision to protect policyholders from "bad buy" would 
be difficult to apply to justify control of insurance 
policies and premium rates relating to large commercial and 
industrial risks. Large buyers of insurance have 
sufficient bargaining power to negotiate fair conditions 
and are able to obtain sufficient information about the 
solvency and reputation of any insurance company whether 
domestic or foreign. On the other hand, the case of 
protecting policyholders from the consequences of bad 
bargains is much more persuasive in relation to individuals 
and small traders who do not possess the necessary 
information. Furthermore, the case of protecting
policyholders from the consequences of insolvency is more 
persuasive in relation to life assurance (rather than to 
non-life insurance) because the settlement of the claim is
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taking place in the very long run.
The Member States have reached agreement in the Council 
with respect to large risks. However, for major commercial 
and industrial risks, the way was open for cross-border 
insurance of these risks and the respective Directive did 
little more than confirm an existing position. The Member 
States would find it very difficult to reach a similar 
agreement with respect to mass risks due to the substantial 
implications of such an agreement.
Insurance contracts have to be written in conformity with 
the legal contracts of the country where they will be 
enforced. For cross-state business this gives and 
immediate choice that the policy can either be written in 
conformity with the position in the company's country or in 
the policyholder's country. The UK authorities believe 
that it is the consumer interest which should be paramount 
whenever a policy is actively marketed and that as a result 
policies should be allowed to be written in line with the 
policyholder's law and subject to his courts but that when 
the policyholder takes the initiative the position is 
different.
The second non-life coordination Directive provides that 
with respect to "large risks" the law applicable to the 
insurance contracts (with a few exceptions) shall be the
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law of the Member State where the policyholder is situated. 
The Directive did not bring about a free choice of laws for 
large risks even if the mutual recognition of supervisory 
controls is a main principle of the EC strategy designed to 
integrate the financial market by 1992. The continental 
Member States prefer to retain a regime which denies 
freedom of choice for their insureds even if the UK
authorities believe that it is the consumer's right to 
select freely the law of his choice. Given the fact that 
the harmonisation of legal contracts of the different EC 
Member States is difficult, the continental Member States 
will continue to maintain restrictions with respect to the 
law applicable to the insurance contracts.
Governments, of course, have a responsibility to ensure
that individual policyholders are protected against 
insolvencies especially with regard to long-term (life)
insurance. In the continental European countries 
restrictions on foreign suppliers of insurance are often
imposed because the national supervisory authorities cannot 
easily check their solvency. An agreement at the European 
level should, therefore, be reached on solvency standards 
and checks, so that the supervisory authority in the 
importing country could rely on its counterpart in the 
exporting country, if this constraint on free trade had to 
be removed.
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The two establishment Directives set general rules with
respect to solvency margins. In calculating the available 
margin of solvency the assets have to be valued in 
accordance with the rules of the home Member State. 
Indeed, each Member State has discretion as to the rules on 
valuation of assets and liabilities for establishments 
within its jurisdiction. These rules are very weak in all 
countries with respect to non-life insurance. However 
prudential considerations are very strong with respect to 
life assurance. Here again the UK authorities' philosophy 
and practice are different from those of most of the other 
European countries.
In the UK the assets have to be valued in accordance with 
the DTI basis. There are rules on the admissibility of 
certain types of assets and restrictions on the extent to 
which individual holdings of assets may be taken into 
account for solvency margin purposes. The DTI have to be 
satisfied that a conservative approach is adopted with 
respect to investment. However, the view is generally held 
that the above regulations do not affect the investment 
policy of firms. The specified percentages, to which 
certain categories of assets may be taken into account in 
calculating the value of assets of a company, are ,
considered by some experts as quite big. Companies would 
follow to a large extent the same investment policy even in 
the absence of these regulations. This argument is
ce
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strengthened by the fact that the DTI returns in 1987 of 
five of the largest companies reveals that the assets which 
have not been included in the admissable assets due to the 
admissibility limits represents no more than 0.4% of the 
gross total of admissible assets. Indeed, the insurance 
companies in the UK have considerable freedom over their 
investment policy. There are no direct constraints on 
investment policy and investment decisions are basically 
influenced by profitability expectations.
In contrast to the UK, in most other countries the rules on 
the valuation of assets significantly limit the freedom of 
the companies investment policy. These rules are designed 
to prevent them from undertaking risk taking activities and 
to protect domestic policyholders from the insolvency of 
insurance companies.
In Germany the valuation rules guide insurance companies to 
invest in government bonds and other titles issued by the 
State since these investments are considered as fulfilling 
the condition of maximum security. Obviously, these 
regulations affect to a considerable extent the investment 
returns. In France there are also strict rules prescribing 
the proportion of assets which have to be invested in 
certain securities and property. The rules on the 
prohibition or concentrating investment in one debtor are 
particularly restrictive.
376
The rules relating to the valuation of assets could
possibly be another issue which the UK authorities will 
find themselves debating with their Community partners in 
the context of a life freedom of services Directive. It is 
normal in the UK for the supervisory authorities to give 
companies virtual freedom to invest the money in the form 
which is most advantageous to the insurers so as to give 
them high investment returns. On the other hand, in the 
continental countries there is a genuine belief that the 
restrictive element in supervision with respect to
investment is essential to protect policyholders from the 
insolvency of insurance companies. Without some
harmonisation of the rules on the valuation of assets, the 
granting to all companies the right to market their
policies in other countries subject to the supervisory
regulations of the country in which the head office is
situated would undoubtedly be deemed to constitute unfair 
competition against the companies of the continental
countries. Furthermore, these countries would consider 
that the degree of protection provided to their residents 
is inadequate and unacceptable.
Another area of potential controversy would possibly relate 
to equalisation reserves. Almost all the continental 
countries believe that equalisation reserves (which
accumulates from the excess of premiums over claims and
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expenses in years when the loss ratio is better than 
average) should be compulsory in life assurance? so that 
the companies should be in a position to absorb losses 
which can be anticipated to arise over the long run. The 
equalisation reserves is another instrument of control to 
prevent solvency in the continental European countries.
On the other hand, the UK authorities argue that an 
equalisation reserve is not necessary because a prudent 
management should, through reinsurance, always be in a 
position to absorb worse than average loss experience. 
They also believe that it is wrong in principle to require 
a company to set up reserves in respect of potential losses 
on business which has not been written. Furthermore, if 
the loss occurs in the first year of a company being 
authorised to write a particular line of business there 
will be no equalisation reserve available to meet losses in 
excess of the average.
The present position is that each Member State has 
discretion as to whether equalisation reserves should be 
compulsory or not. However, the question over equalisation 
reserves will arise in the context of freedom of services 
for life assurance. In the absence of Community 
harmonisation over equalisation reserves, the French 
authorities, for instance, may argue that there are not in 
the UK equivalent safeguards in respect of the equalisation
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of reserves. On the other hand, in the UK, there is 
considerable opposition to the imposition of any additional 
control. Here again it is difficult to see where there is 
room for compromise.
The issue of fiscal harmonisation is also important. 
Freedom of insurance transactions and lack of harmonisation 
with respect to taxation would create a degree of 
distortion of competition and lead to a de-nationalisation 
of insurance and savings. Of course national authorities 
would not remain indifferent to this. There are three 
levels of taxation that should be considered. Taxation on 
premiums, taxation on benefits and taxation on the 
insurance companies.
Tax harmonisation is rather difficult since there are 
considerable divergences among the Member States. In the 
UK the authorities believe that there should be a low 
burden of taxation on business in order to encourage 
competitiveness and expansion of business. Relatively high 
levels of taxation constitute a fiscal distortion and are 
an anomaly which discriminates against life assurance as 
opposed to the other forms of savings. Indeed, the
insurance business in the UK is subject to one of the most 
favourable tax regimes in Europe. (89). Taxation on
premiums and on insurance companies are relatively low 
while receipts for payments of benefits in may cases is tax
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free.
On the other extreme is France whose authorities see the 
insurance industry as a major provider of tax revenue and 
the tax rates are the highest in Europe. The UK and France 
represent the extreme positions and the other countries 
fall in between the two with Germany being closer to the UK 
position and Italy,closer to the French one. Unequal tax 
regimes can give rise to a high degree of unequal 
competition and therefore harmonisation of tax regulations 
is a necessary prerequisite to freedom of services in life 
insurance. However, an acceptable degree of tax 
harmonisation is rather difficult to achieve due to large 
differences in the interests of the Member States. The tax 
authorities view the problem as one element in their total 
taxation policy and changes are unlikely to be made.
A services Directive has been adopted with respect to large 
risks without the necessary harmonisation of taxation. 
Cannot that happen with respect to mass risks as well ? 
Large risk insurance competes only with captives or self- 
insurance. It is therefore possible (leaving on the one 
side the tax considerations which may point towards 
imposing high taxes on captives rather than on the 
traditional insurance market) to liberalise large risk 
insurance in isolation. It is also possible to liberalise 
large risk insurance without considering too much free
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capital movements across Member States and the 
harmonisation of taxes. But in the case of life insurance 
the opposite is the case. Life insurance (with its 
important savings element) is in direct competition with 
the other forms of investment and savings. The effects of 
the distortion of competition are much more important in 
life assurance. And the authorities of the Member States 
of high tax regimes would be reluctant to liberalise trade 
in life assurance. Unequal tax regimes would constitute a 
serious obstacle to trade in life assurance services in the 
years to come.
Lastly will be the dispute over composites. This dispute 
was behind the fact that six years elapsed between the 
adoption of the non-life establishment Directive and that 
of the life establishment Directive. As it has been 
pointed out elsewhere most of the Member States have 
adopted the so called "principle of specialisation” by 
setting rules which provide that the same undertaking could 
not carry on both types of insurance because of prudential 
considerations. Life insurance funds might be used to 
support the risk of insurance operations other than life 
assurance. On the other hand, in the UK, insurance 
companies could carry both types of business. Most of the 
Member States were not only unwilling to allow British 
composites to become established for both classes in other 
countries but considered it undesirable that composite
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should continue to exist at all.
The eventual compromise was that pre-existing companies 
which transact both life and non-life business continue to 
do so, provided that they observe strict rules on separate 
management and financial obligations. On the other hand, 
newly formed companies should no longer be authorised to 
carry on these two activities simultaneously and should be 
specialised in one type of business or the other. This 
solution was not costly for the British insurance companies 
since it did not affect the scope of their business.
Indeed, the British Insurance Law does not contain any 
restriction in relation to the services provided by 
insurance concerns affiliates. Insurance companies are 
relatively free to acquire participations in other 
companies and financial institutions. There are no limits 
to the acquisition of participations? only the DTI needs to 
be notified in advance and satisfied that an authorised 
insurance company has adequate capital and managerial 
resources to support any acquisition. As a result, non­
life insurance companies can enter the field of life 
business through acquisitions.
The question over composites will possibly be reviewed
-k
(according to an official of the EC Commission ) in 1990, 
so that it will inevitably arise again in the context of
V^-v SSfci
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freedom of services for life assurance. Most of the 
continental countries (in particular France,and Germany) 
will be unwilling to allow British composites to offer 
services in both classes in their countries while their 
indigenous companies could not. On the other hand, in the 
UK many of the leading companies are composites engaged in 
both classes of business. And the UK authorities will be 
reluctant to restrict the scope of business of the leading 
insurance companies. If six years elapsed between the two 
establishment Directives to reach a compromise which was 
not costly for the British companies; how many years would 
be necessary to solve once and for all the dispute over 
composites ?
The number of the identified barriers to freedom of 
insurance services which arise from the present position 
is really great. Evaluating these barriers is a 
subjective, difficult and complex undertaking due in part 
to the fact that the subjects analysed differ widely. 
Nevertheless, it is believed that the issues of premium 
rates, policy wordings and the valuation of assets are of 
foremost importance since controls over these matters are 
considered by the continental countries as important 
instruments of solvency regulation. On the other hand, 
however, an excessive regard for solvency and consumer 
protection should not be allowed to override the issue of 
fiscal harmonisation.
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The above analysis leads us to conclude that a complete and 
total freedom of insurance transactions will be very hard 
to attain in the next few years. It is perfectly apparent 
that within the timescale the EC Commission will find it 
impossible to produce a measure which would bring about 
home-country control at a stroke. It would also be
difficult to reach a level of freedom similar to that of 
large risks.
For mass risks there would seem to be another level at 
which a solution could be found. The question of 
liberalisation of life insurance services could be linked 
with freedom of capital movements. If an investor can open 
up a bank account in any Member State and invest in any 
form of security, why should he not equally be free to 
address himself - at his own risk - to an insurance company 
in any other Member State to buy life insurance, which 
after all is merely often another form of investment. 
Insurance companies, however, would still be prevented from 
actively seeking such business and advertising their 
products to the potential purchasers. At this level a 
future Directive for mass risks would do little more than 
confirm and recognise an existing situation. A small 
amount of business is already written in this way and with 
the freedom of capital movements (built in the Capital 
Movements Directive) a future Directive for mass risks may
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have some impact.
On the other hand, however, some Member States may resist 
even that level of freedom since personal policyholders may 
face currency risks in cross border placing of insurance. 
Indeed, currency risks would constitute another barrier to 
freedom of insurance risks transactions with respect to 
mass risk. And this barrier could be eliminated only 
through Monetary Union. Indeed, Monetary Union is required 
if personal policyholders are not to face currency risks in 
cross border placing of insurance. However, it is 
considered that the excessive regard for "prudence" would 
override this major consideration.
The principle of home country control, which is obviously 
the preferable solution for an insurer who wants to do 
international business, clashes with the wish of 
governments to ensure that they are in a position to 
protect their consumers. The rival principle of host 
country control would, therefore, have a strong following. 
In other words, any early expansion of international trade 
in insurance services for mass risks would take place 
through the Establishment Directives mechanisms. But this 
means that different products at different prices would be 
marketed within national borders; a situation which clearly 
conflicts with the principles of a Common Market.
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Some UK insurers believe that even if the extent of the 
progress appear to be rather limited, this is not the end
harmonisation of the technical rules necessary for solvency 
and consumer protection, are a necessary prerequisite to 
freedom of services for life insurance, and that an 
acceptable degree of harmonisation is not achievable within 
a few years. But they also believe that other forces are at 
work and continental insurers are already very aware of the 
danger of losing business to other competing industries 
such as banks. The Second Banking Directive opens up the 
possibility of the provision of competing financial 
services on an international basis which will make it 
difficult for life companies to maintain their position at 
an international level if they continue to be restricted in 
their home markets. This will obviously bring pressure on 
the continental countries for greater liberalisation by the 
supervisory authorities to prevent severe reduction of the 
life industry as substitute savings services take over. 
However, it is believed that such hopes or expectations 
seem to be totally out of proportion with reality. The 
fragmentation of the markets for all the savings services 
would be significant.
Up to now we have analysed some future areas of potential 
controversy between the UK and its partners over the 
freedom of life insurance services. But it is also
of the matter. They recognise the fact that the
s s ce
important to discuss, within the general Community 
framework, the extent to which the community markets would 
open to full competition without prior harmonisation. 
Indeed, this is the case that the UK authorities try to 
promote. The experience suggests that progress in the 
Common Market is a question of bargaining. But the UK 
authorities have nothing to bargain with since they already 
operate an open market. The only things they have are the 
EC Treaty and the Commission's White Paper of January 1985.
The Treaty lays down a right to freedom of trade in 
services. Indeed, freedom to provide services is one of 
the most important objectives of the EC Treaty. The right 
to provide services ranks equal with the free movement of 
persons and capital and only to the free movement of goods 
is a greater priority attached. However, this right is not 
unqualified. Specific requirements imposed on a cross 
frontier supplier of services compatible with the Treaty 
where they have as their purpose the application of rules 
regulating certain types of activity provided that certain 
conditions are fulfilled (90). In the case of insurance 
have been justified (by the judgments of the relevant 
courts) to place restrictions on freedom of trade in 
insurance. Obviously, the UK authorities cannot put the 
less liberal states on the defensive.
The Commission's White Paper of January 1985 on the
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completion of the internal market and the Committment of 
all Member States to the achievement of this objective by 
the end of 1992 built up momentum to abolish internal 
barriers. The Member States recognised that completion of 
the internal market in the long run will be to the benefit 
of all and not least in strengthening the Community's 
industries ability to compete with those from third 
countries. The parallel with the elimination of tariff 
barriers in the early days of the Community is exact. 
There is also a recognition that there must be a readiness 
to compromise. However, the need for "prudence” constantly 
pressed in the case of financial services would undermine 
the principle of mutual recognition of regulatory standards 
upon which the success of '92 heavily depends.
The implementation of the Single European Act changed the 
basic rules. The Act designed to speed up adoption of 
Directives through qualified majority voting ( and avoid 
time delays associated with unanimity). However, given the 
nature of the supervisory regimes in Europe it is 
considered that the British would find themselves in the 
minority. Our analysis leads us to the conclusion that a 
single market for insurance in its most liberal sense is 
unlikely to come about.
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BARRIERS TO THE PROCESS OF LIBERALIZING INSURANCE 
SERVICES IN THE DEVELOPING EC COUNTRIES:
THE CASE OF GREECE
389
ESTABLISHMENT OPERATION AND MARKET ACCESS OF 
INSURANCE COMPANIES IN GREECE:
CONDITIONS AND CONTROLS IN 1989
1. Regulatory provisions and administrative practices 
governing the entry and establishment of indigenous 
insurance companies
The Greek Insurance Law provides that insurance concerns 
are firms that carry on insurance business. (Insurance 
concerns should be constituted in the form of limited 
companies and should concentrate only in the conduct of 
insurance business.
In Greece, insurance concerns may simultaneously carry on 
life assurance and general business with no restriction on 
the number of classes except that requirements as to share 
capital and guarantees must be calculated accordingly. In 
Greece there is an exception to the "principle of 
specialization". The EC Commission has recently advised the 
Ministry of Trade to adopt the provisions of the EC 
Directive requiring the adoption of the "principle of 
specialization" requiring separation of funds and 
management of the composite companies. The justification 
for such separation is that it prevents cross­
subsidisation. However, given the fact that in Greece some
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lines in general business have produced substantial losses, 
due to result of premium rate control, cross-subsidisation 
is considered necessary. As a result, the EC Commission 
advises have been ignored by the government.
The undertaking of insurance business requires 
authorization. The authorization is granted by the Ministry 
of Trade according to the provisions of the Law Decree 
400/1970. The authorization may be granted for all classes 
or for certain specified classes. The insurance concerns 
can only undertake the classes for which the authorization 
is granted. If the concern wishes to carry on business in 
other classes another authorization is necessary.
In order to obtain an authorization, insurance concerns 
should have a share capital equal to the aggregate of the 
respective amounts prescribed for the individual classes to 
be undertaken. The amount of share capital required is 
greater than that prescribed by the general law for 
commercial and other undertakings of identical legal form. 
The authorities recognize the specific nature of insurance 
and the detrimental effects that an insolvency may have on 
the policyholders.
The minimum share capital must be fully paid up and, at 
present, its amounts are as follow: a) for life assurance
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Dr 150m, b) for credit insurance Dr 135 m, c) for insurance 
in respect of aircraft and ships Dr 140m, d) for any other 
class Dr 120m. The amount of the share capital varies 
according to the class of insurance undertaken, the highest 
amounts being required in life assurance. One forth of the 
share capital should be applied to a security reserve whose 
withdrawal could only take place after the authorization of 
the Ministry of National Economy. In contrast to an 
ordinary company, the share capital of the insurance 
company does not serve solely to provide the means required 
for the operation of the entity. It mainly serves as a 
guarantee for the insured. However, this control conflicts 
with Article 5 of Directive 73/239/EC which prohibits the 
blocking in any way of the fixed or movable assets of the 
insurance companies.
The provisions of the Law Decree 400/1970 which is the main 
Insurance Law in Greece does not contain any specific 
provision in respect to the professional qualifications and 
trustworthiness of the management of an insurance concern. 
However, the Ministry of Trade usually examines the 
reputation of the respective management and its 
professional qualifications. An authorization may be 
refused on the grounds of lack of reputable or qualified 
management. However, this has never happened.
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The Ministry of Trade needs to be satisfied about the 
reinsurance arrangements of the insurance concerns. 
Insurers operating within the country are required to make 
adequate reinsurance arrangements. Part of this requirement 
is that a share of reinsurance business should be placed 
with the state-owned insurance corporations. There is no 
such provision within the Greek Insurance Law? but, as a 
normal practice the Ministry of Trade requires insurance 
companies, to place part of their reinsurances with the big 
state-owned insurance concerns. This requirement limits 
considerably the freedom of the insurance companies to 
formulate their own reinsurance policies and to place their 
reinsurances with those institutions that the insurers find 
the most economical and efficient.
An insurance concern seeking a licence authorization should 
produce a business plan. This plan must specify the object 
and organization of the concern, the articles of 
association, the documents on which contracts are to be 
based, the premium rates, the technical bases and the 
reinsurance arrangements. In particular the business plan 
must demonstrate that the respective concern will always be 
able to fulfil its commitments.
The approval of insurance products are of a great 
importance in granting an authorization. The documents on
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which contracts are to be based, the premium rates and the 
technical bases have to be submitted to the supervisory 
authorities for explicit approval. These have to comply 
with particular requirements set by the authorities. 
Controls over insurance contracts and premium rates are, in 
principle, imposed by prudential considerations but, in 
practice, (as it is pointed out elsewhere) they are used as 
a means of defending fairly effectively the large market 
share of the state owned insurance corporations.
The national supervisory authorities enjoy significant 
discretionary powers. They do not only interpret and apply 
the provisions of the Law Decree but they are also set 
additional requirements whose fulfilment is a key of 
obtaining an authorization. The reinsurance arrangements 
are the most serious obstacles to entry and establishment 
of indigenous concerns. Since they are motivated by 
economic considerations (and not by prudential ones) they 
may discourage or even prohibit entry into the market of 
some concerns which would succeed. The second most 
important obstacle concerns the tight controls over premium 
rates and policy wording since they are imposed by economic 
considerations.
The analysis of the authorization requirements with respect 
to entry of indigenous concerns indicates that the
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authorities limit entry and reduce the number of firms in 
the market in order to defend effectively the market share 
of the big state-owned insurance corporations. Furthermore, 
the authorities seem to ignore the provisions of the EC 
Directives and the Commission calls to implement them if 
national economic interests are involved.
2. Regulatory provisions and administrative practices 
governing the entry and establishment of branches bv 
foreign insurance organisations
The entry and establishment of foreign insurance concerns 
in Greece is, in principle, subject to the same regulatory 
provisions applied to domestic insurance companies. The 
entry and establishment requires an authorization which is 
granted by order of the responsible authority. The 
authorization is not general but it always given in respect 
of specified classes. Foreign concerns are required to be 
constituted in the legal form identical with that approved 
for domestic concerns and not in a form recognised in the 
country in which the head offices of the respective 
concerns are situated. They are also subject to the same 
solvency and management requirements as indigenous 
concerns. The Greek Insurance Law makes no stipulation 
about the nationality of those responsible for the
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management of a foreign concern. However the Ministry would 
like to see some Greeks getting actively involved in the 
management since they may have adequate knowledge of 
domestic laws, regulations and market practices.
Any foreign insurance concern seeking to carry on insurance 
business in Greece should produce proof that it is 
authorized to undertake in its country of origin insurance 
business of the classes which it proposes to undertake in 
Greece. This proof usually takes the form of an authorized 
declaration of the concern. The Ministry of Trade reserves 
the right to make the granting of an authorization 
conditional upon reciprocal treatment in the foreign 
concern's own country. However this cannot be considered as 
an obstacle to the entry of an EC insurance company. The 
entry and establishment of foreign insurance concerns is 
subject in principle to national treatment. However, this 
treatment is discriminatory against foreign concerns.
Insurance concerns have to split up into virtually 
separate units in order to operate in different countries 
since they must comply with the different regulations in 
force in these countries. The national authorities consider 
the branches of foreign concerns as new entities rather 
than as a consequence of the operation of these concerns 
worldwide; and this constitutes an important obstacle to
396
the entry of foreign concerns into the Greek market. The 
initial share capital required, for instance, is considered 
by some foreign insurers as exceptionally large relative to 
the amount of business which foreign concerns undertake in 
Greece.
Even more important is the fact that in practice the 
national authorities use their discretionary powers to 
impose more stringent controls on the entry of foreign 
concerns. All the insurance companies seeking an 
authorization must submit to the supervisory authorities 
all the proposed reinsurance arrangements including the 
maximum figure which they propose to bear without 
reinsurance. However, the requirements concerning the 
reinsurance arrangements are more stringent in the case of 
foreign insurance concerns.
Foreign and indigenous insurance concerns are required to 
place part of their reinsurance business with the state- 
owned insurance corporations. Furthermore, the Greek 
authorities believe that the branches or agencies of 
foreign concerns try to establish close links with their 
head offices. These links can be used by the foreign 
concerns established within the country as a means of a) 
transferring, through reinsurance, business outside the 
country, b) participating in speculative activities against 
the drachma and c) investing abroad the savings accumulated
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in the form of insurance funds and denying the domestic 
capital market of funds making more difficult the industry 
to raise adequate funds for investment.
As a consequence the Ministry of Trade does not normally 
allow more than 10% of the insurance companies' liabilities 
to be reinsured with their parent companies abroad. The 
Greek authorities also try to persuade the foreign concerns 
to direct reinsurance business to the domestic market by 
increasing the proportion of business they carry on without 
reinsurance and by placing a large proportion of 
reinsurance to the state-controlled insurance concerns. If 
they do not do so the national authorities may require 
modifications on the business plan (especially the 
provisions referring to the classes of business the 
respective concerns propose to undertake), delay the
granting of the authorizations and restrict the number of 
branches the respective concerns are allowed to operate
within the country.
The above requirements are not included in the Greek
Insurance Law, but they are imposed by the Greek
authorities in order to protect the development of the 
domestic insurance industry, to avoid unnecessary loss of 
foreign exchange and to ensure that funds accumulated by 
insurance operations are channelled into the local capital
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market. Through these requirements the authorities believe 
that they cut the links between the foreign insurance 
concerns established within the country and foreign based 
insurance companies. Even if foreign concerns circumvent 
part of these controls by placing part of their reinsurance 
business with their subsidiaries (which use different 
names) abroad, the net effect might be an extra financing 
cost imposed on foreign concerns and/or further
A'restrictions on the size of their business.
The analysis of the controls on entry and establishment of 
foreign concerns indicates that the national authorities 
enjoy considerable discretionary powers to restrict foreign 
concerns through more stringent enforcement of apparently 
nondiscriminatory regulations. Indeed, the principle of 
host country control could be discriminatory against 
foreign institutions. Despite the intention of the already 
existing Directives there are a plethora of other ways in 
which authorities action can inhibit entry. Eagle Star did 
not find it easy to break into the Greek market: although 
the National Insurance Law incorporates a rather weak 
requirement (which does not conflict with the provision of 
the EC Directives) that a Greek actuary should sign the 
application, it was a requirement that emerged strongly on 
the realization that there were only ten registered 
actuaries in the country? they viewed the signing of these
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application as a significant source of income and they 
closely cooperated with the Ministry of Trade. These 
considerations were behind the Commissions decision to 
promote integration in the financial markets through the 
principle of home country control.
3. Regulatory provisions and administrative practices 
governing the entry and establishment of minority and 
majority owned subsidiaries bv foreign insurance 
organisations
Foreign access to the domestic market through equity 
participation in indigenous insurance concerns is subject 
to certain restrictions imposed by the national 
authorities. Foreign and national equity participation in 
indigenous institutions are subject to authorizations by 
the Ministry of Trade. Thus, both participations are, in 
principle, subject to equal treatment. However, the 
national authorities do not treat foreign acquisitions in 
the same manner as domestic acquisitions.
The Ministry of Trade does not authorize the acquisition by 
foreign insurance organization of majority interest in 
indigenous insurance concerns. The Greek Insurance Law
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does not include any provision as to the maximum degree of 
non-resident participation in the capital stock of a Greek 
insurance concern allowed. However, the Ministry of Trade, 
as a common practice, does not issue authorizations for the 
acquisition of majority interests by foreign insurance 
organisations in indigenous concerns. Furthermore, as in 
the case of establishment of foreign branches and agencies, 
reciprocity provisions apply against foreign states.
With respect to the requirements concerning the management 
qualifications insurance companies with foreign interests 
are treated in the same manner as domestic concerns. The 
national authorities need to be satisfied about the 
reputation and the professional qualifications of the 
management. Moreover, the majority of the board of
Directors should be Greek nationals residing permanently in 
Greece. This constitutes an important practical obstacle
against the establishment of foreign subsidiaries. Usually 
the authorities require the voting powers of the Greek
directors to be higher than the Greek participation in the 
capital stock of foreign subsidiaries.
The Greek authorities usually encourages foreign insurance 
companies to acquire minority participation in indigenous 
institutions. Foreign Minority participation in indigenous 
institutions is seen as a means of acquiring the
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sophisticated managerial capacity, expertise and technology 
which major multinational groups possess. The acquisition 
of these elements may foster the efficiency of the domestic 
concerns and enable them to produce new services and 
increase their capacity to handle larger risks and provide 
better reinsurance cover. Some degree of foreign ownership 
is seen as a means of introducing innovations in the 
structure of the domestic industry and enabling it to face 
successfully the attractive prospects of the common market 
of the 1992.
On the other hand, the establishment of majority owned 
subsidiaries by foreign insurance organizations is not 
permitted. The reasons for forbidding non-resident 
acquisitions of majority holdings in indigenous insurance 
concerns are broadly the same as limiting foreign entry 
through branches. The authorities intention is to protect 
the domestic insurance sector from foreign competition and 
to avoid foreign control over an industry whose importance 
to the whole economy is vital. Broadly speaking, 
restrictions on the entry and establishment of foreign 
subsidiaries are substantial. Foreign insurers are faced 
with the position of having to supply capital, 
sophisticated managerial capacity, expertise and technology 
with little control and with most of the profits going to 
local interests.
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It is rather surprising that while the Commission made 
significant attempts to eliminate obstacles to 
establishment of foreign branches, it did not do so for 
foreign subsidiaries. Indeed, some insurance companies 
(especially the German ones) are specialized in the entry 
into foreign markets through subsidiaries so that they 
obtain a given portfolio and then they try to expand it. 
The adoption of Directives designed to abolish restrictions 
on the entry and establishment of foreign subsidiaries is 
essential for the creation of a common financial market.
4. Regulatory provisions and administrative practices 
limiting the market access bv foreign based insurance 
organisations
The Greek authorities forbid any insurance (with a few 
exceptions) to be taken out abroad by, or, in behalf of any 
person domiciled in Greece with any concern neither 
established not authorized to undertake insurance in 
Greece. Insurance may only be taken out with a Greek 
concern or with a foreign concern specially authorized to 
write in Greece the classes of insurance specified in its 
authorization. Insuring abroad is generally forbidden
403
except in those cases when the risk insured is situated out 
of the country (i.e. international transport, aviation and 
marine hull).
It is not possible for a Greek policyholder to insure with 
a foreign based insurance company even when the Greek 
authorities are convinced that there is no sufficient 
capacity within the domestic insurance market to provide 
the cover required. Furthermore, Greece imposes strict 
foreign exchange controls regulating the outflow of capital 
which would restrict the payments of premiums abroad.
Reinsurance transactions between insurance companies 
represent a major source of insurance trade. Insurance 
concerns established in Greece are generally allowed more 
freedom to place reinsurance business abroad, but even in 
this case severe restrictions apply. Insurers operating 
within the country are usually required to reinsure part of 
their portfolio with the state-owned insurance 
corporations. There are therefore considerable limits on 
the insurance companies to formulate their own reinsurance 
policies. The share of the reinsurance business which is 
required to be placed with the state-owned insurance 
corporations varies according to the size and type of 
reinsurance business.
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The foreign reinsurance operations are further restricted 
by other administrative practices. Foreign based reinsurers 
are required to open "non residents” accounts (with the 
Greek authorized banks) which are subject to special rules. 
The convertibility and the disposition of these funds are 
severely restricted. Funds deposited in the "non-residents" 
accounts are considered blocked and can only be used after 
specific permission of the Bank of Greece. The above 
requirements restricts severely the freedom of 
international reinsurance transactions which is the most 
international of all insurance activities. This provides a 
clear indication that the entry and access by foreign 
insurance companies into the domestic market is 
considerably limited. Moreover, it is obvious that Greek 
authorities have not yet adopted the provisions of the EC 
Reinsurance Directive.
The requirements that a portion of risks should be 
reinsured with state-owned insurance corporations 
interferes with the free placement of reinsurance with 
those institutions that the insurers find the most 
economical and efficient. The requirements concerning the 
opening of "non-residents" accounts and the placing of 
deposits with the direct insurers act as an impediment to 
supply of reinsurance into the domestic market. These 
requirements impose additional capital costs and currency
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risks to foreign based reinsurers and are harmful to 
insurers as well. The expenses incurred by these 
requirements have to be financed by higher reinsurance 
premiums. The authorities do not only directly prohibit, to 
some extent, free international reinsurance transactions 
but also set requirements which have the same effects of an 
outright restriction. These controls contradict with the 
provisions of the EC reinsurance Directive which requires 
free international reinsurance transactions.
As far as co-insurance is concerned although it is a common 
practice on a national level is not permitted on an 
international basis. Foreign insurance concerns cannot 
participate in co-insurance arrangements unless they are 
established and authorized in Greece. No risk expected to 
occur in Greece can insured by foreign based insurance 
organizations. This situation contradicts with the 
provisions of the EC Co-insurance Directive.
Prohibitions and restrictions on transactions arising from 
the provisions of insurance services on a trade basis are 
imposed (according to an analyst of the Ministry of Trade) 
in order to protect domestic policyholders from the 
insolvency of insurance companies. It is generally believed 
that insurance organizations wishing to provide insurance 
services in the domestic market should establish themselves
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1in Greece, obtain an authorization and comply with prudent 
supervisory standards. However, it seems that prudential 
considerations cannot justify alone the prohibition of 
international insurance transactions. The main objective 
is rather to avoid the loss of foreign exchange which would 
occur through the purchase of insurance and reinsurance 
from abroad. The importation of insurance from abroad would 
lead to a long term outflow of premium payments only partly 
offset by the benefit received having adverse development 
on the bop, a constraint to the country's economic 
development.
Since insurance is a financial service the placing of 
insurance abroad is like any other portfolio investment. In 
a weak currency country the freedom of international 
insurance transactions would significantly deteriorate the 
capital account of the bop and might exert further downward 
pressures on the exchange rate of a weak currency. Domestic 
savings, through remittances of premiums abroad, would be 
used in speculative activities against the drachma. Thus, 
prohibitions and restrictions on freedom of insurance 
transactions take the form of foreign exchange controls.
The imports of insurance services through underwriting the 
insurance of risks (that are expected to be incurred in 
Greece) abroad may have adverse developments on the
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operation of indigenous insurance concerns. The kind of 
product the foreign based insurance companies offer does 
provide greater potential consumer satisfaction than most 
that are available nationally. This is because that the 
indigenous institutions are still uncompetitive and less 
developed in relation to giant insurers enjoying benefits 
of scale from their extensive operation. The need of 
protection of the former against the latter is based on the 
"infant industry” argument.
Outflow of funds for insurance• and reinsurance has been 
clearly identified as an area where apparent savings can be 
made by imposing restrictions on placing of insurance 
abroad. The nature of insurance (and especially that of 
life assurance) means that a substantial amount of funds is 
accumulated within the insurance companies. Substantial 
delays occur between the payments of premiums and the 
settlement of claims. If insurances are placed with foreign 
based insurers the accumulating funds are lost to the 
domestic capital market. However, these funds are 
considered of a great importance to the country's economic 
development.
The Greek authorities believe that the scarcity of funds 
hinders the economic development. The prohibitions of the 
imports of foreign insurance services is seen as a mean of
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ensuring that funds generated by insurance operations are 
channelled into the domestic capital market. These funds 
can be invested in government securities or be used to 
finance industrial projects essential to the country's 
economic development.
Furthermore, the Greek authorities significantly restrict 
the entry of foreign intermediaries to the market. Foreign 
intermediaries wishing to carry on business in Greece 
should obtain an authorization from the Ministry of Trade. 
However, the educational and professional qualifications 
acquired outside Greece should firstly be recognized in the 
country. Furthermore, intermediaries from other countries 
may exercise the profession in Greece but they should only 
be persons of Greek birth from those other countries. This 
is a clear discrimination on the grounds of nationality and 
thus a breach of the Article 7 of the Treaty of Rome. These 
restrictions further isolate the domestic market from 
imports of insurance services from abroad.
5. Regulatory provisions and administrative practices 
restricting the domestic operations of established 
foreign-owned insurance organisations
The extent to which foreign insurance organizations
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authorized to operate in the national market can compete on 
an equal footing with domestic insurance concerns is an 
indispensable part of the study. And the Greek authorities 
significantly influence the terms under which foreign 
concerns operate? some of the conditions imposed directly 
affect their ability to compete on equal terms with 
indigenous institutions and in particular with the big 
state-owned insurance corporations. The most important of 
them concern the scope of insurance business; i.e. 
restrictions on the type of services that can be offered 
and on the range of activities in which foreign concerns 
can engage.
The Law Decree 1256/1982 requires the state owned banks to 
recommend in writing to their clients that they place their 
insurance with the insurance concerns controlled by the 
State. Upon conclusion of the insurance contract through 
the agency of state-owned bank, the public sector insurance 
company is required to deposit the commission for the 
service rendered in a special account opened by the bank 
for the benefit of its employees' insurance fund. This 
constitutes a further incentive to the staff of banks to 
ensure that the obligation to recommend a public sector 
insurance company is fulfilled. This regulation contradicts 
fair trade practices and restricts competition in the 
market. The state owned banks acquire a dominant position
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not only in the financial sector but also in the whole 
economy. They have a great number of customers while many 
private companies depend on their patronage. Consequently, 
through this provision the authorities channel a large 
proportion of business to the state controlled concerns 
while private concerns (domestic and foreign) lose this 
amount of business.
Another provision of the Law Decree 1256/1982 requiring all 
public property, including the assets of Greek public 
undertakings, to be insured exclusively with public sector 
insurance companies. Indeed in Greece the State is its own 
insurer, while private insurance concerns are prevented 
from writing insurance business of public institutions. 
This regulatory provision discriminates severely against 
the private non-life insurance concerns since the Greek 
public property insurance markets accounts for 
approximately 25% of annual premium income in Greece.
Generally speaking the regulatory provisions of the Law 
Decree 1256/1982 by prohibiting placement of insurance 
contracts of the public property with private insurance 
concerns and by providing that the state owned banks should 
encourage their customers to place their insurance business 
with the bank-controlled insurance concerns restricts the 
freedom of insurance transactions within the domestic
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market. This freedom is the main element of the functioning 
of a competitive insurance market.
Some foreign insurance concerns established in Greece drew 
attention to the distortions of competition resulting from 
the adoption of the Law Decree 1256/82 and expressed their 
views to the EC Commission. The Commission asked the Greek 
Government in 1982 to bring the offending situation to an 
end. However, the actions taken by the Greek authorities 
introduced only minor modifications to the respective Law 
Decree. As a result in 1985 the Commission has adopted a 
decision (91) stating that the Law Decree is incompatible 
with Article 90 (1) of the EC Treaty requiring the Member 
States neither to enact nor to maintain in force any 
measure contrary to the rules contained in the Treaty, in 
particular those rules providing for in Article 7 and 
Article 85 to 94. However, the respective Law Decree is 
still in force. One therefore might argue that if the 
Commission's regulations conflict with national interests, 
they might be ignored in subsequent behaviour by member 
governments.
The existence of bank controlled insurance companies has
*
been a source of complaint by private insurers who felt 
that the bank controlled companies deprived them of many 
sources of income and their operation to a large extent
have detrimental effects on the principles of competition. 
The authorities do not only use the provisions of Law 
Decree 1256/82 to move business away from private insurance 
concerns (domestic and foreign) and in favour of state- 
owned insurance companies, but also bring pressures on 
private enterprises which depend on government patronage to
deal with the state-owned insurance companies. Indeed, the 
private enterprises which enjoy any of a wide variety of 
concessions (such as tax incentives) are strongly advised 
to insure their interests with state owned insurance 
concerns. The insurance arrangements of these enterprises 
are often important elements in the negotiations with the 
Greek authorities. These practices interfere with the free 
placement of insurance with those institutions which the 
insured find the most economical and efficient. Another 
issue of great importance is the administrative 
determination of premium rates and, therefore, the non­
existence of competition in the pricing of insurance 
products. The administrative price structures are mainly 
based on the average production costs of the state-owned 
insurance companies and the ability of foreign insurers to 
offer lower prices is significantly diminished.
Competition between insurers could be related to the amount 
paid back to the insured, if policies were offered on a 
"with-profits" basis. However, this is not usually the case
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in Greece since policy wording is closely monitored by the 
authorities. Insurance contracts need to be authorized by 
the Ministry of Trade. And, even if this requirement 
applies in principle, equally to both indigenous and 
foreign insurance concerns, it falls with particular 
severity on the latter. Indeed, the Ministry of Trade has 
close and longstanding relations with the state-owned 
insurance concerns? and the Ministry authorizes new 
insurance contracts only if these contracts can be issued 
by the state-owned insurance concerns. In 1987 Nationale 
Netherlande was refused authorization of an innovative 
product on the grounds that this produce might undermine
the company solvency. However, this product is offered 
since 1983 by the company and its subsidiaries in other 
European countries, even if some of these countries 
supervise insurance contracts tightly. In Greece, the 
controls over premium rates and insurance contracts are 
motivated, in principle, by prudential considerations, but 
in practice, restrict significantly the ability of foreign 
concerns to compete effectively with the big state-owned 
insurance companies.
Solvency requirements place also foreign concerns at a 
competitive disadvantage compared with the indigenous 
companies. In principle, the rules concerning solvency 
supervision are identical for domestic and foreign
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concerns. Foreign insurance concerns should adapt 
themselves to the rules applying to indigenous insurance
concerns. This is contrary to the spirit of the provisions 
to the EC Directives which consider foreign companies 
coming from other EC countries as consequences of the 
worldwide operation of these companies and not as new 
entities. The national authorities seem to ignore the 
strong financial ties that foreign establishments have with 
their parent organizations abroad and the strong capital 
base of these organizations as potential cover for Greek 
policyholders when assessing foreign companies' solvency 
status. Obviously, in this case the granting of national 
treatment is discriminatory against foreign companies.
Even more important is the fact that the lack of 
transparency with respect to solvency supervision gives 
rise to sources of discriminatory treatment against the 
operation of foreign insurance concerns. In Greece solvency 
supervision is exercised on a non-statutory basis and the 
insurance supervisory authority has considerable 
discretionary powers to impose certain requirements with 
respect to the adjustment of share capital. These 
requirements apply in a discriminatory way against foreign 
insurance concerns since they are subject to more stringent
solvency criteria in relation to indigenous companies. In 
the case of foreign concerns a growing volume of business
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needs a higher capital cost.
The system of exchange control regulations is also 
discriminatory against foreign insurance companies. The 
exchange control regulations apply to profit remittances. 
The repatriation of profits requires authorization by the 
Bank of Greece. The authorization is generally granted for 
the repatriation of after-tax profits up to the amount of 
foreign exchange imported from their offshore operations. 
The foreign companies may be granted permission to 
repatriate larger amounts if they produce evidence that 
their operations benefit the domestic economy. Significant 
in this context are also the bureaucratic procedures which 
lead to lengthy and irregular delays in obtaining 
permission from the national authorities for profit 
remittances. The net effect of such restrictions is a 
considerable extra financing cost imposed on the foreign 
companies.
The above analysis lead to the conclusion that the national 
authorities severely restricts the operation of foreign 
concerns. In reviewing the range of restrictions described, 
the most serious impediments, in terms of degree of 
severity are those applied on the range of activities in 
which foreign concerns can engage. In particular, the Law 
Decree 1256/1982 which involve a preference that insurance
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contracts be placed with state-owned insurance concerns is 
considered to be of foremost importance. The amount of 
business that foreign (and private insurers) lose as a 
result of this regulation is enormous. The second most 
serious category of obstacles concerns restrictions on the 
type of services that can be offered by foreign concerns. 
The tight controls on rates and policy wordings are 
considered as important restrictions on the expansion of 
foreign insurance business. Discriminatory solvency 
requirements also can have a significant impact on a 
foreign insurer's ability to compete. The exchange control 
regulations on profit remittances are not considered to be 
of great importance since they do not affect directly 
foreign concerns' ability to compete.
Impediments on the operations of foreign concerns are even 
more serious than those on their entry, in terms of both 
numbers of restrictions and degree of severity. Almost half 
of the insurance companies in Greece are foreign, but their 
market share is very limited (only 18%), even if they 
possess sophisticated managerial capacity, expertise and 
technology and are able to develop more efficient 
production and marketing systems in relation to indigenous 
concerns.
The analysis so far leads to the conclusion that the Greek
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insurance market is almost isolated from abroad since 
freedom of insurance transactions is prohibited. Within 
this isolated market the authorities limit entry and reduce 
the number of firms (especially of the foreign ones) in 
order to defend effectively the market share of the big 
state owned insurance corporations. Even more serious are 
the obstacles on the operation of the already established 
firms which are imposed for the same purpose. The 
authorities seem to ignore the provisions of the existing 
EC Directives and the Commission calls to implement them 
since national economic interests are involved. 
Furthermore, they enjoy considerable discretionary powers 
and exploit the lack of transparency with respect to 
prudential supervision in order to restrict foreign 
concerns through more stringent or more restrictive 
enforcement of apparently nondiscriminatory regulations.
The question is whether this picture will be reversed in 
the years to come. Will Greece implement the provisions of 
the existing EC Directives? And even more important, will 
it operate in an integrated financial market based on the 
principle of the home country control, which means that 
almost all the controls (except those associated with the 
establishment of foreign majority owned subsidiaries) would 
be eliminated? These questions are answered in the next 
two sections.
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AN INTEGRATED INSURANCE MARKET:
PROBLEMS FOR THE GREEK ECONOMY
The key feature of the Greek insurance industry is the 
domination of the state controlled companies that in 1986 held 
almost half of the total (life and non-life) business. In the 
Greek insurance sector there is a distinction between 
insurance companies in which the share capital is controlled 
by at least one state-owned commercial bank and other 
companies the share capital of which is controlled by persons 
or companies other than banks.
Indeed, the large commercial banks have a share in the equity 
of insurance companies with prominent position in the domestic 
insurance market. The National Bank of Greece controls seven 
insurance companies amongst whose are Ethniki and Astir; the
Commercial Bank of Greece controls two insurance companies the
Ionian and Phoenix; and the Agricultural Bank of Greece 
controls the Agrotiki Insurance (92). The Links between the 
insurance companies and the banks are not merely in the form
of equity control, but also in the form of financial and
commercial transactions of every day nature.
In order to understand these links it is essential to refer to 
the provisions of the Law Decree 1256/1982 which requires the 
state owned banks to recommend in written to their clients
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that they place their insurance business with the insurance 
concerns controlled by the State? and that all public 
property, including the assets of Greek public undertakings, 
to be insured exclusively with public sector insurance 
companies. The authorities also use administrative practices 
(which have already been discussed) to channel business to big 
state owned insurance corporations.
Another feature of the Greek insurance industry is its highly 
oligopolistic structure. Table 17 shows the largest ten 
insurance companies in terms of their premium income, in 1986, 
in the life and non-life market. The top ten companies in the 
life accounted for 94% of the whole premium income. In the 
non-life market the top ten companies accounted for 77.3% of 
the whole premium income. These figures reveal an extremely 
high degree of market concentration. The marked concentration 
in the Greek market is described as a high degree of oligopoly 
at the producers level.
The bank controlled insurance companies hold a substantial 
market share. On aggregate they accounted for more than 40% of 
the whole premium income in the life market? while in the non­
life market the respective figure is 50%. However, the view is 
generally held that they are not as efficient as they should 
be in order to justify their dominant position in the market. 
Instead, they use regulatory provisions and administrative
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practices to attract business away from private insurance
concerns and to attain (or sustain) a large market share. A 
clear case of inefficient oligopoly is present.
TABLE 17
TOP TEN INSURANCE COMPANIES IN 1986
Life
Rank Company Premium (Drs) Market Share
1 Interamerican 4,796 41.4
2 Ethiki* 2,613 22.5
3 Agrotiki* 1,019 8.8
4 Astit* 660 5.7
5 Aspis-Pronoia 564 4.9
6 Phoenix* 500 4.3
7 Ellinobretaniki 326 2.8
8 Europaiki Pistis 187 1.6
9 Laiki 140 1.2
10 Ionian* 97 0.8
Top ten Total 10,902 94.0
Industry Total 11,596 100
Non-life
Rank Company Premium (Drs) Market Share
1 Ethniki* 8,143 27.7
2 Agrotiki* 3,619 12.3
3 Astir* 3,336 11.4
4 Phoenix* 3,068 10.5
5 Pomellinios 982 3.4
6 Intertrust 863 2.9
7 Magdeburger 749 2.5
8 Ionian* 728 2.5
9 Kosmos 704 2.4
10 Emporiki 501 1.7
Top ten Total 22,693 77.3
Industry Total 29,261 100
* Bank controlled insurance companies
Source: L'Argus 1987
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TABLE 18
INSURANCE MARKET IN 1986
Type of Companies Number Market Share
Domestic
Foreign
71
72
82%
18%
Total 143 100%
Source: Greek Institute of Insurance Studies (EIAS)
The Greek insurance sector is a highly oligopolistic one 
with a small number of state controlled insurance companies 
dominating the market. The degree of competition is 
therefore very limited. Competition is more apparent 
between the oligopolists rather than between the 
oligopolist group and the rest of the market. The Law 
Decree 1256/1982 and some administrative practices makes 
the state owned insurance companies to compete each other 
in attracting insurance business from the banks clients and 
from the State.
The state owned insurance companies with a large, for Greek 
standards, size control to a large extent the market 
conditions under which the private insurance companies 
operate. These conditions (such as prices and contracts) 
are directly controlled by the Ministry of Trade, but the
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administrative price structures and the type of products 
are mainly based on average production costs of the state- 
owned insurance companies and the type of contracts they 
usually offer respectively.
As far as the private sector is concerned, there are at 
present about 140 private individual companies authorized 
to write insurance business in Greece. But, the entry into 
the market is restricted. Half of the companies are foreign 
(see Table 18). However, their market share is very limited 
(only 18%). Some of them definitely exhibit high 
performance, but even so, they cannot challenge the big 
state owned insurance corporations because of the 
restrictions on their operations.
The Greek authorities are advocates of strong public 
ownership in the financial sector. Strong public sector is 
essential to ensure that the necessary volume of external 
finance is available to finance a sustained increase in 
certain type of industrial investment and to arrange the 
allocation of funds according to the social priorities 
rather than criteria of short-term private profits. Private 
institutions operating commercially in considering their 
investment policies look only at the returns to themselves. 
However, the loans bring also benefits to the borrowers. 
The allocation of funds according to the government
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priorities (i.e. to finance the huge budget deficit and 
some industrial investment with cheap funds), rather than 
according to benefits of the lenders establish an important 
economic case for strong public ownership in the financial 
sector.
Indeed, as it is pointed out elsewhere the authorities 
impose special requirements on the state-owned insurance 
concerns with regard to their investments. These special 
requirements have significant repercussions on their 
profitability and severely affect their ability to compete 
on an equal footing with private insurance institutions. As 
a result the national authorities have adopted regulatory 
provisions and administrative practices (which are 
presented in the various parts of the study) designed to 
influence the competitive balance as between state-owned 
and private insurance concerns in favour of the former. 
Furthermore, these regulatory provisions and administrative 
practices are also applied in order to strengthen the 
financial position of the state-owned insurance concerns so 
that they would be able to support the government policy. 
It seems, therefore, that the Greek government considers it 
necessary to have a specific policy with regard to the 
structure of the domestic financial sector.
However, these considerations are incompatible with the
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principle of an integrated financial market. In an 
integrated financial market interest rate parity is emerged 
and borrowers in high rate markets turn to savers in low 
rate markets to reduce their cost of capital. As a result 
capital is flown to areas where the returns are the 
highest. Furthermore, if an integrated market in financial 
services is to work, it will do so through an impetus of 
competition in the most regulated and oligopolistic 
dominated sectors, and through the provisions of services 
by the best operators in markets that are currently 
protected. The Greek government (with the other Member 
States governments) was assigned the task of creating a 
Common Market in financial services by 1992 but it seems 
that it does not realize the implications of an integrated 
market in financial services.
The various peculiarities of the operation of the Greek 
financial system are mainly due to country's economic 
problems. These are a huge government budget deficit and a 
bop deficit. The two attendant problems are, therefore, the 
financing of government expenditure and the financing of 
imports. The efficient utilization of scarce resources 
within the economy is the major reason behind the controls 
imposed on financial institutions. However, these controls 
are against the principles of integration which should lead 
to the promotion of greater competition through the
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liberalization of ossified national regulatory structures. 
The liberalization of the Greek financial sector is 
considered as not feasible in the not too distant future. 
Any move towards effective liberalisation of the financial 
system to permit greater competition and remove the 
constraints on the institutions would have to be done in 
v fairly gentle stages, to give time for the institutions to 
prepare for a new environment.
Furthermore, the liberalization of state controls would 
lead to an increase in the cost of money and to the lack of 
adequate capital which would be used to finance the public 
sector deficit requirements and certain sectors of economic 
activity. On the other hand, any attempt to reduce budget 
and bop deficits through public sector austerity takes time 
and (even more important) faces considerable political 
costs. In addition, the government will face increasingly 
the need for an allocational credit policy in view of the 
completion of the EC internal market for industrial goods 
since some sectors will face still competition from abroad.
Indeed, the integration of financial markets involves a 
loss of independence in two basic areas; a loss which some 
of the EC Member States will be reluctant to sustain. 
Firstly, the degree to which a Member State may influence 
its own monetary aggregates even under a flexible exchange
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rate is greatly reduced. Secondly, the ability to guide a 
flow of savings into preferred channels of investment is 
also significantly reduced. However, some Member States- 
especially the ones which are at the lowest level of 
development- rely heavily on the control of the allocation 
of credit to influence the structure of investment 
spending. This conflict between financial integration and 
independence in controlling the allocation of credit is 
magnified because the structural goals that are the object 
of allocational credit policy differ from country to 
country. In short, a high degree of financial market 
integration inevitably reduces the efficacy of a credit 
policy designed to produce a desired allocation of real 
resources; this is something that some Member States will 
not be able to accept.
The analysis of the structure of the Greek insurance 
industry leads us to some conclusions about the possible 
implication of the EC Directives and the consequent opening 
up of Europe's financial service markets. The traditional 
structure of the large state-owned companies which have 
never faced effective competition even in the domestic 
market and with an extensive home base and a small number 
of establishments abroad would undergo drastic changes. 
These companies would lose a substantial amount of business 
due to implementation of the EC Directives with respect to
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coinsurance and reinsurance. They would also face stiff 
competition from foreign and domestic insurance concerns 
operating domestically.
The Greek authorities could always invent ways of 
restricting the entry and operation of foreign concerns, 
but the implementation of the EC Directives will provide a 
more favourable environment for the operation of foreign 
concerns. Foreign concerns are relatively quick in 
exploiting opportunities, can develop more efficient 
marketing and production systems and are able to perform 
better that their slower-moving big state-owned insurance 
corporations. The amount of business that the state-owned 
insurance companies would lose from the abolition of Law 
Decree 1256/1982 would be substantial. The private concerns 
(domestic and foreign) operating nationally would 
significantly undermine the state owned insurance concerns' 
oligopoly position.
Next to this internal problem there would also be an 
external one: the opening up of Europe's financial services 
market to ensure that the best available operators within 
the Community is providing given services at any location. 
The state-owned insurance concerns would face competition 
in the domestic market from giant multinational insurers 
enjoying benefits of scale from their extensive global
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operations, possess larger capital, write a geographically 
widespread business, have easy access to international 
reinsurance and capital markets (and therefore are able to 
acquire factor inputs, such as risks capital and 
reinsurance, at a lower cost than the state-owned 
companies) and operate (as it is pointed out elsewhere) 
under a favourable supervisory system. Given these 
advantages the foreign based institutions would be able to 
provide better services and at lower prices than their 
rivals among the state owned insurance concerns. As a 
result, the state owned insurance industry would be 
squeezed by freedom of competition. The question is whether 
the national authorities will remain indifferent to these 
developments.
One might argue that all these are the implications of the 
creation of a real Common Market. The economic rational for 
liberalization derives from the theory of the comparative 
advantage. This theory predicts significant efficiency 
gains flowing to the world economy and to each country from 
a more efficient use of resources. The removal of barriers 
would give rise to a reallocation of resources. Resources 
would be transferred from activities in which the country 
does not possess a comparative advantage (such as insurance 
services) towards those activities in which its comparative 
advantage enables it to be internationally competitive
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(such as light industrial goods). As a result domestically 
owned resources, freed by the existence of a foreign supply 
of insurance, may result in a greater value of output 
elsewhere in the economy.
The comparative advantage concept predicts that the whole 
trading community benefits from free trade and every 
country is at least as well off with trade as with no 
trade. However, this concept does not mean that losses can 
be avoided from resulting structural changes. The extent of 
these losses depends very much on where the freed domestic 
resources would most likely to be deployed, and how quickly 
they could be so deployed. Furthermore, the applicability 
of the comparative advantage concept to insurance is still 
unresolved. There is nothing to guarantee that capital and 
labour released by the existence of a foreign supply of 
insurance will be used in the production of goods in which 
the country may have a greater comparative advantage.
Even more important is the fact that the national 
authorities seem to have a specific policy with respect to 
the structure of the domestic insurance sector. State-owned 
insurance concerns should acquire a dominant position 
within the national insurance sector in order to be able to 
support the state policy. The authorities have adopted 
regulatory provisions and administrative practices designed
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to influence the competitive balance as between state-owned 
and private insurance concerns in order to enable the 
former to attain (or sustain) a larger market share without 
being as efficient as they should be in order to justify 
their dominant size. The state-owned insurance concerns are 
very important in achieving some of the government's policy 
goals. The financial services sector is very important for 
the development of other sectors of the economy. This is 
the main reason behind the fact that freedom of trade in 
services lags so far behind freedom of trade in goods. And 
it will possibly continue to lag behind in the future.
On the other hand, progress in the EC is to a large extent 
a question of bargaining. However, the EC Commission has 
virtually nothing to bargain with, and persuade the Greek 
government to remove the economic protection which the 
national supervisory system provides. The policy for the 
completion of the internal market is not accompanied by a 
substantial increase in compensatory payments and sources 
of financing which would become available to some countries 
(especially those which are at the process of development) 
to alleviate the new process of integration.
Of course, the Member States have recently decided to 
increase the EC resources for redistributive purposes. 
However, it is considered that the doubling of these
resources over the course of four years are not adequate to 
enable the less advanced economies to meet the consequences 
of the completion of the internal market. The size of the 
resources available for redistributive purposes might be an 
important determinant of the level of integration than can 
be achieved. And it seems that the Community is not 
prepared to move beyond negative integration which may be 
necessary for the completion of the internal market.
The EC Commission believes that the multilateral removal of 
barriers within the EC would bring about a more intensive 
flow of reciprocal trade in insurance services. However, 
the present study indicates that such an action would 
likely bring rather dubious results. Greece (and other 
countries which are still in the process of development) is 
traditionally importer of insurance services and therefore 
is expected to expand these imports to a substantial extent 
after the dismantelling of the protective barriers to trade 
in international insurance services. On the other hand, a 
multilateral elimination of the protectionist measures 
against the provision of international insurance services 
would not bring about an expansion of Greek export 
activities since the Greek services production is not yet 
in a position to export and any external restriction or 
barrier have almost nothing to stop. Free trade seems to be 
only admissible in relations between countries that are
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structurally similar and not between developed and 
developing countries. For Greece, (and other developing 
countries) integration may only mean a uni-directional flow 
in services with no compensation.
In any discussion concerning the possible implications of 
the implementations of the EC Directives a great deal of 
emphasis should be placed on bop considerations since 
countries formulate their general commercial policies 
according to their international competitiveness.
The Greek insurance industry is rather uncompetitive. The 
bop is accounted with a deficit of the insurance sector as 
we can see from Table 19 which represents the importance of 
the insurance sector to the invisible balance and its 
payments and receipts. The insurance invisible payments 
represent 0.0078% of the total invisible payments, while 
the insurance invisible receipts represent only 0.0016% of 
the total invisible receipts. As a result, the insurance 
balance is in deficit of 9,317 million dollars while total 
balance of invisible experiences a substantial surplus. 
The deficit in the insurance accounts has been paid 
considerable attention by the national authorities (93) and 
this deficit is generated by reinsurance business. The 
development of the Greek reinsurance market lacks behind 
from the development of the insurance market. Unlike other
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Vcountries there are no specialized reinsurance companies in 
Greece.
The one and only specialized reinsurance company is the 
Hellenic Reinsurance Corporation which has been jointly 
established by the National Bank of Greece and the 
Commercial Bank of Greece? and its size relatively to the 
rest of the industry is limited. The large bank controlled 
insurance concerns play an important role in providing 
reinsurance coverage with the encouragement of the 
authorities, but they are relatively uncompetitive. The 
private sector insurance companies are not in a position to 
offer adequate reinsurance coverage to other Greek 
companies mainly due to their size and the amount of their 
share capital. Thus, the prospects of creating a 
competitive reinsurance market are rather limited? and as a 
consequence the Greek authorities will possibly continue to 
apply restrictions on reinsurance which is the most 
international of all insurance activities. In other words, 
the adoption of the EC reinsurance Directive would 
significantly deteriorate the insurance balance? something 
which the authorities could not accept.
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TABLE 19
INVISIBLE RECEIPTS AND PAYMENTS AND INSURANCE 
RECEIPTS AND PAYMENTS IN 1986
Thousand $
Total invisible receipts 
Insurance invisible receipts
6,511,660
10,999
0.0016%
Total invisible payments 
Insurance invisible payments
2,597,980
20,316
0.0078%
Total balance of invisibles 
Insurance balance
3,913,680
9,317
Source: Bank of Greece, Monthly Statistical
Bulletin, November 1987, and calculations by the author
Indeed, effects on bop position is a main motive that has a 
major influence in determining whether a country is 
prepared to operate an open market in insurance services. 
Greece (and some other Member States which are at a 
relatively low level of development) imposes severe 
restrictions on the international insurance transactions 
for bop considerations. The Greek bop suffers from deficits 
and the country was given a long traditional periods to 
adopt the Freedom of services Directive with respect to 
large commercial risks. Recently the Commission has 
considered proposals for Freedom of Services Directive for 
mass risks (a term to cover small commercial risks personal 
insurance and life assurance). The question is whether
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freedom of services with respect to mass risks will be able 
to be implemented. This question is answered by assessing 
the possible adverse effects of such a move on the bop in 
quantitative terms.
Insurance imports in the beginning result in an outflow of 
premium followed in time lag by a countervailing inflow of 
claims payments. The effects on the bop depends on the time 
lag. The longer the time lag the longer will be the effects 
on the bop since the smaller will be the reduction in the 
bop costs provided by the inflow of claims payments. Given 
the fact that life insurance has longer lag than non-life 
insurance the Member States which face bop problems will 
possibly find it very difficult to cope with a Freedom of 
Services Directive with respect to mass risks. Insurance 
transactions in mass risks would be limited by the 
regulations existing in countries facing bop problems.
The implementation of the EC Directives with respect to 
entry and operation of foreign insurance concerns may 
result in a lower direct bop cost than the supply of 
insurance on a services basis. One might argue, that as far 
as foreign concern established domestically are well 
managed develop efficient production and marketing systems 
and have easy access to international reinsurance and 
capital markets may be able to compete effectively with
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foreign based insurance concerns and reduce the bop costs 
accruing from the supply of insurance on a services basis. 
In this respect, the so-called "cumul” rule (which provides 
that the undertaking which have a branch or agency in the 
country of the risk cannot insure the risk though services) 
adopted by the Freedom of Services Directive could have 
important positive effects on the bop. It is, however, 
because foreign concerns would rely on international 
reinsurance and capital markets that the bop effects would 
be negative. Furthermore, the remittances to the parent 
organizations would increase substantially due to 
elimination of foreign exchange controls. To the extent 
that indigenous insurance concerns lose market share, this 
will tend to increase bop costs.
Generally speaking, bop considerations have always been a 
major factor leading to the erections of barriers to entry 
and establishment of foreign concerns and especially to 
international insurance transactions. Since Greece is not 
generally expected to put its bop in a sound footing these 
considerations would continue to exist even after 1992.
The degree of competitiveness of an industry depends very 
much on its stage of development.
The Greek insurance industry is relatively underdeveloped.
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It operates in a very small domestic market which in terms 
of premium income is the eleventh in the EC (see Table 20), 
however, the level of insurance per capita is a more proper 
indicator of a market's development since it takes into 
account population differences. Table 21 presenting details 
of per capita expenditure in each EC country reveals that 
the level of insurance per capita in Greece is the lowest 
in the EC.
The low level of insurance per capita can be explained by 
various factors. Insurance operation provides that the 
insurer undertakes to settle a claim if and when a claim is 
made. In the case of life assurance that promise may not 
need to be fulfilled for twenty or more years ahead. In a 
highly inflationary country the financial consequences may 
be serious for the policyholders, especially if the 
contracts are offered on a non-profit basis. Only 10% of 
the population is covered by life assurance, which is 
encouraged by only a small tax relief. Persons resident in 
Greece do not enter into long term contracts to acquire 
additional capital on retirements. In most of the European 
countries more than half of the assurance companies' 
activities concern pension insurance while in Greece this 
type of insurance is undertaken of only to a limited extent 
(94) .
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TABLE 20
PREMIUM INCOME IN EACH EEC MEMBER STATE 
($ MILLIONS)
Country Total % EEC Life % EEC Non Life % EEC
Premium , Premium Premium
WG 59,685 32.15 25,304 31.56 34,381 32.59
U.K. 45,804 24.67 27,201 33.93 18,603 17.64
F 36,440 19.63 14,108 17.69 22,260 21.20
I 14,452 7.78 2,641 3.29 11,811 11.20
NL 11,474 6.18 5,234 6.53 6,240 5.92
ES 5,319 2.87 1,088 1.36 4,231 4.01
B 5,057 2.72 1,400 1.75 3,657 3.47
D 3,806 2.05 1,579 1.97 2,227 2.11
Ir 2,180 1.17 1,283 1.60 897 0.85
P 783 0.42 76 0.09 707 0 i 67
G 461 0.25 14 0.18 320 0.30
L 192 0.10 46 0.06 146 0.14
Total EEC 185, 653 100% 80,173 100.00 105,480 100.00
Source: Sigma
TABLE 21
PER CAPITA EXPENDITURE ON INSURANCE ($) EEC RANKING
Country Total Life Non-life Total Life Non-life
WG 978 415 563 1 2 1
U.K. 807 479 328 2 1 7
NL 788 359 429 3 4 3
D 743 308 435 4 5 2
F 658 256 402 5 6 5
Ir 616 362 253 6 3 8
L 533 128 406 7 8 4
B 510 141 369 8 7 6
I 253 46 205 9 9 9
ES 183 28 109 10 10 10
P 76 7 69 11 12 11
G 46 14 32 12 11 12
EEC Average 576 248 327
US Averagel,536 621 915
Source: Sigma
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Furthermore, one might argue that insurance as a tertiary 
industry, it needs to be based on highly advanced economies 
and, on such, might not be deemed an appropriate activity 
for developing economies where a wide range of secondary 
industry has not yet been established. The current highly 
regulated environment is also another factor which lead to 
a low per capita demand for insurance in Greece. Policy 
wording and rates are closely monitored by the authorities 
and as a result over the last few years there has been very 
little product innovation.
The high level of inflation, the relatively low level of 
development of the secondary industry and the state policy 
lead to a low per capita demand for insurance in Greece. 
This low demand inhibits the development of the Greek 
insurance industry and this industry does not seem to be 
prepared to operate in an open market. On the other hand, 
however, the low level of insurance per capita makes the 
prospects encouraging. The expansion of demand for 
insurance may be sufficient in the future to lift the Greek 
insurance industry from its underdevelopment status.
However this can occur only in the very long run and until 
then the authorities will have considerable interests in 
delaying the implementation of the EC Directives and 
restricting the openness of the Greek market to foreign
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competition.
Recently the Greek insurance companies started carrying on 
a significant modernization effort. They are in the process 
of introducing new operating methods, expanding their 
communication systems and undertaking personnel training 
programmes. These initiatives form part of a policy 
designed to cope with the competitive environment that is 
emerging with the gradual unification of the European 
insurance market. However, the production of insurance is a 
labour-intensive activity, requiring a well-educated labour 
force, including a wide range of professional expertise in 
financial and other technical subjects. This kind of labour 
force seems to be lacking in Greece and this situation can 
not be changed in the next few years. There will be, 
therefore, good reasons for providing some kind of 
protection to the domestic financial system.
Furthermore, it is considered that the modernization effort 
cannot be successful if it is not accompanied by a gradual 
change of the current highly regulated environment to allow 
the Greek insurance industry to be more innovative and 
creative. However, the controls over policy wording and 
premium rates are seen by the national authorities as 
powerful protectionistic instruments capable of defending 
effectively the state-owned insurance concerns against
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competition within the isolated Greek insurance market and, 
therefore, are very difficult to be loosen.
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IMPEDIMENTS TO THE ADOPTION OF THE
HOME COUNTRY CONTROL PRINCIPLE
In this section the study presents other motives that have 
a major influence in determining whether Greece is prepared 
to operate in an open market in the not too distant future. 
These motives are related to regulatory provisions and 
administrative practices that are imposed on insurance 
firms (domestic and foreign) established in Greece for 
economic or prudential considerations or both. If these 
regulatory provisions and administrative practices are 
applied for economic considerations they will impose a 
heavy burden on the functioning of insurance concerns and 
restrict their ability to compete internationally. If they 
are applied for prudential considerations they are not only 
significantly affect the ability of established insurance 
concerns to compete on an equal footing with foreign based 
insurance companies; but they also give some indications of 
the authorities reluctance to permit imports of insurance 
services from foreign insurers that do not comply with 
these regulations with a view to protect policyholders from 
incompetent and unscrupulous foreign insurers. '
The study also provides some indications about the extent 
to which these regulatory provisions and administrative
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practices can be harmonized with those in the other Member 
States. The analysis leads to the conclusion that the 
national authorities would be reluctant to remove the 
economic protection and allow foreign based insurance 
concerns to supply services to the Greek market.
As a common practice the Greek authorities tightly control 
premium levels and insurance contracts. In the case of life 
assurance the premium levels should be approved by the 
Ministry of Trade before the respective companies obtain 
authorizations. Any change in the premium levels requires 
also the approval of the respective authority. The Ministry 
sets the bases and the assumptions which are used in the 
calculation of premiums. It also sets indicative rates 
which are almost compulsory since they should be taken 
considerably into account by the respective companies if 
they wish to obtain approval. As a result, the life 
assurance companies have almost equal premium levels.
In the case of general insurance the premiums are 
determined by the national authorities. The premium rates 
in the fire, motor and almost all the lines of accident 
insurance are fixed by the Ministry and are not allowed to 
fluctuate. Only in the cases of large fire risks, some 
lines of accident and theft insurance the companies can 
negotiate the rates with the interested parties but under
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the rule that the Ministry will be informed about the rates 
charged and intervene in the cases when the level of rates 
is not the appropriate one.
The administrative determination of premium levels 
prohibits price competition within the Greek insurance 
system. In fact, this is the intention of the national 
authorities. Intensive competition on the price level may 
undermine company solvency and thus the security provided 
for policyholders. If the insurance companies can set 
premiums freely and are eager to expand their market share 
they may take an over-optimistic view about future 
conditions and set the premiums too low with serious 
financial consequences for the companies themselves and 
their policyholders. The Greek authorities control closely 
the premium rates in order to avoid destructive competition 
between insurers with the objective of protecting 
policyholders' interest.
The national authorities also impose tight controls on 
insurance contracts. Contracts of insurance are governed 
not only by the rules of the general law of contract, but 
also by special provisions which are imperative in 
character in the sense that they admit of no exception or 
variation, not even by agreement between the parties to the 
contract.
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The general policy conditions are part of the insurance 
concerns' business plan and should be submitted to the 
Ministry before the respective companies obtain 
authorizations. The companies should also submit to the 
Ministry any alternation in them for explicit approval. The 
function of the supervisory authority is to ascertain that 
the contract conditions contain nothing contrary to the 
laws about contracts or the proper insurance practice.
Furthermore, the Ministry may require modifications on the 
contract conditions on the grounds that they are necessary 
to protect policyholders interests. The Ministry attempts 
to make contracts conditions as uniform as possible 
throughout the market in order to eliminate intensive 
competition between insurers since this competition 
undermines company solvency and the security provided for 
policyholders. The insurance supervisory authority 
considers that standardised policy conditions are necessary 
to avoid destructive competition between insurers with the 
objective of protecting policyholders interests.
The tight controls over policy wordings and rates are also 
used as a means of influencing the competitive balance as 
between state-owned and private insurance concerns in 
favour of the former. The administrative price structures
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are mainly based on average production costs of the state- 
owned companies. And the authorization for new contracts is 
granted only if these contracts can be issued by the state- 
owned companies.
The rigid system of controls on contracts and rates 
severely restricts the freedom of private insurers to 
determine the terms and conditions of their policies. It 
reduces the ability of the industry to adapt to the 
changing market practices or to consumers demand and to 
extend the range of products available or to modernize 
their presentation for the benefit of the consumer.
On the other hand, in other European countries the system 
of controls are more flexible. Policy conditions are 
submitted so the supervisory authorities for approval, but 
the authorities do not attempt to impose standardised 
policy conditions and the rates suggested by the 
authorities are merely indicative and not compulsory. The 
tight controls over policy wordings and rates have direct 
repercussions on private insurance concerns and affect 
considerably their ability to compete internationally.
Complete freedom of services means that companies being 
able to transact business anywhere in Europe in terms 
approved in their home territory and policyholders being
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able to buy where they wanted. The above considerations 
lead us to conclude that total freedom of services will be 
very hard to attain in the next few years.
As it has been pointed out prohibition and restrictions on 
insurance transaction are imposed in order to protect 
domestic policyholders from the insolvency of insurance 
companies. If an insurer is free to cover risks in another 
Member State without complying with legislation as regards 
rates and conditions, this may result in unfair competition 
and inadequate protection for policyholders. There should, 
therefore, be some harmonization of these aspects or an 
obligation to comply with the legislation of the country 
where the risk is situated.
Precisely because freedom of services requires this degree 
of harmonization it is difficult to be achieved. Consensus 
over large risk has been reached with respect to freedom of 
insurance transactions and a Directive has been adopted. 
However, the case for protecting policyholders from the 
consequences of buying insurance products of dubious 
quality is more persuasive in relation to individuals and 
small traders than for large companies since the latter are 
able to obtain sufficient information about the quality of 
the products and the solvency and reputation of any 
insurance company. There are, therefore, significant
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barriers in the process of adopting a freedom of services 
Directive with respect to mass risks.
It is considered that the effects of substituting the 
methods of mutual recognition for that of prior 
harmonization are rather unclear. This method obviously 
result to a minimum harmonization and therefore brings into 
competition not only financial undertakings but also 
national regulatory regimes. Through this method the 
Commission believes that Member States with strict 
regulatory regimes would deregulate their markets in order 
not to penalize the indigenous undertakings. However, the 
strictly regulated Member States may well retain their 
controls (especially if, as in the case of Greece, there 
are economic interests behind them) and resist competition 
and freedom of international financial transactions.
The Greek authorities control also the investment 
activities of insurance concerns. The controls over 
investments are imposed in principle by prudential 
considerations, -i.e. to prevent insurance concerns to 
undertake risky activities and therefore to protect the 
interests of the policyholders. In practice, however, they 
are used for economic considerations and basically with a 
view to finance part of the substantial government demand 
for capital.
449
The Law Decree 400/1970 clearly defines the various options 
and types of investment allowed to the insurance companies. 
Broadly speaking the insurance companies operating in
Greece may invest in deposits in Greek and foreign banks
\
established in Greece, in immovable property and in 
government bonds. The Law Decree recognizes that the funds 
invested by the insurance companies are funds belonging to 
the insured and therefore the investments are required to 
fulfil the conditions of maximum security. The concern for 
the pursue of a prudent investment policy and the 
protection of the policyholders is obvious in the 
regulatory framework.
In addition to the regulations which clearly defines the 
various types of investment the Law Decree sets 
requirements concerning the maximum proportion of funds 
that should be concentrated in some types of investment. 
However, this latter requirement is not observed by the 
companies. The private insurance concerns invest the 
largest part of their funds to government bonds and other 
assets issued by the State. The rate of return in this type 
of investment is directly negotiated by the respective 
companies and is the highest that can be achieved, 
especially after the imposition of a tax on immovable 
property. The private insurance industry is encouraged to
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invest almost exclusively in government bonds and thus to 
finance part of the substantial government demand for 
capital.
Private insurers may also invest a considerable amount of 
their funds to the domestic capital market. However, Greece 
does not possess the sophisticated capital market insurance 
companies require. The domestic market offers very limited 
opportunities. On the other hand, foreign exchange control 
regulations prohibits insurance concerns operating in 
Greece to transfer funds abroad, to invest them in the 
international financial markets which offer higher expected 
yields. Obviously, these controls substantially restricts 
the ability of financial institutions to pursue an 
independent and profitable investment policy and to compete 
on an equal footing against foreign based institutions at 
the international level. Foreign based institutions invest 
in the international financial markets and achieve higher 
returns; and this may be reflected in lower premium rates.
As it has been pointed out elsewhere insurance concerns do 
not merely provide insurance services but they are also 
involved in the mobilization and allocation of capital 
funds. This role is very important to the national economic 
interests. Any action taken by the authorities to protect 
the economy from an outflow of capital and to channel the
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capital to certain types of investment is understandable, 
especially in a developing country suffering by a scarcity 
of funds. What is not understandable is how this situation 
will change after 1992.
The state-owned insurance concerns enjoy less freedom as to 
their choice of investment. The national authorities 
require them to support certain shares in the stock 
exchange. More than 30% of their investment consist of 
share of problem firms and other large overindebted 
enterprises. The state-owned insurance are required to 
support the state-owned banks in their efforts to restore 
the problem firms and other large overindebted enterprises 
to health.
Obviously the authorities impose special requirements on 
the state-owned insurance concerns with regard to their 
investments. These special requirements have significant 
repercussions on their profitability and severely affect 
their ability to compete not only internationally, but also 
with private institutions established domestically. As a 
result, the national authorities have adopted regulatory 
provisions and administrative practices (which are 
presented in the various parts of the study) designed to 
influence the competitive balance as between state-owned 
and private insurance concerns in favour of the former.
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The insurance companies in Greece enjoy only very limited 
freedom over their investment policy. Profitable investment 
operations have proved difficult to achieved because of the 
constrains imposed by national authorities. The EC 
Insurance Coordination Directives provide that the Member 
States may impose their rules with respect to investment. 
Indeed, it is very difficult to harmonize their investment 
rules of the Member States due to different economic 
interests involved.
The EC strategy designed to integrate the financial markets 
by substituting the principle of mutual recognition for 
that of prior harmonization tries to force the strictly 
regulated states to reduce their regulatory constraints on 
the insurance concerns in order not to jeopardise their 
external development.
As a result, harmonization of government regulation will 
take place at a later stage. Obviously, the Commission 
considers that the government involvement within the 
financial markets are solely motivated by prudential 
considerations.
However, motives in control of financial markets arise not 
only from the need to protect the stability of the
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financial system, but also from the desire to attain 
particular macroeconomic and social objectives. This is 
particularly true in the case of a developing country such 
as Greece. The financial system is a very important channel 
for the exercising of government economic policy and thus a 
great deal of government regulation of insurance is 
directed towards this aim. This regulation imposes cost on 
these institutions in terms of profitability and 
considerably affect their ability to compete at the 
international level, but it is imposed with much wider 
goals in mind mainly full employment and long term economic 
growth. These goals could be achieved through many forms, 
but in the case of Greece the direct manipulation of the 
domestic financial market is considered as the most 
effective and politically acceptable one.
The Greek authorities have assumed a very active role in 
regulating investment policies and therefore have vital 
economic interests in resisting competition. The insurance 
companies are a major pillar for the whole economy 
providing cheap finance for the budget deficit and for an 
important part of the Greek industry.
The need for instituting protectionist measures against the 
unrestricted provision of international insurance services 
may not only relate to consumer protection or economic
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considerations. The State in erecting barriers may have 
other motives in perspective political and financial. 
Indeed, the taxation system has a major influence in
determining whether a country is prepared to break down
barriers in international transactions in insurance 
services and operate in an open market. Although an
extensive report of the taxation treatment with respect to 
insurance is outside the scope of this study it is
necessary to give some indications about certain aspects of 
the taxation treatment in order to present a more 
comprehensive view of the conditions under which insurance 
companies operate in Greece.
According to some insurers the Greek tax insurance rates 
rank among the highest in Europe. As far as products 
taxation is concerned, premiums are subject to high rate 
specific taxes which differ according to the line of 
business and the nature of insured risks: car 4%, fire 30%, 
life 9.5%. In Germany the respective figures are 5%, 5%, 0% 
and in Netherlands 4%, 12%, 0%. Payment of premiums for
life insurance give rise to a tax credit for the insured 
party equal to 15% of the part of the premium, limited to 
Dr 100,000, while the corresponding figure for Germany is 
25%. In Greece the life assurance policies enjoy a 
relatively (with most of the other European countries) 
small tax relief while taxes are also imposed on receipts
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for payments of benefits whose average rate is around 7%. 
Furthermore, premiums for accident, health and life 
insurances do not give rise to a tax allowance of the 
insured person something which is an established practice 
in most European countries.
As far as insurance companies taxation is concerned, in 
Greece the companies are taxed at a rate of 58% on retained 
earnings and 40% on distributed profits. These rates are 
considered to be among the highest in Europe. Life 
insurance companies are not subject to any beneficial 
treatment while in many European countries these companies 
are allowed to deduct from their taxable income the part of 
their financial income attributable to policyholders. The 
taxation regime impacts on the premium rates or bonuses 
payable on the policies. In Greece taxes are fairly high 
since the insurance industry is seen as a major provider of 
tax revenue. The tax treatment imposes a heavy burden on 
the functioning of insurance companies established in 
Greece and restrict their ability to compete with foreign 
based insurers which enjoy favourable tax treatments.
Financial and political motives in retaining barriers in 
international transactions in insurance services may arise 
from the strong desire to raise revenue for the State. In 
Greece direct taxation is very small and any increase in
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the level of direct taxation involves high political cost. 
Moreover, once imposed it is difficult to administer and 
subject to evasion. The people feel little responsibility 
for financing government and the attitude of escaping as 
much tax as possible is widespread. Usually greater scope 
for income tax evasion exists for the self-employed rather 
than for the employees whose income tax is deducted at 
source by their employers. The opportunities for tax 
evasion are great in Greece since it is estimated that 
about one-fourth of the Greek workforce are self-employed. 
Furthermore, the issue of tax evasion arises most obviously 
in the context of the black economy which in a developing 
country such as Greece appears to be relativley large.
For all these reasons the Greek authorities look out for 
obvious signs of property-owning or wealth that by their 
visibility can be more easily taxed. This is the main 
motivation behind the high tax insurance rates in Greece. 
Taxation makes insurance companies tax-collecting agents 
that mobilize the adequate resources required by the 
government to finance its activities.
The issue of tax treatment is important, in non-life and 
even more so in life, where it is far more complex not just 
as regards taxation of premiums, but also with respect to 
deductibility and taxation of benefits. With the present
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tax treatment, freedom of international transactions in 
insurance services for Greece means de-nationalization of 
insurance and savings. The national authorities would 
obviously not remain indifferent to this. The taxation 
treatment would be a serious obstacle to the liberalisation 
of international insurance transactions in the case of 
Greece.
As far as the tax climate is concerned, it is rather 
evident than an important element of the main political 
parties in the Greek parliament is that a reduction in the 
budget deficit should be pursued as one of the major aims 
in the coming years. There are already concrete plans for 
future tax increases prepared by the Ministry of Finance. 
Even if, for the time being, it can not be anticipated when 
and to what extent those plans will be enacted, it is fair 
to say that a tax reduction is considered as highly 
unlikely due to large Public Sector Borrowing Requirements.
The analysis leads to the conclusion that the national 
authorities would be reluctant to eliminate the barriers to 
freedom of financial services and adopt the principle of 
home country control. Some people in Greece believe that by 
the end of 1992 the country will open up its financial 
market to the rest of the EC and a Common Market in 
financial services will be created. Such hopes and
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expectations, however, seem to be totally out of line with 
reality. The fragmentation of the markets would remain 
significant.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The Commission's White Paper published in 1985 commits the 
EC to realizing by the end of 1992 a Common Market not only 
for goods but also for services including financial 
services. To achieve this purpose the Commission has 
shifted the emphasis away from systematic harmonization of 
national supervisory systems and in favour of the home 
country control principle based on the mutual recognition 
by EC Member States of each others' systems. This policy 
implies a sufficient minimum harmonization in order to make 
the concept of mutual recognition acceptable. However, the 
analysis leads to the conclusion that a Common Market in 
financial services in its most liberal sense will be very 
difficult to establish in the foreseeable future.
First of all, whatever the Commission might say, its policy 
does not seem to limit the powers of the domestic 
authorities to place and retain barriers to trade in 
financial services. Despite the intentions of the 
Directives, government action can inhibit entry and 
establishment of foreign financial organizations through 
restrictions on foreign equity participations in indigenous 
institutions. The Commission has up to now made significant 
attempts to eliminate impediments to the establishment of 
foreign branches but it did not do so with respect to 
foreign subsidiaries. The adoption of Directives designed 
to abolish restrictions and coordinate the regulatory
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provisions with respect to acquisition by foreign financial 
organizations of participation in indigenous institutions 
should be an indispensable part of any strategy designed to 
integrate the financial sectors. Even if the difficulties 
facing the Commission in its task are recognized, it 
appears that its strategy does not promise a comprehensive 
approach to integrating the European financial markets into 
one unit.
Furthermore, the analysis suggests that the fragmentation 
of the European capital markets would persist due to vast 
divergence in practical and philosophical approaches to 
prudential supervision and national economic and political 
interests involved among the developed EC countries. It is 
in the system of prudential regulation and supervision that 
the U.K. differs most from the other European countries 
because there is no specification of strict rules. 
Supervision is conducted without any published framework 
with the authorities indicating in general terms the 
criteria on which they base their judgements. This is a 
very flexible system, too flexible and loose for many other 
countries in Europe.
In the U.K. supervisory system special emphasis is placed 
on the suitability and competence of those actively 
involved in the management of a financial institution since
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the prime responsibility for relating its soundness lies 
with its own management. A fundamental issue in this regard 
is the perception that the interests of good managements 
and of the supervisory authorities are one: the development 
of sound financial practices which generate confidence in 
those who use their services. Furthermore, it is considered 
that the marketplace in determining the success or failure 
of an institution is capable of imposing an acceptable 
degree of discipline on its members. In this respect, the 
U.K. authorities try to reinforce disciplines inherent in 
the market process through the more frequent disclosure of 
information about the conditions of institutions, the 
existence of Consumers Guaranteed Systems which provide 
some indications that some institutions may be allowed to 
fail, the extensive regulatory provisions relating to 
sanctions imposed on institutions that engage in unsound 
business practices, and the informality of public 
intervention in problem cases.
According to the U.K. authorities a flexible supervisory 
system is effective, since it permits the adaptation of the 
system to the changing market practices, and is essential 
for fair supervision. The adoption of rigid rules that are 
applied uniformly to the supervised financial institutions 
with no regard to their considerable degree of diversity 
entails competitive inequalities. Even more important is
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the fact that the operation of a flexible supervisory
system arises, from the authorities' perception of the need 
to adapt the prudential system in such a way so as not to 
stifle the benefits in terms of efficiency resulting from a 
more dynamic and competitive environment. The U.K. 
authorities take account on the one hand of the continuing 
tension and need to reconcile the objective of achieving a 
more efficient financial system through competition, and on 
the other hand of the absolute need to safeguard the
financial stability of institutions and the public 
confidence in the system, and place emphasis on market 
discipline and f,self-disciplineM as complements to official 
prudential supervision.
However, the authorities of the continental European 
countries consider that flexible supervision on the day to 
day running of the institutions moves in a direction 
inconsistent with the objective of preserving the integrity
of the financial system. In a highly competitive
environment even honest management may engage in risky 
business, in a quest for higher profits or/and market 
share, with considerable repercussion for the solvency of 
the respective institutions.
Furthermore, the degree of emphasis that should be placed 
on market discipline as a complement to prudential
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supervision should depend on the extent to which market 
responses to signs of strains developing in an institution 
are developed in a direction consistent with the objective 
of preserving the integrity of the financial system. 
Considerable doubts have been raised about the reliability 
of the stabilization effect and concern has been expressed 
that reliance on market discipline might lead to further 
instability due to over-reaction by the market to changes 
in an institution's financial situation. The effect of 
market discipline depends on the perception of the
authorities' responses to the prospects of failure of an 
institution. If it is commonly known that the authorities 
stand ready to intervene in problem cases not only the
private control mechanism is weakened but also the
potential for excessive risk taking is increased.
The conflict between regulation and competition in the
financial system is one of the unresolved problems of 
economic policy and the continental European countries - in 
stark contrast to the U.K. -consider that the costs of 
regulation in terms of competition, prices, innovation and 
variety of services are outweighed by its benefits i.e. 
protection against the risk that some sizeable parts of the 
system as a whole may collapse. It is perfectly apparent 
that the differences in the supervisory philosophies are 
substantial and these reflect divergent interests.
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It seems that the U.K. authorities place a great deal of 
emphasis on the interests of the shareholders rather than 
on those of the consumers and the public in general. The 
rules of the game as formulated by the present regulatory 
regime benefits the bankers and the insurers at the expense 
of the public. In addition, the process of consultation and 
dialogue between the authorities and the financial 
community enables the latter to influence and manipulate 
public policy in its favour. This community would express 
strong opposition against any move toward strengthening the 
prudential controls in the U.K.
Furthermore, the evidence suggests that the UK possesses a 
comparative advantage in the provision of financial 
services and the U.K financial industry seems particularly 
well placed to take advantage of any moves towards a single 
market. However, this comparative advantage seems to be 
based to a considerable extent on government control. One 
effect of harmonization of regulation within Europe would 
be to erode to a significant extent the comparative 
advantage in the provision of financial services that the 
U.K. has been enjoying for so many years with considerable 
repercussions for the industry and the economy as a whole.
In addition, the main reason often given for London's
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strength in finance is the low level of regulation in its 
markets. The possible outcome of the strengthening of the 
U.K. prudential controls, as a result of harmonization at 
the EC level, would be to put London's market on an equal 
footing with the rest of Europe and drive business abroad: 
not only to other European centres but also to other 
financial centres outside Europe. However, London as an 
international financial centre plays an important role to 
the benefit of the U.K. It makes a very substantial 
positive contribution to the favourable invisible balance 
and the U.K. has much to lose if EC introduces additional 
controls on the entry and operation of financial 
institutions that would undermine its prominent position in 
finance. The U.K. authorities have therefore substantial 
economic interests in opposing any trend towards tighter 
regulation.
In stark contrast to the U.K., the authorities of the 
continental European countries attach priority in the 
interests of the public rather than those of the 
shareholders. In particularly, Germany represents the 
opposite extreme case and the security of the consumer and 
the financial system as a whole is maintained by strict 
supervision. The consequences of the lack of this type of 
consumer protection policy were revealed after the Second 
World War when consumers lost most of their savings. The
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authorities of the continental European countries would, 
therefore, oppose any trend towards loosening the 
prudential controls. They believe that the continental 
system provides protection for the consumers and that the 
U.K. system is weak. The events of the early 70's still 
live in their memory as proof that the consumer is 
inadequately protected.
Complete freedom of financial services would mean financial 
institutions being able to open branches and transact 
business anywhere in Europe on the terms approved by the 
home supervisory authorities. Without some harmonization of 
national supervisory standards some continental countries 
would consider the degree of protection provided to their 
residents as inadequate and unacceptable. Precisely because 
complete freedom of financial services requires this degree 
of harmonization it is difficult to be achieved. In the 
U.K. there is considerable opposition to any additional 
control. In the continental countries there is a strong 
belief that strict supervision is the only effective method 
of consumer protection. It is difficult to see room for 
compromise particularly within the timescale.
Against this background the EC Commission tries to bring 
about home country control before the end of 1992. However, 
the future is not free from areas of potential controversy
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between the U.K. and the continental European countries.
In the case of banking, the continental countries impose 
certain prudential limitations in the scope of permissible 
activities which banks may undertake directly or 
indirectly. The limitations arise as a response to 
prudential considerations and concentration of power. In 
the U.K. there are no such restrictions and the credit 
institutions get involved in the provision of certain "non- 
banking" products. To allow fair competition and achieve 
the adoption of the Second (draft) Coordination Directive 
there is a need to harmonize supervisory controls on the 
range of banking business. The adoption of the respective 
Directive would imply that foreign banking institutions may 
have wider or narrower fields of activity (unless this is 
invoked by the host Member State on grounds of "public 
good"): an arrangement which some Member States would
greatly oppose.
For the purpose of monitoring banking solvency in the U.K. 
the capital base is defined to include elements (such as 
subordinated debt) which are not permanently available to 
meet current losses and which make British banks appear 
better capitalized than in fact they are. These elements 
are not considered as components of capital for supervisory 
purposes in the other European countries. Furthermore, the
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Bank of England assesses banks' solvency on a case-by-case 
basis without setting any specific minimum solvency limit 
that the institutions should observe. The U.K. authorities 
make implicit judgements of whether funds are adequate in 
stark contrast to other European authorities which have 
adopted explicit measures of capital adequacy.
Freedom of banking services demands a certain degree of 
harmonization over solvency controls if the continental 
countries do not consider the degree to protection provided 
to their residents as inadequate and the UK to have an 
unfair competitive position. Given the large differences 
between the practical and philosophical approaches to 
solvency supervision it is hard to see how there would be 
significant advances towards harrhonization in the 
foreseeable future.
As far as prudential controls on risk concentration is 
concerned, the Bank of England's policy is determined on a 
case-by-case basis taking into account the particular 
characteristics of individual banks in stark contrast to 
the other European authorities which impose strict 
statutory controls on banks' risks exposure. The lack of 
equivalent controls on risk concentration would constitute 
a formidable impediment on the way of granting parental 
supervision over foreign banks.
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In the U.K. the control of banking liquidity takes place 
flexibly and in the context of regular discussion with the 
management, while liquidity ratios, setting statutory 
proportions between certain liquid assets and prescribed 
liabilities, are applied in a large number of continental 
European countries. Controls over liquidity are one of the 
most important difference between the U.K.'s and 
continental countries' supervisory systems and this 
difference would constitute a significant barrier to 
freedom of banking services in the years to come.
In the case of insurance of mass risks, the continental 
European countries impose strict prudential restrictions on 
premium rates. The authorities lay down the bases or 
assumptions to be used in the calculation of the premium 
and this results in virtually uniform premium rates. In the 
U.K. there are no such controls and insurance companies are 
allowed to offer policies at the rate they prefer. Without 
a certain degree of harmonization of premium controls the 
continental authorities would worry about competitive 
distortions and inadequate consumer protection.
The continental countries also control the policy 
conditions and the issue of policies requires prior 
authorization. In the U.K. there are no such controls and
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the range of policies is much wider. The freedom to supply 
insurance services across borders with respect to mass 
risks will be very difficult to be granted without first 
carrying out a sufficient harmonization of the prudential 
controls of policy conditions.
In most countries the supervisory authorities control the 
investment policy in order to ensure the viability of the 
company and the security provided to policyholders. In 
contrast, the British companies enjoy the freedom to invest 
their fund virtually wherever they like. Again 
harmonization is needed if the U.K. is not considered to 
have an unfair competitive advantage and the policyholders 
are not deemed to be inadequately protected.
The dispute over composites seems to be a serious obstacle 
to insurance activities in the EC. Most of the continental 
countries would be unwilling to allow British composites to 
offer services in both classes in their countries while 
their indigenous companies could not. On the other hand, 
in the U.K. many of the leading companies are composites 
engaged in both classes of business. The U.K. authorities 
would be reluctant to reassess the permissible activities 
of their insurance companies.
The issue of fiscal harmonization is also important.
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Freedom of insurance transactions and lack of harmonization 
with respect to taxation create a degree of distortion of 
competition and would lead to a de-nationalization of 
insurance and savings. Unequal tax regimes can give rise to 
competitive imbalances and therefore harmonization of tax 
regulations is a necessary prerequisite to freedom of 
insurance services. However, an acceptable degree of tax 
harmonization is rather difficult to be achieved. In the 
U.K. the authorities believe that there should be a low 
burden of taxation on business in order to encourage 
competitiveness and expansion of business, while other 
European authorities see the insurance industry as a major 
provider to tax revenue.
The Council of Ministers has reached agreement on a 
insurance services Directive with respect to "large risks" 
without any harmonization of controls over premium rates, 
policy conditions, investment policy and taxation. However, 
the same step cannot be taken with respect to "mass risks" 
without prior harmonization. The case for protecting 
policyholders against the consequences of bad bargains is 
much more persuasive in relation to individuals and small 
traders than it is to large buyers of insurance who have 
sufficient bargaining power to negotiate fair conditions 
and are able to obtain sufficient information about the 
solvency and reputation of any insurance concern whether
domestic or foreign. Furthermore, the effects of the 
distortion of competition due to unequal tax regimes are 
much more important in the case of life assurance since it 
is in direct competition with the other forms of investment, 
and savings.
Obviously the wide differences in national regulatory 
standards and the need for fair competition and prudence 
undermine the principle of mutual recognition upon which 
the success of 1992 heavily depends. The principle of home 
country control would clash with the wish of governments to 
ensure that they are in a position to protect their 
residents and the rival principle of host country control 
is expected to have a strong following.
In analyzing the rationales that exist for imposing 
restrictions on the entry, establishment, operation and 
market access of financial institutions in the case of a 
developing country such as Greece, it appears that those 
differ considerably from those of the developed countries. 
The placing of strict barriers to trade in international 
financial services is used mainly as support for protection 
of the domestic financial sector and financial 
protectionism, rather than as a means of consumer 
protection. Indigenous financial institutions are seen as 
not being sufficiently developed and equipped to withstand
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competition from more sophisticated foreign institutions. 
The enhancement of the local capital supply is considered 
to be of enormous importance to the developing countries as 
a means of supporting domestic economic development. The 
funds channelled into the domestic capital market can be 
used for investment in government securities and for 
financing specific projects in the private sector of the 
economy. For these reasons the authorities limit cross 
border international financial operations and keep control 
over the number and size of foreign institutions allowed to 
operate in the domestic market.
The Greek authorities are advocates of a strong state 
ownership in the financial system in order to effect the 
allocative efficiency of the market. Public ownership is 
essential to arrange the allocation of funds according to 
social priorities rather than criteria of short term 
private profits. However, these considerations are 
incompatible with the principle of an integrated financial 
market in which capital would flow to areas where the 
returns are the highest. In principle, the philosophy of 
control over the Greek financial system conflicts with the 
philosophy of a Common Market in financial services.
In the case of developing countries, given the degree of 
sophistication and development of the domestic market, the
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unification of the European financial sectors would imply a 
substantial reduction in the market share of the indigenous 
financial institutions and a considerable reduction in 
their business. The traditional structure of the large 
domestic financial companies which have never faced 
effective competition and with an extensive home base and a 
small number of establishments abroad would undergo drastic 
changes within an integrated European financial market. The 
national authorities have perfectly legitimate fears about 
the effects of the freedom of financial services on the 
domestic financial sector. This sector could be overwhelmed 
by complete freedom of competition.
Of course, one might argue that all these are the 
implications of the creation of a real Common Market and 
that if the developing countries are entitled to export 
light industrial goods then it is only right that other 
countries should be able in return to provide to the 
developing countries financial services. However, the 
developing countries are able to experience a relatively 
good export performance in light industrial good due to a 
strong domestic financial sector. Indeed, the financial 
sector is somehow different from industrial or commercial 
activities insofar as the financial sector plays a special 
role in the development of other sectors of the economy and 
in the attainment of national policy goals. This is the
476
main reason behind the fact that freedom of trade in 
financial services lags so far behind trade in goods? and 
there are reasons why it might continue to lag behind in 
the future.
The elimination of restrictions on market access by foreign 
financial institutions not established in the country would 
have considerable repercussions for the economies of 
developing countries. The intensification of the shortage 
of foreign exchange and savings to finance investment will 
restrict the growth of potential GNP and employment. The 
development process will be halted at the time that the 
authorities try to achieve faster growth rates in order to 
match the level of economic development of other European 
countries.
On the other hand, the EC budget could play an important 
role as cushioning the impact of external pressures on the 
domestic economy. Indeed, the Member Sates have recently 
decided to increase to a considerable extent the EC 
resources for redistributive purposes. However, it is 
considered that the doubling of these resources over the 
course of four years is not adequate to alleviate the new 
process of integration. The size of the resources available 
for redistributive purposes might be an important 
determinant of the level of integration that can be
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achieved.
The analysis leads to the conclusion that the authorities 
of the developing countries would not be able to accept the 
disadvantages that arise from the need to implement the EC 
Directives designed to integrate the European financial 
markets. The EC Commission believes that the multilateral 
elimination of barriers within the EC would bring about a 
more intensive flow of reciprocal trade in financial 
services. However, it is considered that such an action 
would likely bring rather dubious results. The countries 
that are still in the process of development are 
traditionally importers of financial services and therefore 
are expected to expand these imports to a substantial 
extent after the elimination of their effective barriers. 
On the other hand, a multilateral dismantling of barriers 
would not bring about an expansion of export activities 
since its production of services is not yet in a position 
to export and any external barriers have almost nothing to 
stop. For the developing EC countries integration may only 
mean a uni-directional flow in services with no 
compensation.
Furthermore the study identifies and evaluates other 
factors that have a major influence in determining whether 
a country is prepared to operate in an unified financial
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market based on the principle of home country control in 
the not too distant future. These factors are mainly 
related to controls that range over a the whole spectrum of 
monetary and credit policies and are designed to achieve a 
variety of objectives including the promotion of industrial 
expansion and export activity and the finance of budget 
deficit.
Given the obvious domestic saving constraints, it is 
essential that developing countries have a financial system 
which is capable of allocating the scarce national surplus. 
As a result strong restrictions are imposed on portfolio 
policies of the financial institutions and affect the 
ability of the latter to compete at the international 
level. If foreign financial institutions were free to 
operate in the developing countries without complying with 
these restrictions, this would undoubtedly be deemed to 
constitute unfair competition against the indigenous 
institutions. The authorities of the developing countries 
could not therefore accept a measure which would bring 
about home country control in the near future.
It is considered that the effects of substituting the 
methods of mutual recognition for that of prior 
harmonization are rather unclear. This method obviously 
results in minimum harmonization and therefore brings into
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competition not only financial undertaking but also 
national regulatory regimes. According to the Commission, 
this competitive imbalance would force the strictly 
regulated States to reduce their regulatory constraints.
Obviously, the Commission considers that the government 
involvement within the financial markets are solely 
motivated by prudential considerations. However, a 
rationale for government involvement within a financial 
market can be constructed based not only on the stability 
of the financial system but also on the need to attain 
particular macroeconomic objectives. The Commission does 
not take into account that government regulation in the 
developing countries can be used to influence investment 
behaviour and promote macroeconomic stability. The 
harmonization of this kind of regulation will be very 
difficult to attain since it reflects vital national 
economic interests.
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PROPOSAL FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The present study is considered as overambitious in the 
sense that it attempts to provide a comprehensive analysis 
of the challenge to barriers in the way of the 
liberalization of financial services with reference to only 
two countries. The collection of the two countries does not 
offer an exhaustive treatment of the subject. In the U.K. 
case study impediments on the adoption of the home country 
control principle are identified and evaluated in the light 
of divergence of supervisory philosophies and practices 
between the U.K. and the continental European countries. 
However, different practical and philosophical approaches 
to prudential supervision exist also between the 
continental countries themselves. Obviously more case 
studies should be undertaken in order to achieve a more 
comprehensive analysis. Furthermore, the difficulty with 
case studies, is that they can lead to generalizations 
which might prove too simple. More case studies are 
necessary to test the conclusions.
%
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APPENDIX
Components of capital base
Funds included without limit
1 share capital
2 minority interest in consolidated subsidiaries
3 general reserves (including hidden reserves if 
permitted)
4 provisions
Funds included with limits (items included in this 
category must not exceed 50% of the total 
items included in A above less intangible 
assets)
1 Preferred shares that do not mature or mature 
on a fixed date and have an original maturity 
of at least 25 years
2 Subordinated debt that is available at all 
times to absorb losses, and provides that 
interest payments may be deferred if the 
issuer does not make a profit in the 
preceding period and/or pay dividends on 
common and perpetual preferred stock
Adjusted capital base
Deductions from the capital base of:
1 all intangible assets
2 investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries and 
associated companies
3 bank holdings of capital instruments of other 
banking organisations
The Risk Asset Weighting Structure
0% weight given to:
1 all domestic balances with and claims on Bank 
of England
2 domestic government guaranteed export and 
ship-building loans
10% weight given to:
1 short-term claims on the UK and Northern 
Ireland governments
2 short-term claims on discount houses, gilt-
edged market makers and Stock Exchange money 
brokers
25% weight given to:
1 cash items in process of collection - foreign
and domestic
2 short-term claims on UK and Northern Ireland 
governments
3 all claims (including repurchase agreements) 
fully collateralised by UK and Northern 
Ireland government debt
4 all local currency claims on foreign central
governments to the extent funded by local
currency liabilities in that foreign country
50% weight given to:
1 all claims on UK and Northern Ireland 
government-sponsored agencies
2 claims on multinational development 
institutions in which the domestic government 
is a shareholder or contributing member
100% weight given to:
1 long-term claims on domestic depository 
institutions and foreign banks
2 all claims on foreign governments other than 
local currency claims on foreign central 
governments funded by local currency 
liabilities in that foreign country
3 net open position in foreign exchange
4 all other assets
Off balance sheet items
The face amount of these items would be multiplied 
by the credit conversion factors shown below and the 
resulting amount would be slotted in the appropriate 
risk category depending upon the identity of the 
obliger and the maturity of the instrument where 
appropriate.
1 "Direct credit substitutes" (financial 
guarantees and standby letters of credit 
serving same purpose and, acceptances 
outstanding) - 100% credit convention factor
2 "Trading contingencies" (for example,
commercial letters of credit, bid and 
performance bonds and performance standby 
letters of credit) - 50% credit conversion
factor
3 Sale and repurchase agreements and assets
sales with resource if not already included on 
the balance sheet - 100% credit conversion
factor
4 Other commitments, for example overdrafts,
revolving underwriting facilities (for 
e x a m p l e ,  R U F s / N I F s ) , u n d e r w r i t i n g  
committments, commercial and consumer credit 
lines. The credit conversion factors are:
10% - one year and less original maturity 
25% - over one to five years original maturity 
50% - over five years original maturity
Risk asset ratio
Adjusted capital base as percentage of Adjusted
total of risk assets
Gearing ratio
Adjusted capital base as a percentage of deposits
and other non-capital liabilities.
INTERVIEWS
Two officers of Directorate for Financial 
Institutions DG XV of the EC Commission
F Brener Bank of England
An officer of the Bank of England
J Young Lloyds Bank
D Green Midland Bank
A Tret Hessische Landesbank
(in the UK)
T Bucci Banca Commercialle Italiana
(in the UK)
Three officers from the Bank of Greece
D Agelides National Bank of Greece
N Gristou Commercial Bank of Greece
A Xanthopoulos Nat West Bank (in Greece)
J Roger Barclays Bank (in Greece)
J Paizi American Express Bank
(in Greece)
A Portokalakis Arab Helenik Bank (in Greece)
A Niuolaidis Credit Commercial de France
^in Greece)
An officer of the Chartered Insurance Institute
K Doerr Commercial Union Assurance
(ABI)
M Ayling Aegon Insurance
P Maston Eagle Star
E Samoull Ministry of Trade
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D Petras 
L Laskaridis 
A Varsamis 
T Papafilakis
D Traganou 
P Danakis 
V Paipetis
Ethniki
Agrotiki
Ioniki
Nationale Netherlande 
(in Greece)
Alico (in Greece)
Deutsche Victoria (in Greece)
Cigna (in Greece)
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